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1Introduction
Democracy and democratisation
Since the early 1970s a ‘third wave’ of democratisation has swept the
world. In the period 1972–94 the number of democratic political systems
doubled from 44 to 107. And by the mid-1990s 58 per cent of the 
world’s states had adopted democratic governments.1 These momentous
developments have led political scientists to re-examine the theoretical
literature on democratisation, and to compare the current transitions in
the post-communist bloc with earlier transitions in Latin America and
Southern Europe. From my reading of this literature three major schools
can be identified.
One school has focused on the preconditions necessary for the emer-
gence of stable democracy:
1 modernisation, industrialisation, urbanisation, education, capitalism
and wealth;2
2 the nature of classes and the class structure, with a focus on the positive
role of the bourgeoisie or the proletariat;3
3 a democratic political culture and civil society;4
4 the importance of institutional factors,5 electoral systems,6 type of
regime – parliamentary or presidential,7 the development of strong
parties, and a stable party system;8
5 a unified state, agreed borders and the absence of ethnic and religious
conflict;9
6 external factors: a peaceful international environment, the impact of
globalisation.10
A second school has centred its research on the transition process. Here
scholars argue that the very nature of the transition itself largely deter-
mines the success or failure of democratisation.11 ‘Revolutions from above’
are contrasted with ‘revolutions from below’. A major focus for this school
is the role of elites and the importance of elite unity, settlements and
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pacts.12 From this perspective, democratic transitions and breakdown can
best be understood by examining changes in the internal relations of
national elites. For Higley and Gunther, ‘what principally distinguishes
unconsolidated from consolidated democracies, is in short, the absence of
elite consensual unity’.13 For a democratic system to persist and flourish,
elites must engage in ‘politics as bargaining’ rather than ‘politics as war’.
Democratic transitions are the result of negotiated pacts between actors
in the dominant elite leading either to sharing with, or conceding power
to, ascendant elites.14
A third school focuses on the period after the collapse of the old regime
and the problems associated with the consolidation of democracy, which
we discuss further below.15
In contrast to the first school with its stress on socio-economic and other
structural preconditions, the second and third schools stress the inde-
pendent role of individual actors and human agency and the ability of
elites to craft democracy, even where pre-conditions are unfavourable.16
Each of these three approaches has made a positive contribution to the
field. However, there are two major omissions in the transition literature.
First, the focus of all three schools has largely been on national-level poli-
tics. None of the above authors has devoted more than passing attention
to the importance of democratisation at the regional and local levels.
Second, the relationship between federalism and democracy has largely
been overlooked in the transition literature.17
This study seeks to redress this imbalance by moving the focus of
research from the national level to the vitally important processes of insti-
tution building and democratisation at the local level and to the study of
federalism in Russia. I believe that the insights garnered in the study of
the democratisation process of separate countries can be applied equally
fruitfully to individual regions within countries, especially in such a large
and diverse country as Russia.
Many authors have alluded to the unique nature of Russia’s dual
transition and its difficult task of simultaneously reforming its economy
and polity. But there is in fact a third transition under way in Russia that
is of no less importance, the need to reconfigure central–local relations
and to create a stable and viable form of federalism. Federal states are
much more difficult to set up than unitary ones. And forging a new federal
system at the same time as privatising the economy and trying to radi-
cally overhaul the political system has clearly made Russia’s transition
triply difficult.
Defining democracy
There are many competing definitions of democracy. Perhaps the most
famous is that of Robert Dahl who lists the following eight ‘institutional
2 Federalism and democratisation in Russia
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guarantees’ which citizens must enjoy before a country can be classified
as a democracy:
1) Freedom to form and join organisations, 2) freedom of expression, 3) right
to vote, 4) eligibility for public office, 5) right of political leaders to compete
for support, 5a) right of political leaders to compete for votes, 6) alternative
sources of information, 7) free and fair elections, 8) institutions for making
government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.18
Dahl groups these eight factors into the following three essential attributes
of a democratic polity:
1) Meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized
groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government
power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force;
2) a ‘highly inclusive’ level of political participation in the selection of leaders
and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major
(adult) social group is excluded;
3) a level of civil and political liberties – freedom of expression, freedom of the
press, freedom to form and join organizations – sufficient to ensure the
integrity of political competition and participation.19
Dahl argued that there was no country where all of his eight conditions
were fully satisfied thus; he preferred to call such states ‘polyarchies’,
leaving the term democracy for the non-existent, ideal type.20
Dahl’s eight conditions for polyarchy have been criticised for not tak-
ing into consideration the importance of such institutional features as
‘parliamentarism or presidentialism, centralism or federalism, majorita-
rianism or consensualism’ and for its silence over the degree to which
governments ‘are responsive or accountable to citizens between elections,
and the degree to which the rule of law extends over the country’s geo-
graphic and social terrain’.21 Thus, O’Donnell argues that two further con-
ditions must be met before a country can be considered democratic: ‘1)
elected officials should not be arbitrarily terminated before the end of
their constitutionally mandated terms; 2) elected authorities should not
be subject to severe constraints, vetoes, or exclusion from certain policy
domains by other, nonelected actors, especially the armed forces’.22
Beetham takes up many of these issues in his excellent studies of
democracy. For Beetham there are two major features of democracy, ‘po-
litical equality’ and ‘popular control’. Political equality ‘is realised to the
extent that there exists an equality of votes between electors, and equal
right to stand for public office, an equality in the conditions for making
one’s voice heard and in treatment at the hands of legislators’.23
Popular control has four major dimensions which build on and extend
many of Dahl’s original eight preconditions for polyarchy:
1) The popular election of the parliament or legislature and the head of
government; 2) Open and accountable government, and the continuous
Introduction 3
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political, legal, and financial accountability of government directly, to the
electorate; 3) Guaranteed civil and political rights or liberties: freedoms of
speech, association, assembly and movement, and the right to due legal
process; 4) A lively civil society.24
Democratic consolidation
During the past quarter of a century, more than sixty countries around the
world have made the transition from authoritarian rule to some kind of
democratic regime. But as Schedler notes, ‘sustaining democracy is often
a task as difficult as establishing it’.25 Thus, political scientists have turned
their attention to democratic consolidation. As Beetham notes, ‘the pro-
cess of consolidating democracy which begins where the transition to
democracy ends, i.e., with the inauguration of a new government at the
first free and fair elections . . . is a much more lengthy and difficult process
than the transition itself’.26
The installation of democratic institutions and the ratification of a
democratic constitution are but the first of many essential steps on the
path to consolidation. Thus, as O’Donnell notes, a democracy may only
be considered consolidated, ‘when a society frees itself from the spells cast
by authoritarian demagogues and rejects all alternatives to such democ-
racy so as to no longer imagine any other possible regime’.27 And in a
similar vein for Linz and Stepan consolidation comes about, when
‘democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned
incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, “the only game in
town” ’.28
Consolidation, however, should not be mistaken for merely the sta-
bility or longevity of a regime. Consolidation requires a deepening and
broadening of democracy, a ‘depth of institutionalisation reaching beyond
the electoral process itself’.29 As Schedler notes, ‘it implies constructing all
those big organisations that make up the characteristic infrastructure of
modern liberal democracies: parties, and party systems, legislative bodies,
state bureaucracies, judicial systems, and systems of interest intermedia-
tion’.30 And consolidation is only completed, ‘when the authority of fairly
elected government and legislative officials is properly established (i.e.,
not limited) and when major political actors as well as the public at large
expect the democratic regime to last well into the foreseeable future’.31
But how do we know a consolidated democracy when we see one, and
what are the preconditions that are necessary for the creation of a con-
solidated democracy? In answer to the first question, Huntington put
forward his two ‘turnover test’, whereby a democracy can be said to be
consolidated when there have been two consecutive changes of govern-
ment through free and fair elections.32 However, there are problems here
when the same party is democratically elected repeatedly over a number
4 Federalism and democratisation in Russia
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of elections, as was the case in Japan or Italy. If there are free and fair
elections but no turnover of parties does this mean a democracy is not
consolidated? Surely not!
In answer to the second question, most scholars agree that the precon-
ditions needed to consolidate a democracy may not necessarily be the
same as those which brought it about in the first place. Linz and Stepan,
following Rustow, stress that no democracy can be consolidated until con-
sensus has been reached over national unity and any contested bound-
aries of the state have been settled. ‘Consolidated democracy needs a state
. . . no state no democracy’.33 Second, they argue no state can consolidate
its democracy unless it already satisfies all of Dahl’s criteria for democ-
racy listed above. With these preliminary conditions in place Linz and
Stepan posit five addition prerequisites which a democratic state must
satisfy before it can be considered consolidated:
1) the development of a free and lively civil society; 2) a relatively
autonomous political society; 3) throughout the territory of the state all
major political actors . . . must be effectively subjected to a rule of law that
protects individual freedoms and associational life; 4) there must be a state
bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government; 5) there must
be an institutionalised economic society.34
Finally, as Gitelman notes, ‘democracy should not be seen as an
absolute, but as a spectrum’. Some states are more democratic than others
‘and the same system may vary over time in the extent to which it is
democratic’.35 Moreover, as we shall show in this study, levels of democ-
racy and authoritarianism in different regions within one country may
also vary considerably.
Federalism
Writing in 1987 Elazar noted, that a ‘federalist revolution’ was sweeping
the world ‘changing the face of the globe in our time’.36 And as a result
of this largely unnoticed revolution some 40 per cent of the world’s popu-
lation now reside in federal states, and another third live in polities that
are governed by some form of federal arrangements. Moreover, as Smith
observes, with the collapse of communism, federalism has been, ‘pro-
pelled into occupying a more central place by the resurgence of national-
ist and ethnic tensions which have paralleled, if not taken sustenance from
the end of the Cold War’.37
Following Watts, it is important to distinguish between: ‘federalism’,
‘federal political systems’ and ‘federations’. Federalism is a normative
concept, an ideology which advocates, ‘multi-tiered government combin-
ing elements of shared-rule and regional self-rule’.38 Federal political
systems, on the other hand, are descriptive terms referring to a broad
Introduction 5
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category of non-unitary states ranging from quasi-federations and federa-
tions, to confederacies (including: federacies, associated statehood, con-
dominiums, leagues and joint functional authorities). Federations are thus
but one species of the genus ‘federal political system’. In federations
according to Watt’s classic definition:
1) neither the federal nor the constituent units of government are constitu-
tionally subordinate to the other, i.e., each has sovereign powers derived
from the constitution rather than another level of government;
2) each is empowered to deal directly with its citizens in the exercise of
legislative, executive and taxing powers and
3) each is directly elected by its citizens.39
Structural prerequisites for federations
How can we test if a country is a federation or not? In light of the above
discussion, scholars of federalism have put forward the following struc-
tural prerequisites which states must meet before they can be classified as
federations:40
1) The existence of at least two-tiers of government, both tiers of which have
a formal constitutional distribution of legislative, executive and judicial
powers and fiscal autonomy,
2) Some form of voluntary convenant or contract among the components –
normally a written constitution (not unilaterally amendable and requiring
for amendment the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent
units),
3) Mechanisms to channel the participation of the federated units in
decision-making processes at the federal level. This usually involves the
creation of a bicameral legislature in which one chamber represents the
people at large and the other the component units of the federation,
4) Some kind of institutional arbiter, or umpire, usually a Supreme Court 
or a Constitutional Court to settle disputes between the different levels of
government,
5) Mechanisms to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration in those areas
where governmental powers are shared or inevitably overlap.41
Decentralism and noncentralism
Elazar alerts us to yet another vitally important factor in defining federal
systems, the differences between the decentralisation to be found in
unitary states and the noncentralisation of federal regimes. Decentralisa-
tion ‘implies a hierarchy – a pyramid of governments with gradations of
power flowing down from the top’.
Noncentralisation, on the other hand, ‘is best conceptualised as a
matrix of governments . . . where there are no higher or lower power
6 Federalism and democratisation in Russia
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centres, only larger or smaller arenas of decision making and action’.42
Thus, in federations, in contrast to unitary states, regional autonomy is
not only devolved but constitutionally guaranteed.43 The federal govern-
ment cannot usurp powers which have been constitutionally devolved to
the federal subjects. As Elazar observers, federal systems such as the
United States, Switzerland and Canada have such noncentralised systems.
Each has, a national government that functions powerfully in many areas
for many purposes, but not a central government controlling all the lines
of political communication and decision making. In each, the states,
cantons or provinces are not creatures of the federal government but, like
the latter, derive their authority directly from the people. Structurally, they
are substantially immune to federal interference.44
Structure, process and culture
Another important distinction to be made is that between structure and
process. Here we refer to the formal structural features of federations, as
defined above, and the actual operational procedures put into practice by
federal governments. As Elazar stresses, ‘the structure of federalism is
meaningful only in polities whose processes of government reflect the
federal principle’.45 In other words, federal structures may be in place in
a polity, and federal principles may be enshrined in a country’s constitu-
tion, but there may still be no federalism in operation – as was the case,
for example in the Soviet Union (see chapter 2). Here, we need to add a
cultural dimension to the five structural definitions provided above. A
democratic and legalistic culture is required for a democratic federation.
As Watts notes, a recognition of the supremacy of the constitution over
all orders of government and a political culture emphasising the funda-
mental importance of respect for constitutionality are therefore prerequi-
sites for the effective operation of a federation.46
As I shall show in this study, Russia has adopted all of the key struc-
tural trappings of a federation and the Constitution does indeed enshrine
many of the key principles of federalism and democracy, but in practice,
neither the federal authorities nor the federal subjects have fully lived 
up to these federal principles. Moreover, in the absence of a democratic
political culture in Russia there can be no real federalism. Russia is a
federation without federalism.
Symmetrical and asymmetrical federations
Federations may be further sub-divided into symmetrical and asymmet-
rical federations. As we discuss below, the Russian Federation has one of
the highest levels of asymmetry in the world. Stepan makes the interest-
ing observation that all multinational democracies (with the exception of
Introduction 7
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Switzerland) are constitutionally asymmetrical, and all federations that
are constitutionally symmetrical are mononational.47
The Russian Federation is the largest multinational country in the
world incorporating 128 officially recognised ethnic groups and national-
ities. As box 1.1 shows there are 89 federal subjects, 57 of which are terri-
torially defined entities, and 32 of which are ethnically defined, including
21 ethnic republics and 11 national autonomies. Thus, it is hardly sur-
prising that Russia is also constitutionally asymmetrical. However, as
Smith notes, it is not asymmetry per se, but rather, the extent of Russia’s
asymmetry that marks it out from other federations.48
There are three types of asymmetry in federal states: (1) socio-
economic; (2) political; and (3) constitutional. And whilst elements of the
first two are present in all federations, this is not the case with the third
type. Russia possesses high levels of asymmetry in all three areas.
Socio-economic asymmetry
Socio-economic asymmetry is, of course, present in every federation,
referring as it does to such factors as, the number of federal subjects, their
size, population, economic status, and wealth. Whilst it is impossible 
to avoid some degree of socio-economic asymmetry, where there are 
high levels of inequality between regions, tensions and even outright
conflict between federal subjects may arise. Such tensions are liable 
to be particularly rife in those federations where one subject has a 
predominant position, such as was the case with the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in the USSR, and is currently the
case with Moscow city within the Russian Federation (see table 1.1 and
chapter 5).
The 89 different components of the Russian federation vary widely 
in the size of their territories and populations. Thus for example the re-
public of Sakha has a territory which is 388 times the size of the republic
of North Osetiya. The population of Moscow (8.5 million) is 443 times
greater than that of the sparsely populated Yevenk Autonomous Okrug.49
The thirty-two ethnically defined ‘subjects’ also vary considerably in their
ethnic composition (see chapter 4).
8 Federalism and democratisation in Russia
Box 1.1 Federal structure of the Russian Federation
Ethnically defined subjects (32) Territorially, defined subjects (57)
21 Ethnic republics 6 Krais
10 Autonomous okrugs 49 Oblasts
1 Autonomous oblast 2 Federal cities (Moscow and St Petersburg)
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There are also considerable variations amongst the subjects of the fed-
eration in their levels of industrial development, per capita income and
expenditure, average wages and other socio-economic indices such as the
numbers of unemployed and the percentage of citizens living below the
poverty line (see chapter 5). Thus, for example, in the mid-1990s the level
of per capita income in the oil rich Yamala-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug
was 178 times greater than in the republic of Ingushetiya. The volume of
gross regional products per capita in Yamalo-Nenetsk is 36 times higher
than in Ingushetiya. In comparison, the volume of national income varies
by only 1.3 times in the USA. And income per capita varies only 1.5 times
in the German Lander.50
In 1999 unemployment varied across the Russian Federation from 5.6
Introduction 9
Table 1.1 Asymmetry of population of fully fledged constituent units in 
federal systems
Population
difference between
No. of % of Smallest % of largest and
units Largest unit federation unit federation smallest units
Russia 89 Moscow 5.8 Yevenk AO 0.01 443.0
India 25 Uttar Pradesh 16.4 Sikkim 0.05 342.6
Switzerland 26 Zurich 17.2 Appenzell 0.20 84.2
Canada 10 Ontario 37.8 Prince 0.46 81.5
Edward
United States 50 California 11.9 Wyoming 0.18 65.8
Spain 17 Andalucia 17.9 La Rioja 0.68 26.4
Germany 16 N. Rhine 21.8 Bremen 0.84 26.0
Wesphalia
Australia 6 New South 33.7 Tasmania 2.67 12.6
Wales
Malaysia 13 Perak 12.8 Perlis 1.06 12.0
Belgium 3 Flemish 57.6 Brussels 9.52 6.0
region
Austria 9 Vienna 19.6 Burgenland 3.51 5.6
Pakistan 2 East Pakistan 54.0 West 44.16 1.2
Pakistan
Source: Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal; Kingston; London; Ithaca: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2nd edn, 1999), p. 64 (amended version with my figures for Moscow and
Yevenk added to the original table).
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per cent in Moscow city to 51.8 per cent in refugee flooded Ingushetiya.
The disproportionate economic strength of Moscow city is graphically
illustrated by the fact that tax payments from the city regularly comprises
about one-third of the total tax revenues going to the federal budget (see
chapter 5).
Political asymmetry
Political asymmetry refers to the inequalities of representation and politi-
cal status which federal subjects gain either from their socio-economic
status or which they may develop from more overtly political factors such
as patron–client relations. Federal subjects which are economically pow-
erful will usually also have more political status. This is clearly seen in
Russia where rich donor subjects (regions which pay more taxes into the
federal coffers than they receive back in income from the federal budget)
have been able to make more political demands on the centre than the
impoverished ‘recipient regions’ who depend on the centre for economic
survival (see chapter 5).
Constitutional asymmetry
Constitutional asymmetry, which is not found in all federations, refers 
to ‘constitutionally embedded differences between the legal status and
prerogatives of different sub-units within the same federation’.51 One
example is the case of the Canadian Federation, where the province of
Quebec has been granted exclusive powers over language, education and
immigration policy, which for other Canadian provinces are the exclusive
power of the federal government. Other countries with such constitu-
tional asymmetries are: Belgium, India, Malaysia and Spain.52
Constitutional asymmetry is also a major feature of Russian federal-
ism. Even although the Russian Constitution declares that all subjects are
constitutionally equal (article 5) in fact the twenty-one ethnic republics
have been granted far greater powers than the other subjects of the fed-
eration. Such constitutional inequalities have fundamentally undermined
the authority of the Constitution and led to power struggles between the
ethnic republics and the other territorially defined subjects. There have
also been attempts by some regions to unilaterally elevate their status to
that of the republics. Russian nationalists have pressed for Russia’s dual
ethno-territorial form of federalism to be abolished in favour of a new fed-
eration based solely on territorial criteria (see chapters 2 and 3). And bilat-
eral treaties signed between some privileged subjects and the federal
government has widened constitutional asymmetry even further (see
chapter 3).
10 Federalism and democratisation in Russia
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Origins and types of federations
The origins of federal states and the specific ways in which they were
formed are of crucial importance in determining the ‘character of the
distribution of powers’ in federations. Federal states may emerge ‘from
below’ through the voluntary amalgamation of independent states (e.g.,
the US, Switzerland and Australia), or on the contrary they may result
from top-down constitutional changes made to unitary states to prevent
their collapse (India, Belgium, Spain). Stepan calls the former types which
emerge from below as ‘coming together federalism’ and the latter top-
down varieties as ‘holding-together federalism’.53 Stepan also defines a
third category, ‘putting together federalism’, which entails ‘a heavily coer-
cive effort by a nondemocratic centralizing power to put together a multi-
national state, some of the components of which had previously been
independent states’.54 The USSR was a classic example of this type of
federalism. Those federations which arise out of bottom-up bargaining
(‘revolutions from below’) generally cede more powers to their federal
subjects than those which come about as the result of top-down bargain-
ing amongst elites (‘revolutions from above’). As we discuss in chapter 
3 Russia’s Constitution was imposed from above. Yeltsin’s ‘Presidential’
Constitution of December 1993 granted the federal government sweeping
powers over all of the major aspects of the economy and polity (article
71), and whilst aticle 72 lists a number of concurrent powers to be shared
between the federal government and the regions, no exclusive powers
were given to the federal subjects. The regions were only granted resid-
ual powers (article 73).
Federalism and democracy
Scholars of federalism have also stressed the positive relationship
between federalism and democratisation. For Watts, federalism is inher-
ently democratic as it presumes, ‘the voluntary consent of citizens in the
constituent units, non-centralisation as a principle expressed through
multiple centres of political decision making, open political bargaining
. . . the operation of checks and balances to avoid the concentration of 
political power, and a respect for constitutionalism’.55
For King, federation and democracy are but two sides of the same coin,
and for true federalism to function relations between the centre and
regions must be grounded in constitutional law and democratic repre-
sentation. In particular, the constituent units of the federation must be
incorporated into the decision-making procedures of the central govern-
ment, on some ‘constitutionally entrenched basis’.56 King posits four
essential attributes of a democratic federation:
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(a) Its representation is preponderantly territorial; (b) and this territorial
representation is characteristically secured on at least two sub-national
levels; (c) the regional units are incorporated electorally, perhaps otherwise,
into the decision procedure of the national centre; and (d) the incorporation
of the regions into the decision procedure of the centre can only be altered
by extraordinary constitutional measures, not for example by resort to a
simple majority vote of the national legislature, or by autonomous decision
of the national executive.57
Thus, King, Watts, Elazar and others signal what has tended to become
accepted as the norm, ‘only those states whose governments are subordi-
nate to constitutional law and which therefore practice democracy are
judged as true federations’.58 We shall return to a discussion of federalism
and democracy in the conclusion.
Outline of study
In this study I argue that Russia’s weak and asymmetrical form of feder-
alism has played a major role in thwarting the consolidation of democ-
racy. Just as founding elections and the ‘freezing’ of party systems are
highly important for the subsequent trajectory of transitional societies, I
would argue that the ‘freezing’ of a particular set of federal (both consti-
tutional and unconstitutional) relations over the period 1991 to 1993, has
been of no less importance in shaping the present contours of Russia’s
semi-authoritarian form of governance. The result has been the forma-
tion of a highly asymmetrical federation with a weak federal state and
powerful federal subjects. And political and economic relations have 
now superseded legal and constitutional procedures as the basis of
centre–periphery relations.
Below I discuss the major factors which have been instrumental in
bringing about the current chronic weakness of ‘state capacity’ at the
federal level and which, in turn, have thwarted the development of
democracy in Russia. I also argue that it is too simplistic to test the level
of democratisation in Russia by merely studying national level politics.
As we shall see (in chapters 6–7 and 9) there are many different kinds of
political regime in operation in Russia ranging from quasi-democracies to
‘delegative democracies’. In chapters 2 and 3 we examine the origins of
Russia’s ethno-territorial form of federalism and the development of con-
stitutional and political asymmetry in the Yeltsin era. In chapter 4 we turn
to a study of the ethnic make-up of the federation and the prospects for
ethnic secessionism. Socio-economic asymmetry and fiscal federalism are
discussed in chapter 5. In chapters 6–7 we turn to an examination of po-
litical asymmetry. Regional elections and the problems of developing 
a viable party system are discussed in chapter 6 and in chapter 7 we
examine the struggle between executive and legislative bodies of power.
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Chapter 8 provides an examination of Putin’s radical reform of the federal
system. Finally, in chapter 9 we examine the problems of consolidating
democracy in Russia’s regions and republics.
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2The Soviet legacy and 
Russian federalism, 1991–93
Russian federalism and the Soviet legacy
According to the 1977 Constitution, ‘the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics’ was a ‘unified, federal, multinational state formed on the
principle of socialist federalism’. The federation, which was established
according to the dual principles of ethnicity and territory, encompassed
fifteen ethnically defined union republics, twenty autonomous republics,
eight autonomous oblasts, ten autonomous okrugs, and 159 territorially
based regions.
But if we adopt the definition of a federation given by Watts in chapter
1, then clearly the USSR was not an authentic federation. For whilst the
Constitution proclaimed the republics’ rights of sovereignty (article 76),
and secession (article 72), the right to enter into treaties with foreign
powers (article 80), and local control over economic developments (article
77), such rights were heavily qualified in practice, by the provisions of
other articles, which made a mockery of the republic’s sovereign powers.1
And, in any case, whilst the state was supposedly based on federal prin-
ciples, the party, which declared itself to be ‘the leading and guiding force
in society’, was a unitary body. Moreover, party and state bodies operated
under the principle of ‘democratic centralism’, whereby each administra-
tive level was subordinate to the level above it, and centralised control
from Moscow.
In 1989 Gorbachev publicly admitted that the republics’ rights of
sovereignty were largely formal in nature, ‘Up to now’, he noted, ‘our
state has existed as a centralized and unitary state and none of us has yet
the experience of living in a federation’.2
This is not to say that the federal subjects in the USSR were totally
powerless and subservient to the central authorities or that nationalist
demands had been quelled when Gorbachev took over the reins of power
in 1985. For paradoxically, the very policies which the communists had
used to placate nationalism ended up giving it succour. As Bialer notes,
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the concept and reality of Soviet federalism contained a dangerous
dualism: ‘On the one hand it granted to formed nations cultural auton-
omy, territorial integrity, and symbols of statehood; on the other hand it
insisted on the supremacy of the central state and government and strove
for a state of affairs where national separateness and ethnic identity would
ultimately wither away’.3
The USSR’s adoption of an ‘ethno-territorial’ form of federalism was
originally designed as a temporary measure, adopted to entice the non-
Russian nationalities to join the union. But as Gleason notes, such a prin-
ciple entailed a recognition of the ‘national statehood’ of the constituent
republics.4 Under Soviet federalism, ‘ethnicity was institutionalised both
on the individual and on group levels. On the individual level, national-
ity was registered on each person’s internal passport . . . At the group
level, the ethno-territorial basis of political organization established firm
links between national groups, their territories, and their political
administrations’.5
In addition, according to Stalin’s formula ‘national in form, socialist in
content’, the nations of the Soviet Union were supposed to develop to the
point where all national groups would be equal. But as Zwick notes: ‘In
its attempt to neutralize tribal, ethnic and religious identifications and
replace them with socialist norms, the Soviet regime awakened national
feelings among its population, and then, by promising to equalize all
nations, made the people acutely aware of the differences that had always
existed between Russians and non-Russians’.6
Soviet nationality policies even promoted nation building for national
communities which had ‘not yet achieved ethnic awakening in the pre-
revolutionary period’.7 And far from withering away, the administrative
organs of the republics gradually developed a sense of ‘proprietary
bureaucratic self-interest’.8
Federalism and nationalism under Gorbachev
Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika, glasnost and democratisation opened
up the nationalities and federal question to nationwide debate.
Gorbachev’s dilemma was how to simultaneously reform the Soviet
economy and polity, whilst maintaining the unity of the communist party
and the state. In the end, Gorbachev failed on all counts. His acknow-
ledgement of the legitimate demands of the republics for greater economic
and political autonomy, and his proposals for a revived ‘Union of Soviet
Sovereign States’ came far too late to save the Union. The rise of Russian
nationalism coupled with the collapse of the communist party over the
period 1990 to 1991 finally propelled the Soviet Union into the abyss.
Gorbachev’s reluctant acceptance of the need for an asymmetrical form
of Soviet federalism, mixing confederal relations for some (the three Baltic
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republics, Georgia, Moldova and Armenia) with varying degrees of
federal relations with the others, stemmed from a genuine belief on his
part in the economic benefits to be gained in preserving the Union.
Gorbachev repeatedly stressed the interdependent nature of the Soviet
economic system and the fact that the republics ‘rely on a division of
labour in a highly institutionalised, integrated national economic
complex; depend on the central authorities for resource allocations,
investments, subsidies and grants-in-aid; and enjoy the diplomatic, eco-
nomic and military advantages that accrue to a superpower. To cut such
ties would mean to dissect a living body’.9
But economic decentralisation soon led to calls for political decentral-
isation. And once the CPSU began to fragment along political and ethnic
lines there was nothing left to hold the Union together. Elections for
republican parliaments in 1990 inflicted heavy defeats on the communist
party candidates in the majority of the republics. In April 1990 Yeltsin
gained the chair of the Russian (RSFSR) parliament and in June Russia
made its historic declaration of sovereignty, whereby it proclaimed: ‘full
power of the RSFSR in decisions on all questions of state and public life
. . . the priority of the RSFSR’s Constitution and Laws on the entire terri-
tory of the RSFSR; the exclusive right of the people to ownership, use and
disposal of the national riches of Russia, and the right of free exit from
the USSR’.10
The Russian government under Yeltsin’s leadership now began to
champion the rights of other republics. And between ‘June and October
[1990], Uzbekistan, Moldova, Ukraine, Belorussia, Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan and Kazakhstan declared their sovereignty, while Armenia . . .
took the further step of declaring its independence’.11 Yeltsin also entered
into negotiations with these ‘sovereign republics’, and even signed a
number of bilateral treaties with them.
Over the autumn–winter period 1990–91 Gorbachev seemed to
abandon the ‘democratic’ camp. It appeared as if he was determined to
save the Union at all costs. But after the failure of Soviet OMON troops
to set up ‘national salvation fronts’ in the Baltics in January 1991,
Gorbachev tried another tack, seeking instead to gain approval for his
Union Treaty through a nationwide referendum. But the results of the
referendum, held in March 1991, was inconclusive, and at best repre-
sented a pyrrhic victory for Gorbachev, for although 76.4 per cent of those
participating supported ‘a renewed federation of equal sovereign repub-
lics’, six of the fifteen republics refused to participate in the ballot (Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova).12 As Lapidus notes:
Faced with the choice between the hard liner’s pressure to maintain the
Soviet Union through force by imposing a new Union Treaty from above
and the democratic demands to concede real sovereignty to the republics,
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Gorbachev struck a deal with Yeltsin and the leaders of those nine republics
which participated in the March 1991 referendum.13
According to the provisions of this so-called 9 + 1 agreement, signed on
April 23, 1991, the three Baltic republics, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova
were to be allowed to secede from the USSR and a new fourth version of
the Union Treaty was to be concluded in the summer. As John Miller
notes, ‘Implicit in this was recognition by the Union administration of the
sovereignty of the Union-Republics; and that the federation inaugurated
by the Union Treaty should be a very weak one in which the Centre would
retain only a minimum of power’.14
It was the plans to sign the Union Treaty on August 20, 1991, which
sparked off the attempted coup. The failure of the coup, in turn, acceler-
ated the demise of the USSR, leading to its total collapse by December.
As we noted above, Russia’s declaration of Sovereignty in June 1990
was a major catalyst in the collapse of the USSR. But the RSFSR was itself
a quasi-federation comprising sixteen ethnically defined autonomous
soviet socialist republics (ASSRs), ten national okrugs (districts) and five
autonomous oblasts. And seven other such ‘autonomies’ were trapped
inside a further four Soviet republics.15 If Russia could declare its sover-
eignty, then why should the autonomous republics within Russia not
follow suit? After all, some of these ASSRs (e.g., Tatar and Bashkir) were
actually larger and more populous than some of the Soviet republics (e.g.,
Estonia, Latvia, Moldova). Whilst Gorbachev’s polices had led to the rise
of nationalism in the USSR, Yeltsin’s policies were in danger of leading to
a similar rise of national sentiment in the RSFSR. As, Aleksandr Tsipko
warned:
the stronger the striving of the RSFSR to free itself from the centre, the
stronger will be the desire of the autonomous formations to free themselves
from Yeltsin. And in their own way they are right. The relations of Russia
to the autonomies is constructed on the same principle as that of the Union
to the RSFSR.16
Over the period 1990–91 the ASSRs became embroiled in the wider strug-
gle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev. In an attempt to weaken Russia’s role
in the negotiations over the Union Treaty, Gorbachev began to espouse
the need to raise the status of the autonomies. In the All-Union Law, ‘On
the Delimitation of Powers between the USSR and the Subjects of the
Federation’ of April 26, 1990, the autonomous republics, were described
as ‘subjects of the federation’ thus recognising their right to equal repre-
sentation with the union republics, in the negotiations over the Union
treaty.17 In reply, Yeltsin, on a nationwide tour of the Russian Federation
in August 1990, urged the ASSRs to ‘take as much sovereignty as they
could swallow’. Furthermore, he proclaimed, ‘if this meant full inde-
pendence from Russia ‘your decision will be final’.18 And it was not long
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before the ASSRs took Yeltsin at his word, and unilaterally declared their
sovereignty. On August 30, 1990, Tatarstan declared itself the sixteenth
republic of the USSR,19 and by the end of the year almost every other
autonomy had likewise declared its independence from its host union
republic (see table 2.1).
On December 15, 1990 the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies
adopted a series of amendments to the RSFSR Constitution, which raised
the status of its sixteen ASSRs to constituent republics of the Russian
Federation. In addition, in July 1991, the Russian Supreme Soviet adopted
a number of decrees, which, ‘elevated the status of four of Russia’s
autonomous oblasts, Adygeya, Gornii Altai, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya and
Khakasiya (with the exception of the Jewish autonomous oblast in
Siberia), to constituent republics of the federation’.20 This brought the total
number of ethnic republics within Russia to twenty.
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Table 2.1 Dates of declarations of sovereignty
Republic Date of declaration of sovereignty
North Osetiya- July 20, 1990
Alaniya
Kareliya August 9, 1990
Khakassiya August 15, 1990
Komi August 29, 1990
Tatarstan August 30, 1990
Udmurtiya September 20, 1990
Sakha (Yakutiya) September 27, 1990
Buryatiya October 8, 1990
Bashkortostan October 11, 1990
Kalmykiya October 18, 1990
Marii El October 22, 1990
Chuvashiya October 24, 1990
Gorno-Altai October 25, 1990
Tuva November 1, 1990
Karachai- November 17, 1990
Cherkessiya
Checheno- November 27, 1990
Ingushetiya
Mordova December 8, 1990
Kabardino-Balkariya January 31, 1991
Dagestan May 15, 1991
Adygeya July 2, 1991
Source: Jeff Kahn, ‘The parade of sovereignties: establishing
the vocabulary of the new Russian federalism’, Post-Soviet
Affairs, 16:1 (2000), 62.
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After the collapse of the USSR, the number of republics within Russia
increased to twenty-one, when in the summer of 1992 the Checheno-
Ingush Republic was separated into Chechen and Ingush republics. Thus,
the Soviet Union’s hybrid ethno-territorial principal of federalism was
bequeathed to Russia.
The foundations of Russia’s constitutional institutions
The founding constitutional arrangements of any regime must surely be
considered as one of the most important factors determining the future
trajectory of the state. The tragedy for Russian federalism and Russian
democracy is the fact that: (1) The collapse of communism in the USSR
was at best an incomplete ‘revolution’ which largely witnessed the
replacement of one set of Soviet leaders headed by Gorbachev, by another
set of Russian elites under Yeltsin. Whilst it could be argued that a circu-
lation of elites within the Russian state did slowly take place over the
period 1991–93, only a partial circulation occurred in the regions and
republics where ‘nomenklatura continuity’ has been the norm rather than
the exception.21 (2) A new alliance of regional political and economic elites
soon took hold as Russia embarked on a massive privatisation pro-
gramme in 1992–93. These groups were the first to be given access to the
rich pickings of the regional ‘privatisation troughs’. Both of these groups
had a vested interest in demanding economic and political sovereignty
for their territories, and it was not long before they took advantage of the
vacuum of power in the centre to proclaim their rights of control and/or
ownership over the vast natural resources and wealth of their regions.
Thus, for example, in 1991 almost 80 per cent of industrial output in
Tatarstan was produced by enterprises under the command of central
economic bodies but by 1993, 70 per cent of these enterprises had been
transferred to Tatarstan’s own jurisdiction.22
Tragically, for Russia, the founding political and economic institutions
in the regions, were forged not by newly elected democrats but rather by
authoritarian leaders who emerged out of the old Soviet nomenklatura.
Russia’s post-communist elites, particularly in the ethnic republics, soon
turned to nationalism and separatist demands, rather than democracy, to
legitimate their rule. Wielding the sword of ‘sovereignty’ local elites were
able to capture control over the major political and economic institutions
in the localities. Thus, in a short space of time many of Russia’s republics
were headed by authoritarian regimes of one sort or another.
Over the period October 1991–October 1993 the federal authorities in
Moscow were engaged in a ‘civil war’ which pitted the Russian pre-
sidency and government against the Russian parliament. For two years
the central powers in Moscow were paralysed by this all-encompassing
battle. The conflict took many forms but in essence it centred around the
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struggle over the ratification of a new constitution. The parliamenta-
rians fought for a parliamentary constitution which would give them
sweeping powers and relegate the president to a ceremonial figurehead.
The president on the other hand sought to create a presidential constitu-
tion with a weak parliament and a powerful executive presidency.
Numerous presidential and parliamentary drafts of the constitution were
drawn up during this time, but it was only after the dissolution of par-
liament in September 1993 that Yeltsin was able to push ahead with his
presidential constitution which was eventually ratified in December 1993
(see below).
During this period of weak central power the republics became espe-
cially vociferous in their demands for national autonomy. In the absence
of a new federal Constitution many of the ethnic republics unilaterally
granted themselves a whole series of rights and privileges. The republics
and regions were also wooed by representatives of both the parliament
and president, who promised the regions ever greater degrees of auton-
omy. Making the best of the political impasse in Moscow, regional elites
scored a great victory when Yeltsin signed the 1992 Federal Treaty. The
Treaty granted both the republics and regions greater powers over their
own affairs, and in particular gave the ethnic republics considerable
control over their natural resources; the rights of secession, citizenship
and sovereignty.
Thus, the founding constitutional arrangements and concomitant po-
litical institutions, which would determine the future path of Russian
federalism, were forged during a period of weak and divided federal
authority (1991–93) and crucially, before the ratification of the Russian
Constitution of December 1993.
The Federal Treaty
The Federal Treaty of March 31, 1992 created an ‘asymmetrical federation’
with the rights granted to the ethnic republics far outweighing those given
to the territorially based regions.23 For some scholars the treaty was a nec-
essary compromise to save the Union whilst others argue that it funda-
mentally weakened federalism in Russia by constitutionally sanctioning
an asymmetrical federal state with three types of legal subject, each pos-
sessing different rights and powers; national–state formations (sovereign
republics); administrative–territorial formations (krais, oblasts, and the
cities of Mocow and St Petersburg); and national–territorial formations
(the autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs). The Federal Treaty also
recognised three distinct areas of competence; federal, joint federal–
regional and regional.
The republics were recognized as sovereign states with rights of
national self-determination territorial integrity, and by implication the
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right to secede from the Union. They were awarded citizenship rights and
ownership of their land and natural resources. The republics were also
granted their own constitutions and powers to elect their own executive
heads. In addition they were free to sign bilateral treaties with foreign
countries and to engage in foreign economic relations at their own dis-
cretion without the need even to consult the centre.24 The regions were
given no such rights of ownership, nor were they allowed such freedom
to engage in international relations. And instead of constitutions, the
regions were only permitted to draw up local charters, and their top
executives were to be appointed from above.
Bashkortostan and Sakha signed the Federal Treaty only after they were
granted special concessions, including special dispensions with regard to
their contributions to the federal budget. Bashkortostan was also granted
the additional right to create its own independent legal system.25 Two
republics, Tatarstan and Chechnya, refused to sign the treaty. Tatarstan
later ratified its own republican constitution in November 1992 which 
(in article 61) affirmed that the republic was, ‘a sovereign state and a sub-
ject of international law, associated with the Russian Federation’. Only
Chechnya went so far as to declare its outright independence, a move
which eventually led to the invasion of Russian troops into the republic
in 1994, and again in 1999.
But it was not long before this two-class federal system came under
attack from the regions, which demanded parity with the ethnic republics.
As Lapidus and Walker note: ‘Why should the inhabitants of Kareliya,
where the Karelians make up only 10 per cent of the population and
Russians almost 75 per cent, enjoy special economic privileges simply
because they live in a region arbitrarily designated an autonomous
area’?26
In protest, regional authorities also began to withhold their tax
revenues refusing to give them up to the federal authorities. As Sakwa
observes, ‘In 1993, for example, Moscow collected only forty per cent of
the tax revenues due to it from the regions and republics, and over two
dozen refused to pay the centre their federal tax obligations’.27 And in
August 1993 the heads of a number of regions demanded that the
privileges granted to the republics in the Federal Treaty be rescinded.
Indeed, a number of regions were so incensed by their second-
class positions within the federation that they unilaterally elevated their
status to that of republics. Thus, for example, in a referendum held in
April 1993, 84 per cent of the population of Sverdlovsk Oblast supported
the creation of the Urals Republic.28 And it was not long before further
regions followed suit. Thus, for example, regions in European Russia
created the Pomor Republic centred in Arkhangelsk, the Central Russian
Republic, made up of eleven regions with its capital in Orel, and the
Leningrad Republic in St Petersburg. A Southern Urals republic was
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formed in Chelyabinsk, and a Siberian republic in Irkutsk. And in the Far
East, the Maritime Republic was created in Vladivostok.29 Other regions
whilst not going so far as to declare themselves republics, unilaterally
elevated their constitutional status. Thus, for example, Voronezh Oblast
declared that the region was henceforth, an ‘independent participant in
international and foreign-economic relations’. Furthermore it continued,
‘Federal bodies of state power of the Russian Federation may not pro-
mulgate legal acts that fall within the jurisdiction of the regional bodies
of power’.30
Many of these issues were discussed at a special constitutional
conference which Yeltsin eventually was persuaded to convene in the
summer of 1993. Ostensibly the conference was devoted to the task of
making peace with the parliament and the drawing up a draft constitu-
tion which would bring together elements of the rival parliamentary and
presidential constitutions. However, it was clear from the start that this
was not an open conference with delegates democratically elected from
below, rather it was a top-down organisation whose membership was
chosen from above. The proceedings were dominated by Yeltsin, who 
had no intention of compromising on his ‘presidential version’ of the
constitution.
Nonetheless, during the conference Tatarstan took the lead in pushing
for more autonomy for the ethnic republics insisting that Russian feder-
alism should be ‘treaty based’ rather than ‘constitutional’. In particular,
the republics demanded:
1 the right of all of Russia’s people’s to self-determination,
2 recognition of themselves as sovereign states possessing full state (leg-
islative, executive and judicial) power on their territory, except for
powers that were voluntarily transferred to the jurisdiction of the
Russian Federation,
3 the right to enter into direct relations with other states and to exchange
diplomatic and consular missions,
4 acknowledgement that federal principles of legislation would enter
into force on their territories only after they were ratified by local
bodies of power, and
5 recognition of their right to secede from the Russian Federation without
any restraint.31
The regions in return continued to press for their status to be elevated to
that of the republics and for the special privileges granted to the republics
to be abolished. As Vyachislav Novikov (chair of the Krasnoyarsk Krai
Soviet (assembly) and head of the Association of Regional Soviets) noted,
the proposed definition of republics as sovereign states was ‘a bomb
under Russia’s future’ and but the first step on the path to the creation of
‘a Russian confederation’.32
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But the president, buoyed up by the surprise show of support given to
his administration in the April 1993 referendum, was in no mood for com-
promise with either the parliament or the ethnic republics. Indeed, the
president now sought to reverse the powers which he had relinquished
to the regions in the Federal Treaty. Realising which way the wind was
blowing, a number of the republics walked out of the conference. But this
only made it easier for Yeltsin to call for full economic and political equal-
ity to be granted to all subjects of the federation and the abolition of
special rights for the ethnic subects.33
The work of the constitutional conference continued to operate after
Yeltsin’s violent dissolution of the Russian Parliament in October 1993.
But it was no longer needed by the president. As Sergei Pakhomenko
noted: ‘The Parliament is no more – and the conference is now like the
unfortunate chicken whose chopped-off head is clutched in the fist of the
cook while its body continues to run around the yard in confusion for a
time’.34
At the meeting of the Public Chamber (one of the smaller bodies set up
at the conference), on October 23, it was recommended that all references
to the sovereignty of the republics should be deleted from the draft con-
stitution as should the articles which guaranteed republican citizenship.
Finally, it was recommended that the Federal Treaty was to be removed
from the constitution. Yeltsin’s draft constitution (the fourth version) was
finally published on November 10, 1993 and as discussed in chapter 3, the
constitution was finally ratified on December 17, 1993.35
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3Federalism and 
constitutional asymmetry
As Taras notes, ‘Establishing a constitutional framework that sets out the
political rules of the game and the institutions that allocate values in
society is the most daunting challenge for a new regime’.1 For Maravall
and di Tella, two features of constitutionalism are particularly important.
First, constitutions seek to define, ‘the future substance as well as the 
form of politics by placing certain political, social and economic, rights
beyond the reach of democratic uncertainty’. And second, ‘to make such
assurances credible, constitutions bind not just their drafters, but future
generations’.2
We also need to distinguish between ‘those constitutions that result
from a process of extensive compromise and widespread acceptance’, 
and those ‘that are enacted by a victorious majority over the objection 
of minorities’.3 In the former we are far more likely to achieve stable and
long lasting constitutions, whilst in the latter case, unstable and short
lived constitutions are the norm.
In Russia, as we have seen, there was little evidence of consensus 
and compromise in the drafting of its Constitution. Instead, the founda-
tions of Russian constitutionalism were forged out of conflict and coer-
cion, and the president’s Constitution was largely imposed on a weak 
and highly divided society, still reeling from the shock of the violent dis-
solution of the Russian parliament. Moreover, as Stepan notes, ‘the par-
liament never discussed the version of the constitution that was submitted
to the voters for ratification, and thus the chance for constitution-making
to play a focal role in building consensus for democratic state power 
was lost’.4
The Russian constitution
The 1992 victory of the republics over the federal authorities appeared to
come to an end with Yeltsin’s dissolution of the Russian parliament in
October 1993 and the adoption of his Presidential Constitution in Decem-
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ber 1993. The dramatic assault by Russian troops on the Russian parlia-
ment and the arrest of Khasbulatov, and the other leading parliamen-
tarians, followed by Yeltsin’s decrees abolishing the institutions of the
local assemblies (soviets), frightened the regions into submission. As
Zverev notes, ‘tax returns hitherto withheld by the regions began pouring
into Moscow and talk of separate republics in the Urals, Siberia and the
Far East temporarily ceased’.5
The new Constitution reasserted the authority of the federal author-
ities, the integrity and inviolability of the Federation, the supremacy of
the Constitution and federal laws throughout the territory of the country,
the creation of a single unified system of executive power, and a single
economic space. There was also a notable absence of the right of the
‘subjects’ to secede from the Federation (article 4) or to have their own
republican citizenship. And to the dismay of the republics the text of the
Federal Treaty was not incorporated into the Constitution, and the su-
periority of the Constitution over the Federal Treaty was set out in sec-
tion two. Moreover, the Constitution proclaimed that all subjects of the
federation were equal (article 5) thus rejecting the special privileges which
had been granted to the republics in March 1992.
The distribution of powers
As we noted in chapter 1 there are wide variations in the way in which
power is distributed in federations. In most federal constitutions the
federal authorities and federal subjects are each granted exclusive powers
over specific policy areas. However, often there is also the need for a list
of ‘concurrent powers’ to be specified which come under the joint
jurisdiction of the federal government and federal subjects. Russia’s Con-
stitution favours the federal authorities over the subjects. Thus, article 71
grants the federal government exclusive powers over a broad range of
national policies (including the national economy, federal budget, federal
taxes and duties; foreign and defence affairs), and article 72 lists a number
of powers which are to be shared between the federal authorities and the
federal subjects (see appendices 3.1 and 3.2). However, as we noted in
chapter 1, unlike in the Federal Treaty, no exclusive powers were dele-
gated to the federal subjects. Instead, the subjects are granted only ‘re-
sidual powers’ (article 73), that is, powers over those relatively few policy
areas not provided for in articles 71 and 72.
Another important article in the Constitution is the so called ‘flexibil-
ity clause’ (article 78) which allows the centre to transfer `the implemen-
tation of some of its powers’ to the federal subjects and vice versa.6 As
Lapidus and Walker rightly note, this left ‘open the possibility of bilateral
agreements between Moscow and the subjects and the further develop-
ment of an asymmetrical federation’, which we discuss below.7
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Popular support for the Constitution
There was however, one major drawback to Yeltsin’s supposed constitu-
tional victory. Although the Constitution was supported by 58.4 per cent
of the voters nationwide (according to official statistics), it was rejected
by a majority of voters in sixteen regions, and in eight of the twenty-one
republics. Additionally, in eleven regions and six republics the Constitu-
tion failed to be ratified, as turnout was below the required 50 per cent.8
And the Constitution was boycotted altogether in Chechnya. Surely, as
we have noted, an essential attribute of any democratic federation is the
voluntary membership of its subjects. But in Russia the Constitution failed
to be ratified in forty-two of the eighty-nine subjects. Moreover, the le-
gitimacy of the Constitution was also weakened by doubts over the valid-
ity of the officially declared turnout of 54.8 per cent. According to some
estimates the actual turnout was well below the required 50 per cent and
actually lay somewhere between 38 and 43 per cent.9
Such doubts over the legitimacy of the Constitution has fundamen-
tally weakened the powers and authority of the federal government in 
its relations with the federal subjects, particularly in those regions where
the Constitution failed to be ratified. Thus, Yeltsin’s victory in 1993 was
like Gorbachev’s before him, a pyrrhic one. Devoid of any real legitimacy,
the Constitution was soon open to creative interpretation, indifference,
and even outright abuse, by regional political elites, who were able to bol-
ster their ‘patrimonial’ regimes with claims for economic and political
sovereignty.
There was no democratic revolution or people’s revolution in Russia
as there had been in Eastern Europe in 1989, and ‘nomenklatura continu-
ity’ was the norm in the regions, as former communist elites took power
under the new banner of national sovereignty. Moreover, as scholars 
of federalism stress, for a democratic federation to function we need not
only federal structures and institutions but a democratic political culture,
an agreement by all signatories to abide by the democratic and constitu-
tional rules of the game. In Russia all of the federal structures were put
in place by the Constitution but in the absence of a federal democratic
culture. Thus, as we noted in chapter 1, a federation was formed without
federalism.
The formation of a bicameral national parliament
As we noted in chapter 1, one of the key structural prerequisites of federal
states is the institutional representation of regions in policy making at the
federal level. To this end federal states have created bicameral national
parliaments with an upper chamber especially designed to accommodate
regional interests. In Russia, the Constitution called for the creation of a
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bicameral national parliament with an upper house comprising two
representatives from each of Russia’s eighty-nine subjects.
There are considerable variations in the powers of upper chambers, 
the methods by which their member are elected, their relations with 
other federal and regional bodies, and the equality of representation
within them. As Watts notes, members of upper chambers may be se-
lected by the following methods: (1) direct election (e.g., USA, Austalia,
Switzerland), (2) indirect election from the subject assemblies (e.g.,
Austria, India), (3) ex officio appointment (e.g., of Lander cabinets in
Germany), (4) through direct appointment by federal bodies (e.g., the
federal Prime Minister in Canada), (5) by mixed systems of indirect/direct
elections and appointments (e.g., Malaysia, Belgium, Spain).10
According to the Russian Constitution the Federation Council consists
of, ‘two representatives from each component of the Russian Federation;
one each from the representative and executive bodies of state power
(article 95). However, the Constitution did not stipulate the precise
method by which members were to be chosen. In 1993 the first Council
was elected via national elections. However, the method of choosing
members was changed by Yeltsin in 1995 and again by Putin in 2000 (see
chapter 8). From 1996 until 2000 the heads of the legislative and exe-
cutive branches of government in each region were granted ex officio
membership of the Council. Thus, during this period, the Council was
indirectly elected, and its composition was decided by whoever held the
post of chair of a regional assembly or head of a regional administration.
Members of the Council could retain their seats as long as they held their
regional posts. Therefore, as Teague notes, ‘Since electoral laws varied
from region to region, [this] also meant that the composition of the upper
chamber was effectively determined not by federal norms but by regional
ones’. Thus, included in the upper chamber were a number of republican
presidents who had come to power through uncontested and/or unfair
elections (e.g., President Shaimiev of Tatarstan, President Rakhimov of
Bashkortostan). Also by including regional executives in its ranks the
upper chamber violated the democratic principle of the separation of
powers.
In 2000 President Putin radically changed the method by which mem-
bers of the Federation Council are ‘elected’, which has fundamentally
weakend its authority. No longer do heads of regional administrations
and chairs of regional assemblies have ex officio membership; instead
each sends a deputy to represent them in the Council. We shall discuss
Putin’s reforms further in chapter 8.
The changes enacted in 1995 were deliberately designed to give Yeltsin
control over the lower house of the parliament (the Duma). As the
Federation Council has the powers to veto legislation of the lower house,
Yeltsin, by controlling the membership of the upper house, was able to
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gain significant leverage over the work of the Duma. Thus, as Kempton
notes, ‘Although most republican leaders were popularly elected, the
governors of most of the regions were handpicked by Yeltsin and were
subject to removal by Yeltsin’.11 The upper chamber is also charged with
approving the President’s nominations for the top posts in the judiciary
and procuracy. Thus, by packing the Council with his appointees, Yeltsin
also gained control over these bodies. Only after Yeltsin reluctantly relin-
quished his powers of appointment over regional governors, and gave 
the go ahead for nationwide gubernatorial elections (conducted over the
period 1995–97) did he begin to lose control over the membership and
work of the Council (see chapter 6).
Political asymmetry can be found in the over-representation of some
regions in the upper chambers of federal parliaments. In Russia all eighty-
nine federal subjects have equal representation in the Federation Council
even although there are massive variations in the size of their populations.
Thus, Moscow city and the Yevenk autonomous oktug (AO) both have
two ‘senators’ even although Moscow’s population is 443 times larger
than that of Yevenk. However, as Watts observes, equality of representa-
tion in the federal second chamber (also found in the USA, and Australia),
is not, in fact, the norm. In most federations representation is weighted in
favour of ‘smaller regional units’ and/or ‘significant minorities’.12 But, as
Stepan warns us, ‘the greater the representation of the less populous states
(and therefore the underrepresentation of the more populous states), the
greater the demos-constraining potential of the upper house will be’.13
One way of ameliorating such inequalities is to vary the number of
members elected from each federal subject. Thus, for example, in
Germany there are lander having between 3–6 block votes in the upper
chamber depending on the size of their populations, whilst in India
representation of the states varies from as much as 12 to 86.14
There are also considerable variations in the powers granted to upper
chambers but these will usually include; ‘confirmation of federal judges,
approval of the federal budget, changes in tax laws affecting the com-
ponents, territorial changes, education policy, language policy and cultural
policy’.15 Upper chambers also have a key role in reviewing legislation so
as to ensure the interests of the regions are promoted and protected.
Stepan also argues that, ‘the greater the competence of the territorial
house, the more the demos – which is represented on a one person–one
vote basis in the lower house – is constrained’. Thus, for example, in Brazil
senators representing just 13 per cent of the total electorate have no restric-
tions placed on the policy areas they can vote on and indeed there are
twelve areas where the upper chamber has been granted exclusive
competence.16 The ‘German, Spanish and Indian systems are less demos-
constraining, because their upper houses are less unrepresentative and
less powerful’.17
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From a comparative perspective the Russian Federation Council is a
relatively weak federal institution, which has been dominated for much
of its existence by the presidency. It is the lower house, the state Duma,
which is the law-making chamber. The upper chamber has the more
limited power to approve or reject the legislation of the lower house.
However, a veto by the Federation Council can be overturned by a two-
thirds majority in the lower house Duma. The President also has the
power to veto the legislation of both houses which can only be overturned
by a vote of two-thirds of the members of both chambers.
The authority of the Federation Council is also weakened by the fact
that most of its members have often been too preoccupied with their
duties in the regions to attend its sessions. Indeed, often it has been dif-
ficult to achieve a quorum and the Council has had to resort to postal
voting. Also according to article 105, legislation of the Duma ‘is deemed
to have been approved by the Federation Council’ if it has not been ex-
amined by the upper chamber within 14 days. Up until 2002 the Council
met for only a few days each month,18 hardly sufficient time to carry out
its duties. Thus, many laws of the Duma have been approved without the
scrutiny of the Council. Another sign of the weakness of the Federation
Council is its failure to use its right of legislative initiative. Thus, ‘only
about 7 per cent of draft laws prepared by the upper chamber and its
members in 1994–98 passed all stages of the legislative process and were
adopted as federal laws’.19
Nonetheless, the Council has acted as a forum for the airing of regional
interests in the centre, and regional elites have been able to defend their
rights and privileges via the Council. The Council also successfully
thwarted the adoption of a key law which would have tightened up
centre–periphery relations and reduced the powers of the regions vis-à-
vis the centre.
In the late 1990s the Council also played a more prominent role in
drawing up the federal budget. And once Yeltsin lost his control over
appointments to the Council his ability to influence the courts and procu-
racy was also weakened. Thus, for example, in 1999 the Council refused
to approve Yeltsin’s repeated calls for the Procurator General, Skuratov,
to resign.20
Constititutions of the republics
Regional elites have been able to use inherent contradictions in the
Russian Constitution to their own advantage. Thus, for example, whilst
the Constitution declares that all subjects are equal, in fact there are three
distinct classifications of ‘federal subject’ in the document. First, the
twenty-one ethnically based republics which are classified as national–
state formations. Second, krai and oblasts, which are classified as
34 Federalism and democratisation in Russia
FAD3  10/17/2002  5:42 PM  Page 34
administrative–territorial formations; and third, autonomous oblasts and
autonomous okrugs defined as national-territorial formations.21 Only the
republics are defined as ‘states’ with the right to their own constitutions,
languages, flags, hymns and other trappings of statehood.
There was also a great deal of ambiguity over the status of the Federal
Treaty. Thus, for example, article 11 of the Constitution states that cen-
tre–periphery relations are to be determined ‘by the Federal Treaty and
other treaties’ which suggests that the Federal Treaty and the Constitution
are both still valid – a position defended by many of the republics who
refused to relinquish the powers given to them in March 1992. As we
discuss below, this article (alongside article 78) legitimised the creation of
bilateral treaties between the national government and the federal sub-
jects, increasing the levels of constitutional asymmetry in the federation.
It was not long before a number of those republics whose citizens had
rejected the constitution declared that the Federal Constitution was not
valid in their territories, and that their own constitutions were to take
precedence. Those constitutions ratified between the signing of the Federal
Treaty in March 1992 and the ratification of the Russian Constitution on
December, 12 1993 (Chuvashiya, Sakha, Chechnya, Tatarstan and Tyva),
were among the most radical, granting the republics rights of self-
determination, sovereignty and secession. Indeed, a number of republics
(Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Sakha, Tyva, Ingushetiya and Buryatiya) went
so far in their rejection of the Federal Constitution that their relations with
the centre were much more typical of those in a confederation than a
federation.
A majority of Russia’s twenty-one republics adopted constitutions
which violate the Russian Constitution (contravening articles 4 and 15 of
the Russian Constitution).22 And Constitutional asymmetry created politi-
cal asymmetry. Before long there was a multitude of differing political
systems operating in the Russian Federation including different types 
of political regime (presidential or parliamentary); electoral systems 
(proportional, majoritarian or mixed); and party systems. Across the
federation we could soon detect a political spectrum running from partial
democratisation at one end to delegative democracies and outright dicta-
torships at the other. However, one universal rule could be detected – the
greater the autonomy granted to a federal subject the greater the level of
authoritarianism. As we discuss in chapter 9, it is in the ethnic republics,
granted most autonomy by the Constitution, that we find most violations,
and also the highest levels of authoritarianism.
Rights of sovereignty, self-determination and secession
In this section I analyse the constitutions as first promulgated in the early
1990s before the substantial revisions which have taken place since the
Federalism and constitutional asymmetry 35
FAD3  10/17/2002  5:42 PM  Page 35
inauguration of President Putin in 2000. Putin’s reform of the federal
system is discussed in chapter 8.
As we noted above, the Constitution unlike the Federal Treaty before
it, does not grant the republics the rights of sovereignty and secession.
Article 4 (1) of the Russian Constitution states that, ‘The sovereignty of
the Russian Federation extends to the whole of its territory’, and article
4(3) declares that, ‘The Russian Federation ensures the integrity and in-
violability of its territory’. Nonetheless, 19 of the 21 republics (with the
exception of Ingushetiya and Kalmykiya) declared their state sovereignty,
and by implication the right of secession. Thus, for example, article 1 of
the Constitution of Tyva stated that as a sovereign state Tyva is a member
of the Russian Federation on the basis of a Federal Treaty and as such
Tyva has the right to self-determination and the right to secede from the
Russian Federation. Article 61 of Tatarstan’s Constitution declared, ‘The
Republic of Tatarstan shall be a Sovereign State, a subject of international
law, associated with the Russian federation on the basis of a treaty and
the mutual delegation of powers’. Likewise, article 5 of Bashkortostan’s
Constitution noted that:
Bashkortostan joined the Russian Federation on a voluntary and equal 
basis. Relations between the Republic of Bashkortostan and the Russian
Federation are determined by the Treaty on the basis of intergovernmental
relations between the Russian Federation and Bashkortostan, and other
bilateral treaties and agreements.
The Constitution of Chechnya goes even further, failing to even note that
it is actually a subject of the Russian Federation, instead it proclaims that
Chechnya is an independent sovereign state and a full and equal member
of the world community of states.
In the Constitution of North Osetiya-Alaniya it proclaims that the
Republic is a ‘state, voluntarily entering into the composition of the
Russian Federation’. Other constitutions stressed that their relations with
the Russian Federation were based on the free delegation of their powers
to the federation (Buryatiya, Bashkortostan, Sakha). The state sovereignty
of republics is also often acknowledged in their friendship treaties with
other subjects of the federation. Thus, the preamble to the treaty between
Bashkortostan and Chuvashiya on 24 May 1994 recognized the mutual
sovereignty of each republic.23
Further provisions guarantee the supremacy of the Federal Constitu-
tion in the Federation. Thus, article 4(2) states that, ‘the constitution of the
Russian Federation and federal laws are paramount throughout the terri-
tory of the federation’ and article 15(1) declares that: ‘The Constitution of
the Russian Federation has supreme legal force and is direct acting and
applies throughout the territory of the Russian Federation. Laws and
other legal enactments adopted in the Russian Federation must not con-
tradict the Constitution’.
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But these provisions are simply ignored in a number of republican
constitutions which defiantly proclaimed the supremacy of their constitu-
tions over the Federal Constitution (e.g., article 7 of the Constitution of
Sakha, article 15 of Bashkortostan, article 1 of Tyva, article 1 of Dagestan,
and article 7 of Komi).24 Article 1 of Tyva’s Constitution stated that at 
times of political or state crisis in the republic, the Republic’s Constitution
was to take priority over federal laws and all powers were to pass to the
parliament (the Supreme Khural), president and government. Similarly,
article 1 of Bashkortostan’s Constitution declared that, ‘The Republic 
of Bashkortostan has supreme authority on its territory, independently
defining and conducting domestic and foreign policies, adopting the
Bashkortostan Constitution and laws, which have supremacy on the entire
territory’. This article went on to state, that the only federal laws that must
be enforced in Bashkortostan are those that were ‘voluntarily granted by
Bashkortostan to the purview of the Russian Federation’. Article 59 of the
Constitution of Tatarstan proclaimed that, ‘the laws of the Republic of
Tatarstan shall enjoy supremacy over all its territory’. In the constitutions
of Sakha (articles 58 and 70), Bashkortostan (article 95) and Komi (article
73) there were further provisions granting the republic authorities the right
to suspend federal laws and acts which violated their constitutions.
Unilateral expansion of powers
A number of republic constitutions have also unilaterally taken jurisdic-
tion over policy areas which according to article 71 come under the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the federal government. Thus, for example, the
Constitution of Tyva granted the republic the right to decide issues of war
and peace. Some constitutions allowed the republics to adopt laws about
military service (Bashkortostan, Sakha, Tyva) and establish procedures for
declaring a state of emergency in their territory (Buryatiya, Komi, Tyva,
Bashkortostan, Kalmykiya, Kareliya, North Osetiya, Ingushetiya). Others
gave themselves the exclusive right to engage in foreign relations and
foreign trade, and to sign international treaties (Bashkortostan (article 88),
Chechnya (article 62), Dagestan, Ingushetiya (article 54), Sakha (article
69), Tatarstan (article 89)25 Some republics (Tatarstan (article 8), Tyva
(article 3), Sakha (article 6)) unilaterally declared their territories as nu-
clear free zones in violation of article 71, point ‘m’ of the Russian Constitu-
tion which states that such questions fall squarely within the competence
of federal authorities.
Ownership of land and other natural resources
In the Russian Constitution, in distinction from the Federal Treaty, it
clearly states that the ownership, use and disposal of land and minerals
come under the joint jurisdiction of the federal authorities and federal
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subjects (article 72). But only two republican constitutions (Komi and
Kareliya) conformed in this respect. In particular, Sakha, Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan, Tyva and Buryatiya, all declared that such natural re-
sources belong to the republics. Article 10 of Bashkortostan’s Constitu-
tion stated that the, ‘earth, resources, natural wealth, and other resources
on the territory of Bashkortostan are the property of its people. Questions
about the ownership, use, and distribution of the land, resources, natural
wealth, and other resources are determined by Bashkortostan legisla-
tion’.26 And in violation of article 67 (points 1 and 2) of the federal Con-
stitution, Sakha’s Constitution (article 5) went so far as to declare, that
even the ‘air space, and continental shelf of the territory is the inalienable
property of the citizens of the Republic’.27
In a number of republic constitutions the right to private property is
unconstitutionally prohibited in some areas. Thus, for example in Sakha,
land and minerals may not be in private ownership. In the Constitution
of Tyva it actually states that land is under state ownership. Other
republics have used such provisions to try and prohibit or reverse pri-
vatisation programmes in their territories. Several republics also give
themselves the right to decide questions regarding the federal budget.
Thus, for example, the constitutions of Sakha and Bashkortostan noted
that their legislative organs had the right to define the volume of pay-
ments to the federal budget – a provision that clearly contradicted article
71 of the Russian Constitution.
Citizenship
In the majority of republican constitutions it is stated that granting 
and terminating citizenship is based on republican laws. That is, such
matters come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the republics.28 Thus, for
example, article 19 of the constitution of Tatarstan stated that: ‘The Repub-
lic of Tatarstan shall have its own citizenship. The reasons and procedures
for acquiring and renouncing the citizenship of the Republic of Tatarstan
shall be established by the law on citizenship of the Republic of Tatarstan.
Citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be admitted to have the citi-
zenship of the Russian Federation’. Such powers over defining citizenship
rights are in clear contradiction of article 6 of the Russian Constitution
which states that, ‘Citizenship of the Russian Federation is acquired and
terminated in accordance with federal law’, and also article 71 which
clearly places citizenship under federal jurisdiction.29
Powers over the courts
All scholars of federalism agree that a necessary prerequisite for federal-
ism is some form of adjudication between the levels of government. To
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this end federal states have created supreme courts which serve as the
final adjudicator in relation to all laws, and constitutional courts which
specialise in constitutional interpretation.30 Indeed, as Kempton notes,
‘because of the importance that federalism gives to the judiciary it is some-
times derogatorily labelled “government by the judiciary” ’.31 And in
order to ensure the independence and impartiality of the courts it is now
common practice for both the federal government and the federal subjects
(usually through their representation in the upper chamber of the national
parliament) to be given a voice in the appointment of the court’s mem-
bership. Thus, for example, in the USA members of the Supreme Court,
are appointed by the President, subject to the ratification of the upper
chamber. In Germany the Bundesrat representing the Lander appoints
half the members of the Constitutional Court, and the Bundestag the other
half. In Spain the Constitutional Court is composed of 12 members, of
whom 4 are elected by Congress, 4 by the Senate, 2 are appointed on the
proposal of the Government Council, and 2 are appointed on the proposal
of the General Council of Judicial Power. Whilst in Belgium, the members
of the Court of Adjudication are simply elected by the multi-party Federal
Assembly.32
The Russian Constitutional Court
In Russia members of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court 
are appointed by the President subject to ratification of the Federation
Council. However, the Russian Constitutional Court is organised accord-
ing to federal principles. And article 72 (k) of the Russian Constitution puts
personnel appointments of federal branches of the judiciary under the
joint authority of the federal authorities and federal subjects. Nonetheless,
in a number of regions such rights have been unilaterally transferred to
the sole jurisdiction of the republics. Although fifty regional constitutions
and charters outline the rights and duties of regional constitution courts
only twelve regions have actually gone so far as to establish these bodies.33
In ten regions the governor/president nominates members of the courts
and these nominees are then ratified by the parliaments. In Adygeya the
three branches of government (judiciary, parliament and executive) each
appoint three justices. In St Petersburg, small groups of regional legisla-
tors, the Council of Judges, and the governor nominate candidates which
then go before the the regional assembly for ratification.34
The procuracy
The procuracy in distinction to that of the Constitutional Court is not 
a federal body. In the Russian Constitution it states that, ‘The Russian
Federation Procurator’s Office is a single centralised system in which the
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lower level procurators are subordinate to higher-level procurators and
to the procurator-general of the Russian Federation’ (article 129(1)). And
article 129(2) notes ‘the Procurator general is appointed and released from
office by the Federation Council on the submission of the President’.
Article 129(3) states that, ‘The procurators of subjects of the Russian Fed-
eration are appointed by the procurator general of the Russian Federation
by agreement with the Federation components’. However, the mechanism
for reaching such an agreement is prescribed neither in the Constitution
nor in other laws.35 The constitutions of Komi (article 104), Sakha (article
110), Kalmykiya (article 40), Buryatiya (article 103), Ingushetiya (article
89) recognise the right of the procurators of the republics to be appointed
by the General Procurator of the Russian Federation. However, in a
number of other republican constitutions, this right of appointment is
given to the republican parliaments (e.g., Bashkortostan, Chechnya,
Tatarstan and Tyva).
Appointment of heads of other regional branches of 
federal ministries
A major weapon in the hands of regional executives has been their control
over the appointment of the heads of the federal bureaucracies situated
in their territory. Although article 77(2) of the Russian Constitution states
that there ‘is a unified system of executive power’ in the Russian Federa-
tion, and article 78(1) grants federal bodies the right to appoint their own
territorial bodies and ‘the relevant officials’, republican constitutions (and
some regional charters) state that such powers of appointment come
under the sole jurisdiction of the federal subjects.
There are approximately forty to fifty branches of federal bureaucra-
cies in each region. These include: power-wielding structures (the Federal
Security Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs); economic structures
(agencies of the State Property Committee, the Customs Service and the
Employment Service, and enterprises under federal jurisdiction); and
oversight agencies (sanitary and epidemiological supervision, the tax
police, the tax inspectorate, the Ministry of Finance’s Oversight and
Auditing Administration).36 And by 2000 there were currently about
450,000 members of federal bureaucracies working in the regions.37 As we
discuss in chapter 8 it is one of the main aims of the Putin regime to wrest
back control of these appointments from regional executives.
Bilateral agreements and the development of 
an asymmetrical federation
As noted above, articles 11 and 78 of the Russian Constitution left open
the door for the federal government and federal subjects to engage in
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bilateral treaties. Over the period 1994 to 1998, forty-six such treaties were
signed which rapidly undermined the authority of the federal Constitu-
tion as the primary basis of federal relations. These bilateral accords often
gave the local signatories substantial rights over the disposition of natural
resources on their territory, special tax concessions and other economic
and political privileges. Special and often secretive agreements attached
to the bilateral treaties, have in addition, granted the republics the right
to appoint federal officials in their territories, conduct their own inde-
pendent relations with foreign states, set up their own national banks, and
create their own political and administrative organs.38 In many instances
the bilateral treaties actually legitimised those extra-constitutional powers
which the republics had unilaterally proclaimed in their republican con-
stitutions. Most of the treaties were limited to a set period of between two
and five years.39
In Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, bilateral agreements have led to 
such profitable industries as petroleum extraction, petroleum refining 
and power generation being removed from the centre’s jurisdiction 
and handed over to local control and ownership. Tax concessions and
increased federal subsidies are a central feature of many of the bilateral
agreements. Over the period 1991 to 1993, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and
Sakha practically stopped transferring payments from taxes to the centre.
Fiscal relations were of a confederative nature. There was a ‘war of laws’
under the slogan, ‘if you do not fund us we will not send you taxes’.40
According to Lavrov, outright tax losses to the Federation caused by just
four special budgetary deals with the republics of Kareliya, Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan and Sakha, totalled at least 2 trillion roubles, or 2.3 per cent
of the federal budget’s revenues in 1994.41 And other funds flowed into
these republics from the profits of the oil industry (Bashkortostan and
Tatarstan).
In June 1995 Sakha signed a treaty with Moscow which gave the repub-
lic ownership of 26 per cent of its diamond output, 30 per cent of its gold
output, and a slightly smaller percentage of its oil and gas reserves.42 The
treaty also included a section on the division of powers between the two
governments and 15 other agreements dealing with a variety of issues,
such as ‘economic control, budget relations, the mining industry, the fuel
and energy industry, the northern sea route, external relations, agricul-
ture, communications, customs, immigration, roads, education, environ-
ment and natural resources, and federal development funds’.43 In 1995
Sakha received the colossal sum of 1.3 milliard US dollars for the sale of
its diamonds. A sum which was not less than the official budget income
of the republic.44
In 1996 the bilateral treaties were widened to include oblasts and 
krais. In its bilateral treaty with the federal government, Orenburg oblast
gained the status of a free economic zone, a lowering of its tax quotas,
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and financial control over 20 per cent of revenues accruing from oil and
gas production in the region.45 The granting of such special economic
privileges to a select group of regions has done much to undermine ‘fiscal
federalism’ in Russia (see chapter 5). Instead of reasserting fiscal control
over wayward republics and regions, the federal government seemed to
go out of its way to sign special treaties with them, thereby giving legal
sanction to a host of unconstitutional financial and political transactions
carried out by the regions.
Chronology of treaties
The first step on this path to an ‘asymmetrical federation’ was the land-
mark treaty signed with the republic of Tatarstan on February 15, 1994.
To all intents and purposes this treaty created a ‘state within a state’ and
came as close as one could possible come to legitimising Tatarstan’s own
Constitution and those provisions which gave Tatarstan sovereignty over
its economic and political affairs, including foreign trade and areas of
foreign policy. Attached to the treaty was a package of 12 agreements
signed between the governments of Russia and Tatarstan regulating
relations in the spheres of trade, property, budget, finance, the 
banking system, the military, the military industrial complex, customs,
foreign–economic ties, higher education, ecology and the coordination of
the legal and security services. Undoubtedly, one of the major reasons for
the treaty was to thwart the further growth of nationalist sentiment in the
republic and to prevent the secession of Tatarstan from the Federation.
Yeltsin admits the treaty was vitally important in that it, ‘forestalled the
danger of a split in the Federation’ (see chapter 4).46 Other agreements
were followed up in 1994 with the republics of Kabardino-Balkariya and
Bashkortostan, and in 1995 four such treaties were signed with the
republics of Buryatiya, North Ossetiya, Udmurtiya and Sakha.
Political factors played a major role in determining who were to be the
lucky beneficiaries. In many cases such treaties were signed on the eve of
parliamentary and presidential elections and were clearly part of a
package to bribe the regions into submission and win over their political
support for the President. Yeltsin was also able to capitalise on the fears
of regional elites who believed that if the communists or the nationalists
came to power they would bring a halt to the treaties.47
In 1996 there were no less than nineteen such treaties, eighteen of which
were signed in the run-up to the presidential elections, including the first
agreement with a non-ethnic republic which was signed by Sverdlovsk
oblast on January 12. Sverdlovsk benefited from the timing of the treaty.
Yeltsin’s popularity rating in the country was at an all time low, and there
were fears in the presidential camp that the Communists would follow
up their success in the 1995 Duma elections with victory in the forth-
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coming summer presidential elections. The bilateral treaty signed with
Sverdlovsk legitimised many of the demands made by the region in 1993
when it unilaterally elevated its status to that of a republic (the Urals
Republic). Thus, under the provisions of the Treaty the region was granted
the right to form its own civil service and the governor was given the
power to approve the appointment and dismissal of all federal posts in
the region.48 And as Stoner-Weiss notes, in article 8 of the bilateral treaty,
the region was even given powers ‘to suspend the normative acts of min-
istries and departments of the federal government’.49 In 1997 there were
a further fourteen agreements.
Those treaties that were adopted first (at a time of federal weakness),
were generally more generous, granting the signatories a significant
number of economic and political privileges that were denied to later sig-
natories. Thus, for example, ‘In October 1996 representatives from 6 black
earth regions asked the Duma to pass a law defining the legislative and
executive rights of federal subjects. Their complaint was that “those who
came first earned more rights” ’.50 In February 1998 the governor of
Saratov Oblast, Dmitrii Ayatskov, requested that the bilateral treaty which
his region had signed with the Federal Government the year before, be
renegotiated, as it was too restrictive.51 One gets the idea of an endless
cycle of negotiations and renegotiations gradually destroying any vestiges
of constitutionalism leading the country inevitabily and inexorably from
a ‘treaty’ federation to a ‘contractual’ federation. In total forty-six bilat-
eral treaties were signed by the summer of 1998, the last with Moscow
city, which came into operation on June 16.52 Paradoxically, the final treaty
with Moscow was signed before the adoption of a key presidential decree
in June 1999 which was designed to bring the treaties into line with the
Constitution and to tighten up on the procedures by which the treaties
were drawn up and implemented.53
Legal and constitutional basis of bilateral treaties
The legal basis for the treaties is firmly stated in the Constitution in arti-
cles 11 and 7854 and also in a Presidential Decree of March 12, 1996. In
article 78 it clearly states that federal subjects of executive power may give
up some of their powers to executive bodies of subjects of the federation
as long as these do not conflict with the constitution and federal laws.
Article 11 states that: ‘the delimitation of areas of responsibility and
powers – between bodies of the state power of the Russian Federation and
bodies of state power of the components of the Russian Federation is
effected by the present constitution, and the Federation treaty, and other
treaties concerning the delimitation of areas of responsibility and powers’.
A special commission was set up by presidential decree on July 12, 1994
for preparing treaties, and according to the head of the commission ‘all
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the treaties scrupulously followed uniform rules’.55 However, it would
appear that in reality there were many problems with regulating the
treaties. Thus, Yeltsin was forced to enact a special decree on the regula-
tion of the treaties in 1996.56 According to this decree the treaties (and
accompanying agreements): (1) must not violate the Russian Constitution;
(2) cannot change the status of a subject of the Federation; (3) cannot add
to or change what is enumerated in articles 71 and 72 of the Constitution;
and (4) must respect the supremacy of the Constitution.57
But, as we illustrate below, these provisions have simply been ignored.
As Umnova demonstrates, the treaties have significantly widened the
number of areas coming under joint jurisdiction as stipulated in article 72,
‘In Tatarstan there were 17 new spheres, in Bashkortostan and Sakha 11,
in Kabardino-Balkariya 8, North Osetiya 14, Buryatiya 3, Sverdlovsk
Oblast 8, Kaliningrad Oblast 11, and Udmurtiya 11’.58
Thus, for example, the following areas were transferred from the exclu-
sive authority of the federal authorities to joint jurisdiction: state defence
(Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkariya, North Osetiya); intro-
duction of a state of emergency (Kabardino-Balkariya); conversion of
defence industries to domestic production (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan,
North Osetiya, Udmurtiya, Sverdlovsk and Orenburg oblasts); coordinat-
ing of military production complex (Tatarstan and Bashkortostan); man-
agement of the defence industry (Sverdlovsk oblast, Udmurtiya); the
citing of military forces (Bashkortostan); arms sales (Tatarstan); coordina-
tion of budget finance, money-credit and pricing policy and the adminis-
tration of public energy, transport and communications (Tatarstan, North
Osetiya, Kabardino-Balkariya).59
In other cases constitutional powers exclusively reserved for the
Russian federation government were transferred to the sole jurisdiction
of federal subjects; international relations (Tatarstan); national banks
(Tatarstan, Bashkortostan); republican citizenship (Tatarstan,60 Kabardino-
Balkariya, Bashkortostan61); the right to appoint or approve nominations
for regional representatives of federal agencies, police, procuracy, judges,
treasury, tax and others (Bashkortostan, Tatarstan Sverdlovsk, and many
others). Thus, for example, according to the bilateral treaty signed
between Ulyanovsk and the federal government, ‘the heads of the tax
inspectorate, treasury, police and other offices were appointed with the
agreement of the oblast authorities’.62
A long awaited law to regulate bilateral treaties was finally adopted by
the State Duma on June 30, 1999.63 The law ‘reinforced the supremacy of
federal laws and the Constitution in the legal hierarchy, categorically
stated the principles of glasnost in treaty promulgation, and gave the
regions three years to bring existing treaties into conformity with federal
law’.64 However, the law came too late as no more treaties were signed
after June 1998. And, it would appear to have made little impact. As we
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discuss in chapter 8, progress in bringing bilateral treaties into line with
the Constitution has been so slow that President Putin has been forced to
set up yet another special commission to re-examine this whole issue.
Conclusions: bilateral treaties and the federal Constitution
As Khakimov notes, there are two basic approaches to federalism in
Russia: (1) constitutional–treaty, when the centre defines the course of 
all the processes and delegates powers to the regions, and (2) treaty–
constitutional, when relations are constructed from below up through the
voluntary delegation of powers from subjects to the centre.
The supporters of the constitutional–treaty form of federalism argue
that the sovereignisation of the republics on the Tatarstan model will lead
to the collapse of Russia. Thus, they argue for strict controls from the
centre over the subjects. Bilateral treaties according to them are simply
anomalies and provincial documents which have hindered the devel-
opment of a unitary state. The war with Chechnya is seen as a positive
development to keep the ethnic republics in check (see chapter 4).
Those who support a treaty–constitutional federation do not consider
Russia a true federation but insist on forming relations with the centre
according to the model ‘from below-above’ through the voluntary dele-
gation of powers with the help of bilateral treaties. Sovereignty is
established on a legal basis allowing the subjects of the federation 
self-determination. If the first variant insists that the constitutions of the
republics must correspond with that of the federal Constitution then the
second variant argues the reverse, that the federal Constitution must
conform to the constitutions of the republics, and that the centre must be
placed under the control of the subjects. The source of power in a democ-
racy is the people, therefore the functions of central organs must be
defined by the subjects of the federation.65 Tatarstan and Bashkortorstan
have been vigorous champions of the latter model.
For other scholars the bilateral treaties have played a positive role in
preventing the disintegration of the federation (see chapter 4). Thus,
Hughes argues that, ‘the empowerment of asymmetric federalism’ in
Russia, ‘has been the key factor in the successful management of sepa-
ratist and regionalist challenges, and is the principal factor explaining its
survivability as a federation’.66
The treaties have also been defended on the grounds that they allow
the centre to engage in a more responsive, flexible, and democratic way
to the local needs of Russia’s highly diverse subjects. Furthermore, as
Hughes argues, ‘by decentralising power over a wide range of policy
domains the treaties have acted as a counterweight to the strongly cen-
tralist state tradition in Russia’, engineering ‘a new institutional structure
for the accommodation of Russia’s plural society’.67 Supporters of such
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‘treaty based’ federalism also often refer to the Spanish example of ‘foral-
istic federalism’ to support their case. ‘Foralistic federalism’ was the term
given to the negotiated charters drawn up between the king and the
provinces in medieval Spain. As Elazar notes, in modern day Spain, bilat-
eral agreements are authorized and adopted ‘through a complex process
involving the consent of the national and regional parliaments’ and the
‘agreements are tailored to meet the specific constitutional needs of each
federal subject’.68 Thus, as Smith notes, developments in Russia demon-
strate that federalisation may involve ‘a post-constitutional process of
reaching important agreements as much as it may rely on an original
compact’.69
However, I would agree with those critics who argue that the treaties
have fundamentally weakened the Constitution and the rule of law in
Russia. Whilst the Constitution does allow for some flexibility, it may be
argued that such treaties have fatally undermined its authority. The
treaties make a mockery of article 5 of the federal Constitution which
states that the relations between the centre and all the subjects are equal.
Moreover, it is clear that the bilateral treaties have, in all but name,
elevated a select number of oblasts to the status of de facto republics.
Furthermore, it is also important to note that the treaties were never
legitimised by the national parliament (Duma or Federation Council) nor
by the legislative bodies of the subjects. These were agreements between
executive bodies of power – signed usually by either the President or the
Prime Minister and the chief executive of the regions. In April 1997, the
Federation Council vetoed legislation which would have given the Duma
such powers. Also we should take note of the complete silence of the con-
stitutional court as regards the constitutionality of the bilateral treaties.
Not a single treaty was brought before the court for examination. Clearly,
such sensitive areas were kept out of its purview. The court, since its rein-
carnation in 1995, does not have the power to initiate hearings but must
have cases brought before it.
In conclusion, the bilateral treaties have led to a situation, whereby
some poor regions are totally dependent on the centre and no real federal
relations exist whilst a second stronger group has the trappings of feder-
alism, and finally the most powerful autonomous entities, such as
Tatarstan, coexist with Moscow as part of an exclusive club of confed-
erative states.70 Moreover, the treaties have increased the already high
level of ‘constitutional asymmetry’ operating in the Federation.
Appendix 3.1 Article 71 of the December 1993 Russian Constitution
The following fall within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation:
a) adoption and amendment of the constitution of the Russian Federation
and federal laws, and the monitoring of compliance with them;
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b) the federative system and territory of the Russian Federation;
c) the regulation and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms;
citizenship of the Russian Federation; the regulation and protection of
the rights of national minorities;
d) the establishment of a system of federal bodies of legislative, executive,
and judicial power, the procedure for their organization and activity; the
formation of federal bodies of state power;
e) federal state property and the management thereof;
f) the establishment of the fundamentals of federal policy and federal pro-
grammes in the sphere of the state, economic, ecological, social, cultural
and national development of the Russian Federation;
g) the establishment of the legal foundations of the single market; finan-
cial, currency, credit and customs regulation, monetary emission and the
foundations of pricing policy; federal economic services, including
federal banks;
h) the federal budget; federal taxes and duties; federal regional develop-
ment funds;
i) federal power systems, nuclear power generation, fissile materials;
federal transport, railways, information and communications; activity
in space;
j) the Russian Federation’s foreign policy and international relations and
the Russian Federation’s international treaties; issues of war and peace;
k) the Russian Federation’s foreign economic relations;
l) defence and security; defence production; the determination of the
procedure for the sale and purchase of weapons, ammunition, military
hardware and other military property; the production of toxic sub-
stances, narcotic substances and the procedures for their use;
m) the determination of the status and protection of the state border, terri-
torial seas, airspace, the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf of the Russian Federation;
n) the judicial system; the procurator’s office; legislation in the field of
criminal, criminal-procedure and criminal-executive law; amnesty and
the granting of pardons; legislation in the field of civil law, the law of
civil procedure and the law of arbitration procedure; the legal regula-
tion of intellectual property;
o) federal law relating to the conflict of laws;
p) the meterological service, standards and standard weights and
measurements, the metric system and measurement of time; geodesy
and cartography; geographic names; official statistical records and
accounting;
q) state awards and honorary titles of the Russian Federation;
r) the federal civil service.71
Appendix 3.2 Article 72 of the December 1993 Russian Constitution
The following fall within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation
and the components of the Russian Federation:
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a) the guaranteeing that the constitutions and laws of republics, and 
the charters, laws and other normative legal acts of krais, oblasts, 
cities of federal significance, the autonomous oblasts and autonomous
okrugs accord with the constitution of the Russian Federation and
federal laws;
b) the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms; the protection
of the rights of national minorities; the guaranteeing of legality, law and
order and public safety; the arrangements relating to border zones;
c) issues relating to the ownership, use and disposal of land, mineral
resources, water and other natural resources;
d) the delimitation of state property;
e) the use of the natural environment; environmental protection and the
guaranteeing of ecological safety; natural sites under special protection;
the protection of historical and cultural monuments;
f) general issues of nurture, education and science, culture, physical fitness
and sport;
g) the coordination of questions of public health; the protection of the
family, mothers, fathers and children; social protection, including social
security;
h) the implementation of measures for combating catastrophes, natural
disasters and epidemics and the elimination of their consequences;
i) the establishment of general principles of taxation and levying of duties
in the Russian Federation;
j) administrative, administrative-procedural, labour, family, housing,
land, water, and forestry legislation, and legislation on mineral re-
sources and on environmental protection;
k) personnel of judicial and law-enforcement bodies; attorneys and
notaries;
l) protection of the primordial habitat and traditional way of life of
numerically small ethnic communities;
m) the establishment of the general principles for the organization of a
system of bodies of state power and local self-government;
n) the coordination of the international and foreign economic relations of
components of the Russian Federation and the fulfilment of the Russian
Federation’s international treaties.72
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4From ethnic to legal 
and economic separatism
Federalism and the ‘parade of sovereignties’
With a population of 145 million citizens the Russian Federation is one of
the most populous and ethnically diverse states in the world. Within its
vast territory, which encompasses one-eighth of the world’s land surface,
reside 128 officially recognised nations and ethnic groups.1 As we dis-
cussed in chapter 2, of the 89 republics and regions that make up the
Russian Federation, 32 are based on ethnic criteria; namely, 21 republics,
10 autonomous okrugs and 1 autonomous oblast. In such large multi-
national states, federalism, it is argued, can be a positive or a negative
phenomenon.
For those who stress the positive side, federalism functions as a form
of empowerment for regional groups and protects minorities from the
tyranny of the majority. According to Watts, federalism refers to the advo-
cacy of multi-tiered government combining elements of shared rule and
regional self-rule. ‘It is based on the presumed values of achieving both
unity and diversity by accommodating, preserving and promoting dis-
tinct identities within a larger political union’.2
As Kempton notes, federalism ‘allows many minority groups to sustain
themselves by making them the majority within a specific component of
the larger state’.3 Most importantly of all, by providing a democratic alter-
native to nation-statehood, federalism provides a viable alternative to
regional secession and the potential disintegration of multinational states.
In this regard it has been successful in quelling ethnic and religious ten-
sions in Canada, Belgium, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Spain and South
Africa.4
For those who stress the negative side, federalism is the problem rather
than the solution, particularly in multinational states where ethnic bound-
aries coincide with boundaries of the federal subjects. Federalism, accord-
ing to this scenario, is much more likely to intensify the nationalist
grievances it is supposed to ameliorate. As Smith notes:
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Federalism provides incentives for structuring group/class conflicts along
territorial lines, [and] when the territories in question are spatial surrogates
of large-scale, potentially self-conscious cultural communities, most territo-
rial conflicts become community conflicts as well. In the process, feelings 
of ethnicity are strengthened and new issues take on ethno-territorial
significance.5
Federalism can also lead to the creation of new national communities, as
was the case in the USSR. By granting ethnic communities virtually all 
of the trappings of statehood (constitutions, flags, hymns, parliaments,
executive bodies, courts etc.), federalism, it is argued, simply provides
such communities with the institutional and cultural building blocks to
go one step further and forge separate states. In other words, the drawing
of regional boundaries intrinsic to federalism acts to reify and reproduce
the very group differences to which federalism is itself a response.
However, it is doubtful that the Russian state would still exist today in
its current form if it were not for the federal arrangements codified in the
1992 Federal Treaty, the 1993 Constitution and the numerous bilateral
treaties which were negotiated over the period 1992–98. These federal
arrangements helped to quell nationalism in the republics and eventually
brought an end to the ‘parade of sovereignties’ which dominated the
political landscape in the early 1990s.
With the exception of the wars in Chechnya, and sporadic inter-ethnic
conflicts and tensions in the Caucasus, even Russia’s weak and imperfect
form of federalism has succeeded in quelling outright demands for sepa-
ration. Bilateral deals struck between the centre and the republics trans-
formed the regions zero-sum demands for secession into more negotiable
and viable demands for greater legal, economic and political sovereignty.
No doubt, Yeltsin’s dissolution of the Russian parliament and the hor-
rific events of the ‘October days’ in 1993, coupled with the sending of
federal troops into secessionist Chechnya in 1994 and 1999, has also
helped to persuade ethnic groups to change tactics and to opt for nego-
tiation rather than conflict.6 The rise of Russian nationalism and the calls
from nationalists for the liquidation of the ethnically based federal sub-
jects, and the ‘gubernisation of Russia’ may also have convinced regional
elites of the need to find some urgent form of accommodation with the
Yeltsin regime.
Payin argues rightly that the bilateral treaties between Moscow and the
republics ‘severely weakened the positions of radical nationalist forces,
whose influence was based almost entirely on notions of an imperial
enemy’.7 Thus, for example, the radical nationalist movement in Tatarstan,
which had been fairly strong, literally fell apart after the signing of the
treaty between Moscow and Kazan in 1994.8 And nationalist movements
in other republics have so far, failed to gain support at the ballot box.9
However, Yeltsin’s compromise with the ethnic republics was bought
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at a cost – at the cost of undermining the Federal Constitution and the
sanctioning of authoritarianism.10 As Furman notes: ‘The federal centre
agreed to grant the republics more rights than the Russian provinces,
allowing them to develop into ‘vassal kingdoms’ in whose internal affairs
Moscow did not interfere as long as they regularly paid Yeltsin their
‘tribute’ in the form of votes – which they did in every important federal
election’.11 We discuss these ideas further in chapter 9.
Federalism and secessionism
The outright disintegration of the Russian Federation remains highly
unlikely given the ethnic makeup and geo-political status of Russia’s
thirty-two ethnically defined subjects. The following six demographic,
geo-political and social factors have conspired to weaken or stifle the
development of separatist movements. (1) Nationality based entities
(including autonomous regions) occupy 53 per cent of the country’s 
area, but only 18 per cent of the population lives in those regions.12 (2)
Furthermore, according to a micro-census carried out in 1994 Russians
now make up the overwhelming majority of the population (82.95 per
cent), compared to 50 per cent in the USSR.13 (3) Of the 172 ethnic groups
the largest, the Tatars, make up only 3.8 per cent of the population 
(followed by the Ukrainians (2.3), Chuvash with (1.2), Bashkirs (0.9),
Belarussians (0.7) and Mordvinians (0.6): all the other ethnic groups com-
prise less than 1 per cent.14 (4) Russians predominate not only in the
Russian Federation as a whole but also in most of its regions – in 74 of
the 89 members of the Federation. Indeed, forty-nine regions can be called
purely Russian areas. In those regions, representatives of the ethnic major-
ity make up 85 to 98 per cent of the population. The largest per centage
of Russians in any region is now found in Tambov oblast (97.8 per cent).15
(5) The ethnic republics make up just 28.6 per cent of the territory and
only 15.7 per cent of the population.16 Furthermore, of the twenty-one
republics, the eponymous population comprises a majority in only seven;
Chechnya, Chuvashiya, Dagestan,17 Ingushetiya, Kalmykiya, North
Osetiya-Alaniya, and Tyva, and a plurality in two, Kabardino-Balkariya
and Tatarstan. Russians, on the other hand, have an absolute majority in
nine, Adygeya, Buryatiya, Altai, Kareliya, Khakassiya, Komi, Mordoviya,
Sakha (Yakutiya) and Udmurtiya; and a plurality in three, Bashkortostan,
Karachai-Cherkessiya and Marii-El (see table 4.1). (6) Finally, of the 
eleven autonomous areas (the ten autonomous okrugs (AOs) and the
autonomous oblast (AOB)) the eponymous population comprises a major-
ity in only two, Aga-Buryatiya AO and Komi-Permyakiya AO (see 
table 4.2).
However, we should caution that the numbers of eponymous peoples
are rising in their native regions where the rates of population growth are
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Table 4.1 Ethnic composition of the republics, 1989 (%)
Republic Eponymous population(s) Russian population
Adygeya 22.1 68.0
Altai 31.2 60.4
Bashkortostan 21.9 39.3
Buryatiya 24.0 70.0
Chechnya-Ingushetiya 70.7 23.1
Chuvashiya 68.7 26.7
Dagestan 90.8 9.2
Kabardino-Balkariya 57.6 32.0
Kalmykiya 53.0 37.7
Karachai-Cherkessiya 40.9 42.4
Kareliya 10.0 73.6
Khakassiya 11.1 79.5
Komi 23.3 57.7
Marii-El 43.3 47.5
Mordoviya 32.5 60.8
North Ossetiya 53.0 29.9
Sakha (Yakutiya) 33.4 50.3
Tatarstan 48.5 43.3
Tyva 64.3 32.0
Udmurtiya 30.9 58.9
Source: G. W. Lapidus and E. W. Walker, Nationalism, regionalism, and federalism:
centre–periphery relations in post-communist Russia’, in G. W. Lapidus (ed.), The New
Russia: Troubled Transition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 88–9; E. Payin and
A. Susarov, ‘Line five in the mirror of demography’, Rossiiskie Vesti, October 30, 1997, 2.
Translated in CDPSP, 49:44 (1997), 11.
greater for the indigenous population than for the Russian population. We
have also witnessed the return migration of representatives of the epony-
mous nationalities from other parts of Russia, the Baltic states, and the
Confederation of Independent states. Whilst at the same time there has
been a steady outflow of Russians from a number of regions. Thus, for
example, the per centage of Kalmyki in Kalmykiya grew from 41.5 per
cent in 1979 to 52.6 per cent in 1994.18
One would imagine that demands for secession are likely to be
strongest in those republics: (1) situated in the outer rim of the Federa-
tion which border on foreign states; and (2) where a majority of the
population is eponymous.19 Of the seven republics where the eponymous
population comprises a majority, Chuvashiya is an enclave with no real-
istic prospects for secession. This leaves only six republics where there is
a majority of the eponymous population and the subjects are situated on
the outer rim of the Russian state: Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetiya,
FAD4  10/17/2002  5:43 PM  Page 56
Kalmykiya, North Osetiya-Alaniya and Tyva.20 And indeed it is these
republics, mainly to be found in the North Caucuses which have proven
to be the most vociferous in their demands for autonomy. But only
Chechnya has opted for secession and it has had to pay the price of two
wars, the loss of thousands of its citizens, occupation by Russian troops,
and the imposition of a pro-Moscow ‘puppet government’. Of the other
five republics, as Payin notes, North Osetiya-Alaniya can be excluded, for,
‘as the only Christian autonomy in the Muslim North Caucasus, it will
not want to leave Russia under any readily conceivable circumstances’.21
Secession from the Federation is also highly unlikely in the multi-ethnic
state of Dagestan, since the majority of the population realise that even
the suggestion of secession from Russia would invite an explosion of
demands for internal secession and of internal conflicts amongst it thirty-
three ethnic groups.22
Another factor which has dampened down calls for independence from
these states is their dire economic situation and financial dependence on
the centre. Thus, for example, although we may expect nationalism to be
strong in Tyva, which was nominally a sovereign state from 1921 to 1944,
demands for secession have been stifled by the fact, that the Republic
depends on the federal authorities for 90 per cent of its income. And
Dagestan, Ingushetiya, Kalmykiya, and North Osetiya-Alaniya are also
highly dependent on federal subsidies (see chapter 5).
It is interesting also in this respect to consider the point that the epony-
mous population in three of the most radical and confederalist repub-
lics, Bashkortostan, Sakha (Yakutiya) and Tatarstan, make up only 21.9
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Table 4.2 Ethnic composition of the autonomous areas, 1989 (%)
Autonomous areas Eponymous population(s) Russian population
Autonomous oblast (1)
Jewish 4.2 83.2
Autonomous okrugs (10)
Agin-Buryat 54.9 40.8
Chukotka 7.3 66.1
Yevenk 14.0 67.5
Komi-Permyak 60.2 36.1
Koryakiya 16.5 62.0
Khanty-Mansi 0.9 66.3
Nenets 11.9 65.8
Taimyr 13.7 67.1
Ust¢-Ordin Buryat 36.3 56.5
Yamala-Nenets 4.2 59.2
Source: Lapidus and Walker, The New Russia, p. 89.
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per cent, 33.4 per cent and 48.5 per cent of the population, respectively.
Whilst the Russian population comprises a plurality of 39.3 per cent in
Bashkortostan, a majority of 50.3 per cent in Sakha (Yakutiya), and a size-
able minority of 43.3 per cent in Tatarstan. And of course all three of these
republics are like Chuvashiya, landlocked inside Russia with no realistic
prospects for separation.
In Bashkortostan, Bashkirs are the third largest ethnic group in the
Republic, some way behind Tatars, and Russians. However, in an attempt
to gain an external foreign border, Bashkortostan has recently begun
negotiations for an exchange of territory with the neighbouring region of
Orenburg. If successful this would allow Bashkortostan to establish a
direct border connection with Kazakhstan which is only fifty kilometres
away. The area in question has a high per centage of Tatar and Bashkir
populations.23
Other sources of ethnic tension can be found in the republics of
Kabardino-Balkariya and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya. Here the question is
not one of secession from Russia but, rather, calls for the division of each
of these republics into two new entities providing separate homelands for
the Kabards, Balkars, Karachais and Cherkess. In other regions there have
been calls for unification rather than separation. Thus, for example, there
has been strong support from citizens in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan for
the idea of creating closer economic and political ties in some kind of
confederacy.24
The autonomous formations
The ten autonomous okrugs (AOs) which are considered by the constitu-
tion to be full subjects of the federation, are in fact trapped ‘matroshka
doll-like’, within the territories of eight other federal subjects. The Agin-
Buryat AO within Chita Oblast; Chukotka (Magadan Oblast); Yevenk and
Taimyr AOs (Krasnoyarsk Krai); Khanty-Mansi and Yamala-Nenets
(Tyumen Oblast); Komi-Permyak (Perm Oblast); Koryakiya (Kamchatka
oblast); Nenets (Arkhangelskaya Oblast); Ust¢-Orda Buryat (Irkutsk
Oblast).
The Constitution is rather unclear as to what their proper relationship
should be with the regional authorities in whose territories they are situ-
ated. Their legal status is contradictory. On the one hand they are admin-
istratively subordinate to the regions of which they are part but on the
other hand they are also constitutionally equal to them. In an attempt to
solve this anomalous situation, the Constitution states that relations
between the okrugs and the regions should be ‘treaty based’. In 1997 the
Russian Federation Constitutional Court ruled that where conflict arises
and there is no treaty (as was the case in Tyumen oblast in 1997) then the
autonomous okrug is equal in status to the region.25 By this ruling the
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regional authorities are not allowed to interfere in the administration of
the okrugs, but on the other hand, the populations of the okrugs are
allowed to participate in the elections of their ‘parent regions’. Such an
interpretation actually appears to makes the autonomous okrugs ‘more
equal’ than the regions in which they are situated.26
The special status of the autonomies becomes more questionable when
we consider their ethnic makeup (see table 4.2). In only two of the eleven
(Aga-Buryatiya and Komi-Permyakiya) does the eponymous population
comprise a majority, whilst in the remaining nine the Russian population
predominates. And in a number of the autonomous okrugs the per
centage of the indigenous population is tiny. Why it may be asked are
Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets okrugs (with indigenous populations
of just 0.9 and 4.2 per cent respectively) granted full membership of the
federation, with the right (until January 2002, see chapter 8) to send two
representatives to the upper chamber of the parliament, and to maintain
their own charters and other trappings of statehood?27 As we shall discuss
below, these questions become all the more critical when they involve dis-
putes over who should control the economic spoils of the okrugs – the
okrugs, or their ‘parent regions’.
Recently we have witnessed the situation of autonomous okrugs
demanding independence from their ‘parent’ regions (e.g., Khanty-Mansi
and Yamalo-Nenets from Tyumen Oblast) and paradoxically others
seeking to be fully integrated into their parent oblasts (e.g., Komi-
Permyak Okrug with Perm Oblast). As Paretskaya rightly stresses, the
main reasons for both kinds of change of status are economic. Perm 
Oblast is happy to be free of the social responsibility of its impoverished
okrug. By contrast, Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenents okrugs are fabu-
lously wealthy oil and gas producers. By seceding from Tyumen Oblast
the okrugs will no longer have to give up a per centage of their oil and
gas revenues to the Oblast authorities. The majority of citizens in both
okrugs boycotted the 1997 gubernatorial election in Tyumen Oblast.28
Failing in their quest for seccession these two okrugs have recently
adopted a new strategy – to take control of the Oblast’s economy. As
Arbatskaya notes: ‘Effectively, the okrugs, and especially Khanty-Mansi,
are buying up the largest tax-paying enterprises in the south. Over time
these purchases will give the northern okrugs control of the political
processes in the region, particularly local elections and elections to the
oblast Duma’.29
A similar battle has been raging between the leaderships of Krasno-
yarsk Krai and the Taimyr autonomous okrug over the profits of the
Norilsk Nickel Factory which supplies 20 per cent of the world’s nickel
and 5 per cent of its copper. The factory provides some 70 per cent of the
krai’s income. The battle began when in collusion with its director, the
Taimyr authorities unilaterally transferred the factory from the krai to
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their jurisdiction. Such a move guaranteed that the spoils of the factory
would no longer go to the krai but would instead flow into the coffers of
the okrug. The factory would also benefit from the move, as it would gain
access to Taimyr’s mineral resources and at the same time escape super-
vision from the krai administration. Tax evasion and corruption were also
at the heart of the deal. These actions of the okrug were opposed by the
mayor of Norilsk, where the factory was situated. However, after months
of wrangling, federal authorities prohibited the transfer of the factory
from the krai’s jurisdiction. In response the okrug administration boy-
cotted the Krasnoyarsk gubernatorial elections and it declared all laws of
the krai invalid in the territory of the okrug. Finally, after years of stale-
mate and conflict a power sharing agreement was signed in 1997 between
the krai and the okrug. The treaty granted the Okrug some of the profits
generated by the plant at Norilsk. In a more recent twist to this saga, the
former head of Norilsk Nickel, Aleksandr Khloponin was elected gover-
nor of Taimyr AO and he has now given his support to a proposal by
deputies of the Taimyr legislative assembly to consider the exit of Taimyr
from the krai.30
Tensions have also arisen over calls by Buryats to unite Russia’s 
two Buryat okrugs with the Republic of Buryatiya to create a ‘greater
Buryatiya’ republic. The Ust-Orda AO which is situated in Irkutsk Oblast
and the Agin Buryat AO situated in Chita oblast have historical links with
the Republic of Buryatiya, which lies between the two okrugs.31
New legislation is being prepared in the presidential administration to
bring an end to these anomalies. The solution being suggested is simply
to dissolve the okrugs and to amalgamate them with their parent regions.
But for the centre to do this unilaterally would mean violating the
Constitution which has strict rules for changing the borders of federal
subjects.32
From ethnic to legal and economic separatism
For many regions a more realistic option than outright secession has been
the development of ‘economic’ and ‘legal’ separatism or what Khemkin
terms ‘internal emigration’, the process whereby a number of subjects
have withdrawn themselves from the legal and economic orbit of the fed-
eration and become de facto autonomous islands within the Russian
state.33 Thus, as we noted in chapter 3, the constitutions of 19 of Russia’s
21 republics (all except Kalmykiya and Kareliya) violate the Federal Con-
stitution.34 According to an analysis by the Ministry of Justice, of the
44,000 regional acts adopted over the period 1995–97 almost half were 
in violation of the Russian Constitution and federal legislation.35 And
regions and republics regularly pass legislation that infringe citizens’
rights. Thus, for example, according to Voronezh Oblast Procurator,
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Aleksandr Frolov, 399 regional directives of the oblast Duma which were
adopted in 1998 violated human rights.36
What we appeared to be witnessing during the early part of the Yeltsin
regime was a ‘war of laws’ between the federal authorities and the regions
reminiscent of the struggle which existed between the Union Republics
and the federal authorities during the Gorbachev period.
The ability of the regions to opt for legal separatism has been increased
by the fact that the top executive and legislative bodies are now elected
from below rather than appointed from above. Up until the gubernator-
ial elections of 1995–97 the majority of regional chief executives were
appointed to their posts by the president. The fact that regional leaders
now come to office through the ballot box has significantly enhanced their
local powers. No longer can the Russian President simply appoint loyal
supporters to rule the regions.37 Elections for regional assemblies have
also taken place throughout the country and thousands of new deputies
have taken their seats in local assemblies. Regional executive heads and
the chairs of regional assemblies have been until very recently exofficio
members of the Federation Council and new elections in the regions led
to changes in its composition weakening Yeltsin’s control over the upper
chamber (see chapter 6).
For Lapidus these trends gave rise during the late 1990s to fears, that,
at best, Russia [was] being progressively transformed from a federation
to a confederation, and at worst that it [would] be thrown backward to
the period of medieval chaos and conflict known as the era of ‘appanage
principalities’.38 And Sakwa argues that by the end of the Yeltsin era
Russia had witnessed the development of what he calls ‘segmented
regionalism’, a process which ‘fragmented the country, juridically, eco-
nomically and, implicitly, in terms of sovereignty’ and which transformed
the country from a multinational state into a ‘multi-state state’.39 In a
similar vein, Smith speaks of the creation of ‘regional states’ – regions
which have increasingly adopted ‘many of the features usually ascribed
to the modern nation-state’.40 By the mid-1990s major economic and
political powers had passed from the centre to the regions and regional
politics was firmly under the control of regional elites.
Economic separatism
Regional elites have also opted for economic separatism. As Smith writes,
‘seven decades of centrally directed economic coordination between the
regions has given way to the anarchy of regional autarky’.41 With the
breakdown of the Soviet centrally planned system, and a massive collapse
in industrial production, regions have increasingly been forced to turn
inward absorbed only by their own selfish interests. One symptom has
been the breakdown of inter-regional trade, exacerbated by the dramatic
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fall in regional production. Thus, for example, the share of inter-regional
trade as a part of Russia’s gross regional product fell from 22 per cent in
1990 to approximately 12–14 per cent in 2000.42
Benefiting from the continuing political stalemate in Moscow a number
of republics have refused to implement legislation concerning the pri-
vatisation of land, and in some regions (particularly those controlled by
the communists) we have witnessed a denationalisation of industry. A
number of republics have also unilaterally taken control of their land and
natural resources. And throughout the 1990s regions and republics con-
tinued to attempt to blackmail the federal authorities by withholding
taxes from Moscow. In those regions where privatisation has gone ahead
there have been fierce battles between the centre and the regions over who
should benefit from the spoils of these programmes.
Federal subjects have also imposed their own import duties and sales
taxes on certain goods, prohibited the export of various products from
their regions and set their own prices, all in clear violation of article 74 of
the Russian Constitution. For example, Omsk Oblast placed a 50 per cent
duty on imported alcoholic beverages and a 10 per cent duty on the sale
of all imported foods, measures which were expected to bring in addi-
tional revenue of 830 billion roubles in 1997. And Yaroslavl¢ Oblast intro-
duced a 4 per cent sales tax on various goods and services to offset costs
for healthcare, education, and child benefits.43
These early moves to create regional economic autarkies intensified
after the financial crisis of August 1998, when almost every region was
forced to adopt protectionist measures to survive. Such actions have con-
tinued into the Putin era threatening to turn the Russian economy into a
collection of closed regional markets. Putin in his first presidential address
to the Duma in July 2000, spoke out against regional protectionism:
The federal authorities are responsible for establishing uniform conditions
for economic activity throughout the country. But regional agencies . . . are
creating barriers to the free circulation of capital, goods and services. This
is reprehensible and disgraceful! . . . Any actions by regional authorities 
that are aimed at restricting economic freedom must be halted as
unconstitutional.44
During the Yeltsin period regions were free for the first time in their history
to engage in the global economy. A number of republics and regions have
now set up diplomatic channels with foreign states and begun to engage
in foreign economic activities. Many of the republics now have their own
foreign consulates, and they are independent members of international
trade organisations. Thus, according to figures published in June 1999
Russian regions had signed more than 1,200 friendship agreements with
partners in 69 foreign states. And ‘permanent representatives’ of the
regions had been created in 46 foreign countries.45 Over the period
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1991–96, the regions and republics signed more than 300 trade agreements
with foreign states and in a number of cases such deals were struck
without the participation or sometimes even the knowledge of the rele-
vant ministries in Moscow. Thus, for example, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs expressed some alarm with regard to an agreement signed between
Kabardino-Balkariya and the Republic of Abkhazia (Georgia). And in 1995
Moscow was forced to annul a trade treaty between Kaliningrad Oblast
and Lithuania as it conflicted with Federal legislation.46
The inter-regional economic associations
In order to increase their leverage with Moscow all of the regions (except
Chechnya) have joined one or more of the regional economic associations
set up over the period 1992–94 based on Soviet-era geographical admin-
istrative divisions. As Klimanov notes: ‘In conditions marked by a long-
term economic crisis, an undeveloped political system, and the lack of a
comprehensive federal system, interregional cooperation expands the
internal potential of regions and creates conditions for a more effective
resolution of local political and economic problems’.47
Box 4.1 lists the eight inter-regional associations, their leaders and
membership. As Klimanov notes, in each association there are supra-
regional institutional structures including an executive and various eco-
nomic committees. The highest decision making bodies are the councils
which usually meet several times a year and are attended by senior gov-
ernment officials, often including the Prime Minister. As a measure of
their importance Prime Minister Primakov incorporated the leaders of the
associations into his cabinet in 1998.48
The associations have played an important role in aggregating and
articulating the demands of the regions. As we would expect the most
powerful associations are to be found in the most powerful economic
regions. In addition to the Siberian lobby, here we may include the asso-
ciations of the Urals, Volga and Central Russia.49
However, the power of the associations to affect policy making at the
highest levels has been rather disappointing. The economic interests of
the regions that make up each of the associations are highly diverse and
regional leaders are often too preoccupied with their own internal prob-
lems to mount a unified campaign. Thus, for example, as Klimanov notes,
the Siberian agreement is undermined by the division between the regions
of west Siberia, whose industries are dominated by military industrial
complex, and east Siberia, whose industries are based on the extraction
of natural resources.
There are also tensions between regions and ethnic republics, and
between those regions which managed to sign bilateral treaties with
Moscow and those which did not. As Smith notes: the ‘Siberian Accord’
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fragmented ‘in part because the larger oblasts resented the way in which
Sakha used its position to secure considerable economic and financial
autonomy from Moscow’. And Kalmykiya withdrew its membership
from the Greater Volga Association after a dispute with neighbouring
Astrakhan oblast.50 This has allowed the federal leadership to adopt a
policy of divide and rule with the associations. Moreover, leaders of the
associations tend to use their posts to further the interests of their own
regions rather than the associations as a whole and/or as a way of
launching national careers.
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Box 4.1 The inter-regional associations
1 The Far East and Baikal Association, consists of the republics of Buryatiya and
Sakha (Yakutia), Primorskii and Khabarovsk krais, Amur, Kamchatka,
Magadan, Chita, and Sakhalin oblasts, the Jewish autonomous oblast, and
Koryak and Chukotka autonomous okrugs.
2 The Siberian Accord Association comprises the republics of Buryatiya, Altai,
Khakasiya, along with Altai and Kransnoyarsk krais, Irkutsk, Novosibirsk,
Omsk, Tomsk, and Kemerovo oblasts, plus Agin-Buryat, Taimyr, Ust-Orda
Buryat, Khanty-Mansi, Yevenk, and Yamal-Nenets autonomous okrugs.
3 The Greater Volga Association includes the republics of Tatarstan, Mordoviya,
Chuvashiya, and Marii-El, as well as Astrakhan, Volgograd, Nizhnii Novgorod,
Penza, Samara, Saratov and Ulyanovsk oblasts.
4 The Central Russia Association is made up of Bryansk, Vladimir, Ivanovo, Kaluga,
Kostroma, Moscow, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tver, Tula, and Yaroslavl oblasts, along
with the city of Moscow.
5 The Association of Cooperation of Republics, Krais and Oblasts of the Northern
Caucuses has on average the lowest standard of living of the eight regional
groupings. It includes predominantly agricultural and mountainous areas: 
the republics of Adygeya, Dagestan, Ingushetiya, Kabardino-Balkariya,
Karachaevo-Cherkesiya, North Osetiya-Alaniya, Kalmykiya, Krasnodar and
Stavropol Krais and Rostov oblast.
6 The Black Earth Association consists of Voronezh, Belgorod, Kursk, Lipetsk, Orel,
and Tambov oblasts.
7 The Urals Regional Association includes the republics of Bashkortostan and
Udmurtiya, Komi-Permyak autonomous okrug and Kurgan, Orenburg, Perm,
Sverdlovsk and Cheliabinsk oblasts.
8 The North-West Association comprises the republics of Kareliya and Komi, as 
well as Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Kaliningrad, Kirov, Leningrad, Murmanask,
Novgorod, and Pskov oblasts. Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and St Petersburg.
Source: EWI Russian Regional Report, 15 January, 1997.
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Finally, Smirnyagin makes the important point that vertical relations
have long dominated horizontal relations in Russia. Horizontal contacts
between regions are ‘partial and intermittent’ and, ‘Even when horizon-
tal disputes arise between regions, the leaders of contending regions
launch their appeals first to Moscow rather than to each other’.51 More-
over, as discussed in chapter 8 the powers of the associations have
significantly declined since the creation of Putin’s seven federal districts
in 2000.
Federalism, ethnicity and democracy
Local democracy is surely a necessary pre-requisite for democratisation
at the national level. And the provision of certain basic democratic pro-
cedures should, in a democracy, be universally available to all citizens
across the federation regardless of their place of residence. Clearly democ-
racy will be that much more difficult to create and consolidate in multi-
national states where there are disputes over the boundaries of the state
and some groups wish to secede from the federation. Russia’s wars with
Chechnya have not only frightened other republics into submission, 
they have also bolstered authoritarianism at the centre and they played a
major role in bringing President Putin to power. As Rustow stresses no
democracy can be consolidated until consensus has been reached over
national unity and any contested boundaries of the state have been
settled.52 National unity is achieved when ‘the vast majority of citizens in
a democracy-to-be . . . have no doubt or mental reservations as to which
political community they belong to . . . [and] the people cannot decide
until someone decides who are the people’.53
A further problem in multinational states, as Smith notes, ‘is how 
to counter domination by either nationalist-minded minorities or the
majority national group’. One answer for those who advocate a liberal
federation ‘is to prioritise the individual rights of citizens regardless of
their ethnic or national affiliation’.54 For as O’Donnell rightly observes:
‘Citizenship can be universally exercised only when the normative system
is guided by universal criteria, when the rule of law is effectively enforced,
when public powers are willing and able to protect rights, and when all
individuals enjoy some social and economic prerequisites’.55
One of the major failings of the Russian state has been the inability or
unwillingness of the federal authorities to give equal rights to its citizens
and the centre’s tolerance of discrimination against minority nationalities,
particularly in the ethnic republics and autonomies. Article 126 of the
Russian Constitution guarantees the equality of all citizens regardless of
nationality – including political rights. But in Russia republican elites
regularly discriminate against minority groups and give preferential poli-
tical representation to their indigenous populations even when that 
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population does not comprise a majority in the given republic. As Kahn
notes, whilst republican constitutions are ‘replete with declarations about
the supremacy of law, open, free and fair multiparty elections, freedom of
speech, assembly and conscience’, in practice they, ‘embed special rights
and privileges’ for their indigenous citizens.56 Thus, for example, most of
the constitutions begin with declarations recognising the rights of the
multinational peoples of the republics, but conclude ‘with the assertion
of the right to self-determination of a particular national group’.57 Thus,
article 69 of Bashkortostan’s constitution declared that the republic ‘was
formed as a result of the realisation of the right of the Bashkir nation to
self-determination and to defend the interests of all multinational people
of the republic’, even although as we noted above ethnic Bashkirs make
up only 21.9 per cent of the population.
In Adygeya where ethnic Adygeya comprise 22.1 per cent of the
population, the Republican Constitution declares that the republic was
formed ‘as a result of the realisation of the right to self-determination of
the Adygeya people and the historically formed community of people
who live on its territory’.58 Non-indigenous citizens of ethnic republics are
also discriminated against when it comes to their rights to stand for
elected posts (see chapter 9). Thus, for example, ten republics require that
candidates, for select political offices, must possess knowledge of both
Russian and the titular language. In Sakha, ‘where Russians and ethnic
Sakha respectively comprise 50.3 per cent and 33.4 per cent of the popu-
lation, knowledge of both languages is required for candidates for the
posts of President and Chairman of either house of the Parliament’. Even
although only 2 per cent of Russian’s know how to speak Sakha.59 In
Bashkortostan, where Bashkiri comprise just 22 per cent of the population
and where Bashkir is only spoken by 15 per cent of the inhabitants (that
is not even by all Bashkiry) the Bashkir language alongside Russian is
mandatory for all candidates in presidential elections.60 And furthermore
this electoral law neglects the languages of the Tatar, Chuvash, Marii 
and other nationalities which as Khan notes, comprise 36 per cent of the
population.61
In November 2000 President Aslan Dzharimov of Adygeya made
changes to the way the electoral districts were formed in the republic in
a blatant attempt to guarantee that a majority of ethnic Adygeys would
gain election to the newly created upper chamber of the Republican
Parliament, even although, as noted above, Adygeys make up only one-
quarter of the population of the republic. In defiance of rulings by the
Russian Constitutional Court and the Adygeyan prosecutors’ office,
which declared the elections illegal, Dzharimov pressed ahead with the
elections in March 2001. As planned, ethnic Adygeys won a majority of
seats.62
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The discrimination against non-indigenous groups in the republics
even when these groups comprise a larger per centage of the population
than the titular nationality is graphically illustrated by their under-
representation in government and parliamentary posts. Thus, for example,
in the republic of Sakha (Yakutiya), Sakha make up 34 per cent of the
population but 69 per cent of posts in government structures. In Tatarstan
78.1 of the governing elite are Tatar even although they comprise 48.3 per
cent of the population. And Tatars make up 73.3 per cent of the members
of the Tatarstan Parliament – Russians 25.1 per cent and other nationalities
1.6 per cent.63
In Buryatiya the Buryats comprise 24.0 per cent of the population but
they held 43.1 per cent of the seats in the Republican parliament in June
1994.64 Of the eight top politicians in Bashkortostan in 1997 (President,
Prime Minister, Head of Presidential Administration, State Secretary,
leaders of the State Assembly), seven were Bashkirs in 1997, and only one
was Russian.65 It is also instructive to note that the per centage of Bashkiry
in the republic’s elite structures has risen in the post-communist period
(see tables 4.3 and 4.4).
However, factors other than the ethnic one must be considered in
assessing the likelihood of secession and the prospects for democratic con-
solidation in the republics. The most important additional factor is the
overall wealth and economic status of the federal subjects and the degree
to which they are economically dependent on the centre and this is one
of the topics we now turn to in chapter 5.
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Table 4.3 Ethnic composition of government elite in Bashkortostan, 1990–97
Chairs of
executive
Secretaries Chairs committees Chief Members
of raikoms of raion of city administrators, of cabinet
and and city and raion cities and of
% of gorkoms, soviets, soviets, districts, ministers,
Nationality population 1990 1990 1990 1997 1997
Bashkir 21.9 44.8 44.7 32.9 58.5 65.5
Russian 39.3 31.3 32.9 21.1 15.0 19.0
Tatar 28.4 19.4 15.8 38.2 18.5 13.0
Others 10.6 4.5 6.8 7.8 8.0 2.5
Source: R. Gallyamov, ‘Politicheskie elity Rossiiskikh respublik: osobennosti transformatsii
v postsovetskii period’, in A. Mel¢vil¢ (ed.), Transformatsiya Rossiiskikh regional¢nykh elit v
sravnitel’noi perspektive (Moscow: MONF, 1999), p. 167.
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5Fiscal federalism and 
socio-economic asymmetry
He who controls the economy controls the polity. But who does control
the purse strings in Russia, and how are federal funds distributed across
the federation? To what degree have federal policies ameliorated the high
levels of socio-economic asymmetry inherited from the USSR? To answer
these questions we need to examine fiscal federalism taking into account
both the formal structural aspects of the system and the more hidden
informal practices.
Fiscal federalism
As Bradshaw and Hanson note, ‘fiscal federalism brings together an
analysis of the workings of the federal system in Russia with an assess-
ment of the logic underlying the redistribution of federal tax revenues
between regions’.1 In addition to the formal income and expenditure flows
between federal and subnational budgets which are distributed through
the tax system, it is important to note that there are a wide range of other
forms of fiscal transfers: subventions, net mutual payments, credits, social
welfare programmes, and off-budget funds.
Ideally, fiscal federalism, it is argued, ‘should promote territorial
justice, economic efficiency, and political stability’.2 According to Hanson
et al., fiscal federalism requires that: (1) the responsibilities of each level
of government should be clearly delineated; (2) sub-national governments
should have the means for primary control over economic matters within
their jurisdiction; (3) the budgets of sub-national governments should be
substantially independent of those at higher levels; (4) transfers between
levels should be based on stable, transparent, public-domain formulae.3
As we shall see Russia is still very far away from implementing these
principles.
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Fiscal centralisation or decentralisation
Two of the most commonly employed measures of fiscal decentralisation,
‘are the share of the subnational budgets in consolidated revenue and
expenditures, and the degree to which subnational budgets consist of
revenue raised on their territories as opposed to transfers’.4 And by both
of these (aggregate) measures the Russian system especially over the
period 1993–98 was ‘rather decentralised’.5 Thus, as table 5.1 clearly
demonstrates, in 1992 the balance of funds between the federal and sub-
national budgets was a ratio of 56.0/44.0 per cent in favour of the centre.
However, over the period 1993–99 there was a steady increase in the share
of revenues allocated to the regional budgets, so that by 1998 the balance
of revenues was the reverse of that found in 1992, 44.0/56.0 per cent in
favour of the regions. Nevertheless, by 2001 President Putin had shifted
the balance back in favour of the centre (55.0/45.0 per cent).6
Turning to an examination of the share of federal transfers in subna-
tional budgets these made up approximately 15 per cent in Russia in 1999
compared with 30 per cent in India, China and Mexico, and 25 per cent
in Brazil.7
However, as Lavrov et al., note, when we measure levels of decen-
tralisation according to formal levels of ‘subnational autonomy’ we find
that the Russian system is highly centralised. Thus, compared to federa-
tions such as Canada, Switzerland and the US, where subnational gov-
ernments have a great deal of fiscal autonomy, in Russia the vast majority
of decisions concerning the income and expenditure of subnational
budgets are decided by the Federal Government in Moscow. Indeed, in
the Russian Federation ‘just 15 per cent of regional revenue derives from
taxes over which the regional authorities have any sort of real decision
making authority, and even these taxes are usually rigidly regulated from
above or subject to federal spending ceilings’.8
Moreover, according to changes made to the tax code that became
operational in January 2001 the Federal Government has increased its
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Table 5.1 Share of the income of federal and territorial (subnational) budgets
(%) in total state revenue, 1992–2001
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997a 1998 1999 2000 2001
Federal budgets 56.0 49.0 48.0 54.0 49.0 47.0 44.0 51.0 52.0 55.0
Territorial budgets 44.0 50.0 52.0 46.0 51.0 53.2 56.0 49.0 48.0 45.0
Source: Data for 1992–97, Yu. N. Gladkii and A. I. Chistobaev, Osnovy Regional’noi Politiki
(St Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Mikhailova V.A., 1998), p. 430; for 2000, EWI Russian Regional
Report 5:30 (August 2, 2000); for 2001, EWI RRR, 6:20 (May 30, 2001), pp. 4–5.
Note: a January–June 1997.
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control over regional finances even further. Thus, for example, the centre
now controls 100 per cent of the value-added tax whereas previously the
regions controlled 15 per cent of it. The regions have also been left 
with a smaller percentage of turnover tax to finance housing and 
roads. Responding to these developments, Belgorod Governor Yevgenii
Savchenko declared that the new tax regime would lead to the ‘formation
of a unitary state in which all regions will be dependent on the centre’.9
And ‘Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov warned that the Federal Government
would now control 65 per cent of the country’s revenue, leaving only 35
per cent for the regions’.10 As we shall discuss below, the vast majority of
regions have had to rely on additional fiscal transfers from the federal
budget to meet their expenditure obligations. However, the creation of a
single ‘Fund for the Financial Support of Subjects of the Federation’ in
1994 has been a positive factor in channelling such extra resources to the
most needy regions.11
In discussing fiscal federalism we need to make a distinction between
‘structure’ and ‘process’. For whilst in formal terms the fiscal system is
highly centralised, in practice it operates with a high degree of regional
autonomy operating behind the scenes. As the 2000 OECD Report
concludes, ‘Recent years have witnessed a striking and growing contrast
between a formal highly-centralised fiscal federalist system and actual
practice, under which a large degree of financial authority is exercised at
the subnational level through informal channels’.12
Non-budget’ (or ‘off-budget’) funds are one such informal channel
through which the regions are able to exercise a considerable degree of
local autonomy. These funds include pensions and roads funds, income
from export privileges, and hard currency allocations. As Makushkin
notes, almost 50 per cent of these funds are allocated to finance social
services. But, ‘unlike formal budgetary issues, the spending part of these
non-budgetary funds is not controlled by the federal treasury’. This opens
the way for bureaucratic manipulation of these financial sources and
provides grounds for corruption.13 ‘Money surrogates, particularly debt
offsets, have been used as primary tools for the conduct of relatively
independent fiscal policies at the subnational level’. These include the use
of ‘barter chains’, ‘creative book keeping’ and ‘individualised tax treat-
ment’. Moreover, regional administrations will often have very cosy
relations with the financial institutions in their territories, including direct
participation in their capital, indirect participation through affiliated com-
panies, control of utilities, control of various inspections empowered to
administer penalties and fines, close ties with the courts and federal 
anti-trust or tax bodies, licensing, and the police.14 As we noted in chapter
3 regional governors have also been able to capture control over the ap-
pointment of federal representatives including those from the Inspectorate
of Taxes.
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Turning to an examination of the expenditure side of budget relations,
the OECD in its Economic Survey of Russia in 2000 noted that, 
‘ambiguity in expenditure assignments has plagued the development of 
fiscal federalist relations in Russia’.15 In particular there has been a lack of
clarity over those areas, such as education, health and social policy, which
come under the joint jurisdiction of the regions and the federal govern-
ment. In most cases the vast majority of such expenditures have been
delegated to the subnational levels in the form of unfunded federal
mandates (amounting to 600 billion roubles in 2001 or 8 per cent of the
country’s GDP) which most regional governments are too poor to imple-
ment. As a result, almost all regions suffer from chronic budget deficits.
Thus, for example, in 1997 only Moscow city and the Nenets AO had
balanced budgets.16
As was the case in the communist era, local administrations have 
also relied on local deals with the major enterprises situated on their
territories for the provision of social services and maintenance of the 
local infrastructure.17 In return, these enterprises can expect to be
rewarded with special ‘tax privileges, debt restructuring, and protection
from bankruptcy or competition’.18 Thus for example, Chelyabinsk
Governor, Petr Sumin announced that he was granting political protec-
tion from possible bankruptcy to the 200 companies that were most
important to the region’s economy.19 In many cases regional adminis-
trations will also own shares in local enterprises, and will have their own
authorised commercial banks to conduct their financial affairs. Sverdlovsk
Governor Eduard Rossel issued a decree preventing shareholders in key
oblast companies from removing directors without first gaining his
approval and he needled his way into bankruptcy proceedings in the
region by establishing an oblast controlled management company.
Privatisation of industry has also increased the opportunity for regional
leaders and enterprise directors to engage in such bilateral deals, and it
has put a great deal of regional economic policy out of the hands of the
federal government in Moscow.
Economic and social asymmetry
There are vast differences across the Federation both in the economic
status of federal subjects and the welfare provisions of their citizens. And
despite the official policy, pursued for many years, of evening out the level
of social, economic and cultural developments in the various regions,
there are very great differences among them in terms of the level of
production and consumption. According to Hanson, ‘the 89 Russian
provinces probably differ more widely in development level than the
member states of the European Union’.20 Indeed, the territory of the
Russian Federation presents the whole spectrum of development from 
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the ‘agrarian’ stage to the ‘industrial’ stage.21 And economic strength leads
to differentials in the political powers of regional elites. However, as we
have shown in chapter 3, bilateral treaties have intensified the existing
levels of socio-economic asymmetry in the Federation creating tensions
both horizontally between members of the federation and vertically
between subjects and the federal government.
Elites in rich and financially independent regions, such as the so called
‘donor regions’ will have far greater bargaining powers with the federal
authorities than elites from regions which are economically dependent on
the centre. As we noted in chapter 4 the economic status of federal sub-
jects will have an important impact on their sovereignty and secessionist
claims. Those subjects which are mired in poverty, and depend on federal
handouts are hardly likely to pose any real ethnic or separatist challenge
to Moscow.
Industrial production and gross regional product
There are tremendous variations in the volume of industrial production
which ranged from a high of 228.929 million roubles in Tyumen Oblast to
just 13 million in the tiny Yevenk AO, in 1998. In 1999 gross regional
product varied from 362.5 billion roubles in Moscow to 1.1 billion roubles
in Ingushetiya (table 5.2).
Foreign investment and exports
In 1999 the export industry in Moscow was worth 11.3 billion dollars
whereas in each of the following regions the total value of exports was less
than 10 million dollars; Tyva, Altai, Adygeya, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya,
Kalmykiya, Komi-Permyak, Agin-Buryatiya and Ust’-Ordina Buryatiya
AOs and the Yevreiskii Autonomous Oblast.22
There are also sharp variations in the levels of foreign investment, with
the top ten regions attracting 80.4 per cent of all such investments in 1995
and 75.5 per cent in 1999. In 1995 nearly half of all foreign investments
were directed to Moscow city (46.9 per cent), and in 1999 over a quarter
(27.8 per cent), see table 5.3.
Tax contributions to the federal budget
These sharp variations in the level of economic development have led to
a situation whereby just two-thirds of all taxes paid to the federal budget
come from just 10 of Russia’s 89 regions. And Moscow’s contributions in
1998 and 1999 made up approximately one-third of the total tax revenues
going to the federal budget (see table 5.4).23
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Variations in the standard of living and social conditions
These sharp variations in economic development are also reflected in
wide regional variations in the standard of living of the Russian popula-
tion. Thus, for example, in 1999 monthly expenditure per capita in the
resource-rich Yamalo-Nenets AO was twice the national average and
seventeen times that of poverty stricken Ingushetiya. Average income per
capita in the city of Moscow was four times the national average and
fifteen times greater than in Ingushetiya (see table 5.5). In comparison,
variations in the average income per capita in the German Lander vary
by a factor no greater than 1.5. However, it is important to remember that
such inequalities in Russia were the result of a sharp and prolonged
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Table 5.2 Top ten and bottom ten regions of Russia according to volume of
gross regional product (GRP) in 1998 and industrial production (IP) in 1999
GRP IP
Region (billion roubles) Region (million roubles)
Top ten Top ten
Moscow city 362.5 Tyumen Oblast 228,929
Tyumen Oblast 201.2 Khanty-Mansi AO 176,787
Moscow Oblast 100.6 Moscow city 175,054
St.Petersburg 89.8 Krasnoyarsk Krai 124,498
Sverdlovsk Oblast 80.7 Sverdlovsk Oblast 114,714
Samara Oblast 72.7 Samara Oblast 108,102
Krasnoyarsk krai 71.6 St.Petersburg 104,671
Tatarstan 67.7 Tatarstan 100,534
Bashkortostan 64.2 Chelyabinsk Oblast 91,134
Perm 55.6 Bashkortostan 89,872
Bottom ten Bottom ten
Kabardino-Balkariya 6.4 Kalmykiya 910
North Osetiya-Alaniya 4.1 Chukotka 868
Adygeya 3.4 Buryatiya 609
Karachaevo-Cherkesiya 2.9 Ingushetiya 406
Chukotka 2.6 Permyak 249
Evreiskii 1.8 Altai Republic 227
Tyva 1.8 Chita Oblast 117
Kalmykiya 1.7 Taimyr 66.8
Altai Republic 1.6 Agin-Yevenk 60.6
Ingushetiya Republic 1.1 Buryatiya 13.0
Source: Rossiya v Tsifrakh (Moscow: Goskomstat, 2000), pp. 34–41.
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Table 5.3 Ten largest regions according to their share of total volume of
foreign investment in 1995 and 1999 (%)
1995 1999
Moscow 46.9 Moscow 27.8
Moscow Oblast 7.4 Sakhalin Oblast 10.7
Tatarstan 5.8 Omsk Oblast 9.3
St Petersburg 5.6 St Petersburg 7.3
Tyumen Oblast 3.7 Krasnodar Krai 5.3
Samara Oblast 2.5 Moscow Oblast 4.6
Tver Oblast 2.4 Nenets AO 3.6
Nizhegorod Oblast 2.2 Leningrad Oblast 3.0
Novosibirsk Oblast 2.1 Krasnoyarsk Krai 2.1
Sakhalin Oblast 1.8 Sverdlovsk Oblast 1.8
Total 80.4 Total 75.5
Source: Leonid Vardomskii, ‘Vneshneekonomicheskie svyazi regionov’, in Russian Regions
in 1999: An Annual Supplement to Russia’s Political Almanac (Moscow: Carnegie Centre, 2000),
p. 114.
economic decline in the overall growth of the Russian economy. As
Hanson and Bradshaw point out Russian GDP fell by 47 per cent over the
ten-year period 1989–99.24
The average monthly wage in the oil rich Khanty-Mansi AO in 2000
was four times the national average, and 10.4 times higher than in the
Republic of Dagestan.25 In 1999 the average level of unemployment in the
Russian Federation was 13.4 per cent but there were wide variations
across the country ranging from 5.6 per cent in Moscow City to 31.2 per
cent in Dagestan, 33.4 per cent in North Osetiya-Alaniya, and 51.8 per cent
in refugee flooded Ingushetiya.26 There are also significant variations in
the level of poverty across the Federation. In 1995 there were 51 subjects
of the Federation where a quarter of the population or higher were living
below the officially recognised subsistence level, including 5 subjects
where the figure was over 50 per cent, Kurgan (50 per cent), Buryatiya
(55), Kalmykiya (60), Chita (67), and Tyva (73 per cent).27 In 1999 in the
aftermath of the August 1998 economic crises there was a substantial
increase in the number of subjects where poverty levels exceeded 25 per
cent (79 regions) and where over half the population were living 
below the poverty line (29 regions).28 Of these, Agin-Buryatiya AO and
Ingushetiya had staggeringly high levels of 96.8 and 95.1 per cent
respectively; Ust¢-Ordin Buryatiya AO (89.4 per cent), Chita Oblast (88.8
per cent) and Tyva (78.6 per cent). In contrast, at the other end of the scale,
Yamalo-Nenets AO had a poverty level of 13.3 per cent, Khanty-Mansi
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AO (15.6 per cent), Tyumen Oblast (17.8 per cent), Murmansk (19.8 per
cent), and Moscow city (23.3 per cent).29
In an excellent study of regional poverty which Smirnov conducted in
1997 each of Russia’s regions was ranked according to seven key socio-
economic variables:30 (1) growth of the population in 1996 per 1000
inhabitants; (2) the balance of immigration/emigration in 1996 per 10,000
inhabitants; (3) level of unemployment as a percentage of economically
active members of the population in 1997; (4) intensity of the labour
market in 1997 calculated as the number of unemployed/to number of
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Table 5.4 Concentration of tax contributions to the federal budget, 1996–98
1996 1997 1998 1999
Share of taxes of federal budget 26.0 30.9 36.1 32.71
collected in Moscow
Share of taxes of federal budget 47.3 52.7 55.1 51.53
collected in first 5 regions
Share of taxes of federal budget 59.6 64.3 65.4 62.74
collected in first 10 regionsa
Source: Figures for 1996–98, O.V. Kuznetsova, ‘Territorial’naya struktura nalogovovo
potentsiala’, in A. M. Lavrov (ed.), Federal’nyi Byudzhet i Regiony: Opyt Analiza Finansovykh
Potokov (Moscow: Instityt Vostok Zapad, MAKS Press, 1999), p. 64; figures for 1999, Olga
Kuznetsova, ‘Regional’nye Byudgety’, in Russia’s Regions in 1999: An Annual Supplement to
Russia’s Political Almanac (Moscow: Carnegie Centre, 2000), p. 77.
Note: a The first ten regions in 1999 were: Moscow (32.71), Khanty-Mansi AO (6.45), St
Petersburg (4.54), Moscow Oblast (4.33), Samara Oblast (3.50), Yamalo-Nenets A0 (2.85),
Krasnodar Krai (2.25), Krasnoyarsk Krai (2.07), Perm Oblast (2.05), and Sverdlovsk Oblast
(1.99).
Table 5.5 Regional variations in per capita income and expenditure, 1999
Monthly 
Monthly income expenditure
(thousand roubles) (thousand roubles)
Moscow City 6,002 Yamalo-Nenets AO 3,011
Yamalo-Nenets AO 5,297 Magadan Oblast 2,407
Khanty-Mansi AO 4,329 Samara Oblast 2,352
Tyumen Oblast 3,371 Tyumen Oblast 2,216
Sakha Republic 2,797 Kamchatka Oblast 2,052
Ingushetiya 390 Ingushetiya 181
Source: Rossiya v Tsifrakh (Moscow: Goskomstat, 2000), pp. 34–43.
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vacancies; (5) average length of time workers had been unemployed on
December 31, 1996; (6) the ratio of average wages and payments from the
Federal Social Fund to the minimum subsistence level of the able bodied
population in December 1996; (7) housing provision in 1996, calculated as
number of inhabitants per square metre.
Table 5.6 shows each region’s average rank for all seven factors. The
table is divided into four groups according to the aggregate rank of each
region: (1) regions with relatively favourable social conditions, (2) regions
with moderate conditions, (3) regions with unfavourable conditions, and
finally, (4) regions in crises. Smirnov found that 44 of Russia’s 89 regions
were either regions in crises (22 regions) or regions with unfavourable
social conditions (22 regions). And the gap between the most favourable
region, Belgorod Oblast with an overall rank of 16.3, and the least
favourable region, Ivanovo Oblast with a rank of 73.4, varied by a factor
of 4.5.
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Table 5.6 Measuring poverty in Russia’s regions, 1996–97
1 Regions with favourable Average 2 Regions with moderate Average
social conditions rank social conditions rank
Belgorod Oblast 16.3 Voronezh Oblast 34.1
Lipetsk Oblast 17.4 Ul’yanov Oblast 34.3
Moscow City 19.4 Sverdlovsk Oblast 34.7
Rep. Sakha (Yakutiya) 19.7 Nizhegorod Oblast 35.0
Orenburg Oblast 20.1 Novosibirsk Oblast 35.7
Rep. Tatarstan 20.7 Omsk Oblast 35.9
Stavropol’ Krai 20.9 Astrakhan Oblast 36.1
Rep. Bashkortostan 22.9 Yevenk AO 38.0
Krasnoyarsk Krai 23.3 Kaluga Oblast 38.1
Rostov Oblast 23.7 Kamchatka Oblast 39.4
Yamalo-Nenets AO 24.0 Krasnoyarsk Krai 39.4
Khanty-Mansi AO 26.2 Volgograd Oblast 39.9
Tyumen Oblast 26.3 Tul’a Oblast 39.9
Smolensk Oblast 27.4 Tver Oblast 40.0
Vogograd Oblast 27.9 Magadan Oblast 40.9
Orel Oblast 28.7 Ryazan Oblast 40.9
St Petersburg 28.9 Kaliningrad Oblast 41.4
Kursk Oblast 29.0 Rep. Komi 42.0
Samara Oblast 29.3 Irkutsk Oblast 42.6
Moscow Oblast 30.1 Rep. Khakasiya 43.7
Kemerovo Oblast 33.6 Rep. Altai 44.1
Chelyabinsk Oblast 33.7 Amur Oblast 44.3
Source: S. N. Smirnov, Regional’nye Aspekty Sotsial’noi Politiki (Moscow: Gelios, 1999), pp.
63–4.
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Variations in taxes maintained
There are also vast differences in the percentage of local taxes which
regions are permitted to maintain for their own expenditures. Special 
tax concessions and increased federal subsidies have been a common
occurrence in Russia and were also a central feature of many of the special
agreements attached to bilateral agreements. Thus as table 5.7 demon-
strates whilst the top ten regions in Russia were able to maintain between
74 and 82 per cent of the local taxes collected in their regions in 1996, those
regions in the bottom ten were permitted to keep only between 9 and 54
per cent.
Federal transfers
There are also major variations in the degree to which federal subjects 
are dependent on federal subsidies and transfers. The number of regions
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3 Regions with unfavourable Average Average
social conditions rank 4 Crises regions rank
Rep. Buryatiya 44.4 Sakhalin Oblast 55.4
Tomsk Oblast 45.0 Rep. Tyva 55.9
Saratov Oblast 45.7 Tambov Oblast 57.0
Ust’-Orda Buryat AO 46.5 Bryansk Oblast 58.7
Leningrad Oblast 46.9 Nenetskii AO 58.8
Novgorod Oblast 47.3 Rep Ingushetiya 59.7
Rep Kabardino-Balkariya 47.9 Yaroslavskaya Oblast 59.9
Khabarovsk Krai 48.3 Rep. Dagestan 60.4
Rep Karachaevo-Cherkesiya 48.7 Aginskii-Buryat AO 60.5
Taimyr AO 49.3 Rep. Kalmykiya 60.6
Yevreiskaya AOB 49.5 Rep. Udmurtskaya 60.6
Altai Krai. 49.7 Vladimir Oblast 60.9
Primorski Krai 50.6 Kurgan Oblast 61.0
Perm Oblast 51.6 Chita Oblast 62.0
Rep. North Osetiya-Alaniya 52.0 Pskov Oblast 63.0
Rep. Chuvashkaya 52.1 Kirov Oblast 63.1
Rep. Adygeya 52.1 Penza Oblast 63.3
Rep. Marii El 53.1 Arkhangelskaya Oblast 64.9
Rep. Kareliya 53.1 Komi-Perm Oblast 65.2
Chukotskii AO 54.0 Rep. Mordoviya 65.3
Kostroma Oblast 54.1 Koryakskii AO 66.8
Murmansk Oblast 54.3 Ivanovo Oblast 73.4
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receiving such financial transfers has steadily increased from 39 in 1994;
66 in 1995; 75 in 1996; 81 in 1997; to 76 in both 1998 and 1999. However,
as can be seen from table 5.9 the levels of such transfers have varied from
1–90 per cent.31
Lavrov divides the regions into five categories depending on the level
of federal transfers in their budgets; in non-subsidised regions, money
coming from federal sources accounts for less than 5 per cent of budget
revenues. Slightly subsidised regions are those in which, federal assis-
tance of all types accounted for less than 10 per cent of the budget. For
subsidised regions, the federal share is 10–20 per cent; for moderately
subsidised areas, 20–50 per cent, and for heavily subsidised ones, more
than 50 per cent.32 Table 5.8 shows major variations in the percentage of
federal transfers in the total income of two highly divergent groups of
federal subjects over the period 1994–96. For example, in 1994 as much as
91.9 per cent of Dagestan’s income came from federal transfers whereas
in Bashkortostan the figure was only 2.6 per cent. In 1996, 79.3 per cent
of Ingushetiya’s income came from such subsidies, whilst for Lipetsk
Oblast the figure was only 1.2 per cent. And table 5.9 shows that in 1999
wide variations in the amount of federal transfers still persisted. Thus for
example, such transfers comprised between 60 and 80 per cent in the
Yevreiskaya Autonomous Oblast; the Agin-Buryatiya, Komi-Permyak,
Koryak, and Yevenk AOs, and the republics of Dagestan, Tyva and
Kabardino-Balkariya. Whilst in the Ust¢-Orda Buryatiya AO and the
Republic of Ingushetiya such transfers were even higher, comprising
between 80 and 90 per cent. On the other hand, thirteen regions received
no federal transfers: the cities of St Petersburg and Moscow; Moscow,
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Table 5.7 % of local taxes maintained by subjects of the Federation, 1996
Top ten regions % Bottom ten regions %
Vologda Oblast 74 Ingushetiya Republic 9
Komi-Permyak AO 74 Kalmykiya Republic 41
Ust¢-Orda Buryat AO 74 Moscow City 42
Koryak AO 75 Khanty-Mansi AO 43
Novosibirsk Oblast 76 Yaroslavl’ Oblast 49
Komi Republic 76 Omsk Oblast 51
Chukotka AO 79 Moscow Oblast 52
Khakasiya Republic 80 Orel Oblast 53
Yevenk AO 82 Samara Oblast 53
Aginsk-Buryat AO Okrug 82 Bryansk Oblast 54
Source: A. M. Laverov (ed.), Rossiiskie Regiony Posle Vyborov-96 (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya
Literatura, 1997).
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Lipetsk, Samara, Perm, and Sverdlovsk oblasts; Khanty-Mansi and
Yamalo-Nenets autonomous okrugs; the republics of Komi, Tatarstan, and
Bashkortostan, and Krasnoyarsk Krai; and in a further 17 regions such
transfers made up less than 10 per cent.
Donor and recipient regions
For Lavrov the donor regions are equivalent to the non-subsidised regions
which we describe above, i.e. those regions where federal transfers
account for less than 5 per cent of budget revenues. In 1999, there were
thirteen donors (St Petersburg and Moscow cities; Moscow, Irkutsk,
Lipetsk, Samara, Perm and Sverdlovsk oblasts; republics of Bashkortostan
and Tatarstan; Khanty-Mansi and Yamal-Nenets AOs, and Krasnoyarsk
Krai).33
On the other hand, recipient regions, according to Kuznetsova, are
those regions where the volume of taxes paid into the federal budget is
less than the volume of financial assistance paid to the regions from the
federal budget. In 1999 there were twenty-four recipient regions. The vast
majority of which were to be found in the republics of the Northern
Caucuses and the regions of Eastern Siberia and the Far East. Thus, for
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Table 5.8 Federal transfers as % of total income in
twelve selected regions, 1994–96
Regions 1994 1995 1996
Group A
Aga-Buryat AO 83.3 69.4 68.6
Altai Republic 85.0 74.7 61.9
Dagestan Republic 91.9 64.4 55.5
Ingushetiya Republic 91.3 77.0 79.3
Koryak AO 81.6 81.6 68.1
Tyva Republic 86.0 78.7 68.5
Group B
Bashkortostan Republic 2.6 0.2 2.8
Yamalo-Nenyets AO 3.7 1.2 2.0
Lipetsk Oblast 12.7 1.1 1.2
Samara Oblast 7.7 1.2 1.4
Sverdlovsk Oblast 3.4 2.1 1.9
Rep. Tatarstan 7.7 0.9 2.2
Source: A. M. Laverov (ed.), Rossiiskie Regiony Posle Vyborov-
96 (Moskva: Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1997).
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example, the volume of financial assistance from the federal budget
exceeded tax payments to the federal income by almost 13 times in the
Yevenk AO, approximately 10 times in Dagestan, and the Chukotka AO,
from 8–9 times in Tyva and Ust-Ordin Buryatiya AO, and 4.7 times in the
Yevreiskaya autonomous oblast (AOB).34
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Table 5.9 Typology of regions of Russia according to the share of federal
budget transfers as a % of total budget income, 1999
Share of federal
transfers in income Regions (ranked according to the share of transfers coming 
of budget from federal budget)
None Cities of St Petersburg and Moscow; Moscow, Lipetsk, 
Samara, Perm, and Sverdlovsk oblasts; Khanty-Mansi and 
Yamalo-Nenets autonomous okrugs; republics of Komi, 
Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan; Krasnoyarsk Krai.
Up to 10 Vologda, Chelyabinsk, Nizhegorod, Yaroslavl¢, Leningrad,
Belgorod, Irkutsk, Orenburg, Novosibirsk, Tiumen (without
okrugs), Tula, Murmansk, Volgograd, Tomsk, Omsk, 
Ul’yanovsk, Smolensk oblasts.
From 10–20 Kursk oblast; Udmurt republic; Tver oblast, Krasnodar 
krai; Kirov, Kaliningrad, Saratov, Nenets AO; republic of 
Khakasiya; Kemerovo oblast; Republic of Kalmykiya; 
Novgorod, Voronezh, Vladimir, Arkhangelsk oblasts; 
Stavropol’ Krai; Astrakhan oblast; Republic of Kareliya;
Rostov oblast.
From 20–30 Ryazan, Kaluga oblasts; Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya); 
Chuvash Republic; Kostroma oblast; Khabarovsk Krai; 
Bryansk, Magadan, Penza, Tambov oblasts; Primorsk Krai; 
Taimyr autonomous okrug; Kurgan, Sakhalin oblasts.
From 30–40 Ivanovo, Amur, Orel, Chita, Pskov, Kamchatka oblasts; 
Republic of Mordoviya.
From 40–60 Republics of Marii El, Buryatiya; Altai Krai; Republics of 
Altai and Adygeya; Karachaevo-Cherkessiya republic; 
Chutkotka AO; Republic of North Osetiya (Alaniya).
From 60–80 Evreiskaya autonomous oblast; Komi-Permyak, Koryak, 
and Yevenk AOs; Republic of Dagestan; Agin-Buryatiya 
AO; republics of Tyva and Kabardino-Balkariya.
From 80–90 Ust¢-Ordin Buryatiya AO; Republic of Ingushetiya.
Source: L. I. Sergeev, Gosudarstvennye I Territorial’nye Finansy (Kaliningrad: Yantarnyi skaz,
2000), p. 142.
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Political criteria for budget transfers and privileges
Until now the centre has been quite successful in its use of economic levers
to dampen down nationalist demands. The centre has also been adroit at
playing the game of divide and rule and capitalising on the major eco-
nomic differences between the regions by playing one region off against
another. As Lavrov notes, recipient regions will ‘be the most staunch sup-
porters of preserving or even increasing centralization of tax revenues’,
so as to benefit from tax redistribution. Donor regions on the other 
hand are ‘interested in reducing the territorial redistribution of budget
resources; decentralising control of budget expenditures, and, especially,
revenues; acquiring special budget status; creating their own tax services
. . . [and] removing their financial agencies from the control of the Russian
Ministry of Finance.35
Yeltsin also sought to buy support from recalcitrant regional elites. 
As Tolz and Busygina note, despite the attempts undertaken since 1994
to rationalize the system of federal aid by introducing a publicised
formula favouring needier regions, the system of redistribution of bene-
fits and support apparently continues to be dependent on the political
preferences of Moscow and the personal relations of governors with 
representatives of the federal executive.36
Political criteria have dominated in the distribution of budget funds
and other federal transfers in both the Yeltsin and Putin regimes. Yeltsin
as we have seen gave special privileges to forty-six subjects of the federa-
tion by signing bilateral treaties with them, and he has frequently used
his control over budgetary transfers to quell ethnic unrest, dampen repub-
lican bids for political autonomy, purchase electoral votes, and neutralise
potential regional opposition movements.
Paradoxically it is the ‘oppositionist regions’ and not the ‘loyal subjects’
which have fared best in such budget transfers. Whilst resource-rich
Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Sakha have been rewarded with special
deals, and ethnically troubled Kabardino-Balkariya, North Osetiya-
Alaniya and Chuvashiya were likewise privileged; impoverished but
trouble-free subjects such as Tyva and Koryakiya have so far been left out.
In other words loyal but poor republics and regions have been penalised
whilst rich or potentially troublesome subjects have been rewarded. As
Treisman concluded in his major study of budget transfers ‘benefits are
geographically targeted so as to appease the discontented rather than to
reward the loyal’.37 Thus Lavrov notes that: ‘among the regions that sup-
ported the new Constitution in the December 12, 1993 referendum, 40 per
cent made gains and 26 per cent lost out. But among the regions that
rejected the Constitution, 55 per cent gained and only 18 per cent suffered
losses’.38
There is now also a substantial amount of economic data to support
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the hypothesis that the ethno-national subjects of the federation have been
favoured over the territorial subjects in tax concessions and federal aid.
As Smith notes: ‘It is the geopolitical leverage and rhetoric of nationalist
politics – the threat or perceived threat of secession or withdrawal from
the system of fiscal federalism – that result in the greater likelihood of a
region’s securing economic benefits’.39
As Kahn observes, over the period 1992–94, ‘more than seventy presi-
dential decrees and resolutions gave special federal dispensations and
exemptions to fourteen republics in the form of export quotas, licences
and special resource rights’.40 And it was the ethnic republics which
gained the most privileges from the bilateral treaties which they signed
with Moscow. In 1992 one trillion roubles was allocated to the regions
from the federal budget. However, an examination of those fifteen regions
that received more from the federal budget than they contributed to it,
showed that almost all of them (except Kamchatka) were republics or
autonomous entities. As Leonid Smirnyagin observed, ‘a conclusion sug-
gests itself: the political advantages that the republics have in comparison
with the provinces have ensured them economic advantages as well’.41
And table 5.10 clearly shows that the ethnic republics and ethnic
autonomies in 1996 had higher levels of expenditure per capita, retained
a higher percentage of their tax revenues, and a greater portion of their
income was allocated to them from federal sources.42
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Table 5.10 Variations in the financial status of subjects of the Russian
Federation with different constitutional status, 1996
Budget expenditure Share of federal Share of federal taxes
per capita in aid in the budget credited to the
(thousand roubles) as expense (%) subject’s budget (%)
Average for subjects 1,536 11.7 56.8
of the Russian 
Federation
Republics 1,750 17.9 70.1
Krais and oblasts 1,242 12.7 61.0
Federal cities 2,635 3.9 44.0
Autonomous 6,525 5.9 50.0
okrugs, oblasts
Including ‘poor 2,878 42.3 74.2
autonomies’a
Source: Aleksei M. Lavrov, ‘Budgetary Federalism’, in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin,
Conflict and Consensus in Ethno-Political and Center-Periphery Relations in Russia (California:
Rand, 1998), p. 27.
Note: a This refers to data for the ethnic autonomies excluding the rich Khanty-Mansi and
Yamalo-Nenets AOs.
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Thus, an examination of the data (in table 5.10) for the territorial krais
and oblasts shows that expenditure per capita was 1,242 (thousand
roubles), federal transfers 12.7 per cent, and the share of credited taxes
70.1 per cent; whereas, for the ethnic republics the figures were 1,750 thou-
sand roubles, 17.9 per cent and 70.1 per cent; and for the poor autonomies
2,878 thousand roubles, 42.3 per cent, and 74.2 per cent, respectively.
Moreover, those ethnic republics that have been the most confederalist
in their demands and which have been willing to go furthest in their
claims of national sovereignty have received the most privileges from the
federal government. As can be seen in table 5.11, over the period 1992–95
Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Sakha (Yakutiya) practically stopped trans-
ferring payments from taxes to the centre. And as Lavrov notes, the total
losses to the federal centre from these three republics over the first 10
months of 1996 was 3.5 trillion roubles or 2.3 per cent of the tax income
of the federal budget. As Smirnyagin notes, ‘In 1992 Tatarstan paid only
93 million roubles in taxes [but] the republic received 38 billion roubles
from the federal treasury in the form of subventions, special dispensations
and credits – more than went to a dozen central provinces with a total
population several times that of Tatarstan’.43 These provinces paid over
half the taxes that were collected – almost 250 billion roubles, that is, 2,688
times more than Tatarstan.44 And over the period 1995–98 all three
republics continued to be granted much higher tax credits than the
Russian Federation average.
Moreover, an examination of the draft budget for 2000 reveals that
Bashkortostan, Tatarstan and Sakha continued to enjoy special privileges
even although their bilateral treaties had expired.45 For example, Tatarstan
was allowed to keep all of the excise duties on the sale of spirits on its
territory, whereas the norm is 50 per cent. In total, Tatarstan payed 22.4
per cent of the taxes collected in its territory to the federal budget, whereas
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Table 5.11 The portion of taxes credited to the budgets of ‘privileged
republics’ in 1992–98 as a % of total taxes collected in each republic’s territory
Republics 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Tatarstan 99.9 100.0 83.8 77.3 80.3 75.4 88.9
Bashkortostan 99.9 100.0 87.5 73.8 71.9 73.0 82.2
Sakha 98.8 99.8 100.0 99.5 70.8 71.7 77.9
Average for 48.3 62.9 64.8 59.1 57.3 56.3 62.9
subjects RF
Source: Data for 1992–96 from A. M. Lavrov, ‘Asimmetriya Byudzhetnovo Ustroistva Rossii:
Problemy i Resheniya’ in Asimmetrichnost . . . 1997’, p. 104. Data for 1997–98 from A. M.
Lavarov, Federal’nyi Byudzhet I Regiony: Opyt analiza finansovykh potokov (Moscow: Instityt
Vostok Zapad, 1999), p. 64.
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the average contribution from Russian regions is 71.4 per cent.46 And it
has been calculated that if the special budget agreement with Tatarstan is
rescinded, the Republic will lose 17 per cent of its income.47
Such politically motivated policies have done little to alleviate the
sharp inequalities to be found across the federation. Putting out one fire
by showering troublesome regions with extra resources has only led to
the outbreak of fires in other regions. Regional inequalities have in fact
increased in recent years. Whereas in 1990 the ten least developed regions
were 2.3 times behind the ten most developed regions in terms of per
capita industrial and agricultural output, in 1996 the gap was 4.5 times.48
And since the August 1998 financial crises we have continued to see an
increase in the gap between the rich and poor regions. Such high levels
of inter-regional inequalities fuel tensions and jealousies between regional
elites and intensify regional competition over the distribution of scarce
federal subsidies. As Smirnyagin observes, citizens in a federation should
be able to enjoy relatively equal benefits regardless of their place of resi-
dence and thus: ‘It cannot be considered acceptable when some regions
differ from others several times over in terms of such important indica-
tors of social development as per capita income, production downturn,
unemployment, infant mortality, or per capita support from public funds
. . . citizen’s rights are inevitably violated here’.49
However, there are signs that the special budgetary deals with the
republics is finally coming to an end. President Putin has begun to recen-
tralise the economic system. As we noted above, the balance between the
federal budget and subnational budgets has now moved in the favour of
the centre. Moreover, under pressure from federal authorities and the new
presidential representatives (‘Polpredy’) from 2001 the republics have
begun to transfer a far greater share of their taxes to the federal govern-
ment. Thus, as Rabinowitch observes, ‘in Bashkortostan, in the first quarter
of 2001, the republic increased its transfers to the federal government 2.3
times in comparison with the first quarter of 2000. Of the 9.9 billion roubles
in revenue collected for budgets at all levels (federal, regional, local),
Bashkortostan sent more than 5 billion – more than 50 per cent to the
federal budget. In the past this figure was only 18–20 per cent’.50
Putin’s creation of seven new federal districts has also intensified the
levels of socio-economic asymmetry in the federation (see table 5.12).
Thus, as Slay notes, there are now two economically powerful districts –
the Central and Volga districts which together account for ‘60 per cent of
Russia’s retail trade, 55 per cent of new housing contructed, 40 per cent
of industrial output, and 47 per cent of its population’. In stark contrast
the Southern and Far East districts ‘account for only 15 per cent of Russia’s
industrial output, 18 per cent of housing constructed, and 13 per cent of
retail trade’.51 We discuss Putin’s radical assault on the Yeltsinite federal
system in chapter 8.
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6Federalism and political 
asymmetry: regional elections 
and political parties
Elections
As we noted in chapter 1, ‘Competitive elections are one of the corner-
stones of democracy. Without freely established political parties battling
in honestly conducted elections, democracy by most definitions does not
exist’.1 Since the adoption of the Russian Constitution in December 1993
Russian citizens have been given the opportunity to engage in numerous
rounds of national and local level election campaigns. There have now
been three elections for the state Duma (1993, 1995 and 1999), two presi-
dential elections (1996 and 2000) and two or more rounds of elections for
regional level legislative and executive bodies. Thus, for example, over
the period 1995–98, elections took place for more than 5,000 deputies of
regional legislative assemblies in almost all subjects of the federation and
a further 14,000 deputies were elected to municipal bodies.2 In addition,
during this same period citizens cast their votes for 101 republican presi-
dents and regional governors. Average turnout for the assembly elections
was 42.8 per cent and for regional governors and presidents a healthy 55.6
per cent.
To a large degree these elections marked a watershed in central–
periphery relations and a recognition by the centre that the regions had
to be granted a significant degree of economic and political autonomy
within the federation. The higher status of the regional political bodies
was also reflected in the fact that their two top leaders (chairs of assem-
blies and governors/presidents) were from 1996, granted ex officio mem-
bership of the Federal Council. More recently, Russian democracy has
been further consolidated by a third round of regional elections conducted
over the period 1999–2001.
Manipulation of the electoral system
However, the cynical nature in which President Yeltsin manipulated the
election process in the regions has done much to damage the develop-
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ment of a democratic political culture. Yeltsin’s victory over the parlia-
mentarians signalled a victory of executive power over legislative power
which eventually led to the development of a semi-authoritarian form of
presidential power at the federal level and more overt forms of executive
dominance at the regional level. In the wake of the dissolution of the
Russian Parliament in October 1993, Yeltsin turned his wrath on regional
officials, many of whom had sided with the parliament against the
President. Yeltsin viewed the local soviets (assemblies) as the local head-
quarters of the Communist ‘intransigent opposition’, and he was anxious
to see an end to their powers.3 ‘The system of Soviets’, he declared, ‘dis-
played complete disregard for the security of the state and its citizens’,
and in so doing ‘wrote the final chapter of their own political life’.4 In
presidential decrees promulgated in October 1993, Yeltsin called for the
abolition of regional and local soviets (assemblies), which were to be
replaced in new elections by much smaller and weaker assemblies. The
decrees whilst mandatory for the regions were only recommended for the
republics.5
The first terms of the new assemblies were to be elected for a period of
just two years (as with the first session of the national parliament) and
elections were to be conducted over the period December 1993–March
1994. The decrees also called for a sharp reduction in the number of
deputies represented in the soviets, down from 250–300 to between 15 and
50 deputies. There was also a significant reduction in the number of
deputies permitted to work on a full-time professional basis. This was
legally restricted to two-fifths of the total number of deputies. And there
was a return to the practice of the Soviet era with the right of deputies to
combine their parliamentary duties with work in the executive bodies of
state. Members of the regional administration and lower level executives
from cities and district administrations could now also be elected deputies
to the regional assemblies. In some cases these officials were directly
appointed by the regional governors or presidents in republics (see
chapter 9).6
From the dissolution of the regional soviets in 1993 until the first new
elections conducted over the period 1994–96 there was an absence of leg-
islative power in many regions. Moreover, during this period, Yeltsin per-
sonally appointed the heads of regional executives and he posted
presidential representatives to the regions (for a discussion of legisla-
tive–executive relations see chapter 7).
By May 1994 assembly elections had been successfully carried out in
seventy regions of the Federation. But, as the terms of these first regional
assemblies neared completion in 1995 and 1996, Yeltsin, fearing that the
communist opposition would sweep the board, called for the elections to
be postponed. Thus, in Presidential edicts of 17 September 1995 and 2
March 19967 he cynically prolonged the sessions of forty-two assemblies.
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In one region, the elections were postponed until March 1997; in 31
regions until December 1997; and in four regions until as late as March
1998. Once again, this legislation did not apply to the ethnic republics
which continued to elect their own presidents and to control the timing
of elections to their assemblies.
A number of regional assemblies were only too happy to have their
powers prolonged, whilst in others appeals against the decrees were
placed before the courts (e.g. Republic of Marii El, Kemerovo, Sakhalin,
and Tula oblasts). However, the Constitutional Court not surprisingly
gave its support to the President. More recently, since the popular elec-
tion of regional governors, the dates of elections to regional assemblies
(now normally every four or five years) have been decided at the local
level either by the assemblies themselves, the electoral commissions or the
governors (chief executives). As we shall discuss in chapter 9, chief exec-
utives, following Yeltsin’s example, have blatantly used such powers to
their own advantage.
Structure and tenure of legislatures
The vast majority of regional assemblies are elected for a period of four
years.8 In three regions (Volgograd, Vologda and Sverdlovsk) there is a
rotation of half of the deputies every two years. In the majority of sub-
jects there are single chamber assemblies. Only the republics of Adygeya,
Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkariya, Kareliya, Sakha and Sverdlovsk
Oblast have bicameral legislatures. Not surprisingly with such wide vari-
ations in the size and population of federal subjects there are also con-
siderable variations in the number of deputies elected to local assemblies.
Whilst the norm is somewhere between twenty and fifty for oblast assem-
blies, there are less than twenty deputies in the sparsely populated
autonomous okrugs of Ust-Orda Buryatiya, Aginsk Buryat, Komi-Perm,
Nenetsk, Chukota, Koryak and Taimyr. In order to increase their status 
a number of regions have created multi-member electoral districts. In 
the ethnic republics, which have no restrictions placed on the size of 
their assemblies, we find much larger assemblies, many with 100 or 
more deputies. Thus for example: Bashkortostan (190); Tatarstan (130);
Dagestan (121); Udmurtiya (100); and Khakasiya (100). Russia’s constitu-
tional asymmetry is reflected in the rather absurd situation whereby
Moscow city with a population of over 8 million has 35 deputies in its
assembly, whilst the Republic of Altai, with a population of just over
200,000, has 50 deputies.9
As noted above, legislation limits the number of deputies that may
work full time. Only in three of the single chamber assemblies – Moscow
(35 deputies), St Petersburg (50), and the Koryak autonomous okrug (with
just 12 deputies) – do all the deputies work on a professional basis. This
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is also the case in one of the two chambers in Bashkortostan, Kabardino-
Balkariya, Sakha and Sverdlovsk. In Bashkortostan, just 30 out of 144
deputies work full time. All of the full time deputies are members of the
legislative chamber, whilst the Chamber of Representatives is reserved for
the part time deputies. In Tatarstan just 28 of its 130 deputies are full time
professional politicians. In Tatarstan there are two kinds of plenary
session; those which include all deputies (full and part time) and those
which are restricted to the much smaller group of full time deputies. There
is also a list of key issues which can only be decided in those sessions
where there is a full complement of deputies.10 In some assemblies only a
very small per centage of the deputies work full time. Thus, for example,
in Kursk, of the 45 deputies only 3 are full time professional deputies, the
oblast chair, deputy chair and secretary. The large number of part time
deputies, many of whom are employed in district administrations (see
chapter 7) has undoubtedly weakened the authority and independence of
regional assemblies.
Elections for governors
Yeltsin’s control over the appointment of governors lasted much longer
than that over regional assemblies. Decrees adopted in November 1991,
October 1994 and September 1995 placed moratoriums on gubernatorial
elections. The September 1995 decree which postponed elections until
1996 was challenged in the courts by the state Duma and a number of
regional assemblies. But, in April 1996 the court finally resolved that the
decree was consistent with the Constitution.11
Gubernatorial elections finally got underway in earnest only in the
period August 1995–April 1997 when there was a total of 70 elections (for
which 88 million people registered). By early 1999 almost all of Russia’s
89 chief executives had come to power through the ballot box.12 The major-
ity of executive bodies are elected for a period of four years.13 In the
1995–97 elections there was an average of five candidates standing for
each executive post, although in some ethnic republics there was a throw-
back to the old Soviet system with just one candidate standing unopposed
(see chapter 9). In approximately one-third of these elections, candidates
could win with just a plurality of the votes, whereas in two-thirds of the
regions, over 50 per cent of the vote was required for victory otherwise
there had to be run off elections between the two top candidates. Run-offs
took place in 30 per cent of the regions.14
The elections armed the governors with a new democratic legitimacy
and greatly enhanced their authority and status in the regions. No longer
could they be appointed or dismissed on the whim of the President. The
elections also brought to power new representatives of the communist
and nationalist opposition, and other independents (‘strong managers’).
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They also brought new opponents of the President to the Federation
Council and weakened Yeltsin’s overall control over the upper chamber.
In a further round of gubernatorial elections conducted over the period
2000–1, fifty-three chief executives were elected (see below).15
Political parties and democracy
Whilst there is some debate about the importance of parties in con-
temporary industrial societies most scholars would still agree with 
Geoffrey Pridham that parties and party systems must remain a basic 
if not the central theme for examining not only the quality of the 
liberal democracy in question but also its progress towards and achieve-
ment of democratic consolidation.16 As Juan J. Linz notes, ‘Today, in all
countries of the world, there is no alternative to political parties in 
the establishment of democracy. No form of non-party representation that
has been advocated has ever produced democratic government’.17 And
Peter Mair adds that, ‘However fragmented, weak, or undisciplined,
however poorly rooted in society, however unstable and vociferous,
parties are a very real and necessary part of the politics of new de-
mocracies. Democracy cannot be sustained without competing political
parties’.18
Parties are particularly important during regime transitions and the
consolidation of democracy where they play a vital role in bolstering
system legitimacy at a time of political uncertainty.19 And strong and
cohesive national parties have an important integrative function in federal
states binding together the diverse subjects of the federation.
According to Hague, Harrop and Breslin, parties perform four vital
functions in modern democracies:
1) as agents of elite recruitment they serve as the major mechanism for pre-
paring and recruiting candidates for public office, 2) as agents of interest
aggregation they transform a multitude of specific demands into more man-
ageable packages of proposals . . . 3) Parties serve as a point of reference for
many supporters and voters, giving people a key to interpreting a compli-
cated political world and 4) the modern party offers direction to government,
performing the vital task of steering the ship of state.20
Scholars in the field have traditionally been divided over which pre-
requisites are necessary for the creation of a strong party system. One
group stresses the external environment in which parties operate – the
political culture and the strength of civil society. From this perspective,
parties are seen as dependent variables and their ability to develop
successfully is determined by these external cultural factors. As Karen
Dawisha notes: ‘a strong civil society is a necessary but not sufficient
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condition for a strong party and system and it is difficult to find examples
where parties have been established in states with weak civil cultures’.21
In contrast, a second group of scholars focus on the internal structures,
leadership and operational behaviour of parties. In this second approach,
parties are seen as independent variables whose actions can positively or
negatively shape civil society and culture. Here, institutions matter –
change the institutions, change the culture. Strong cohesive parties can
bring about consolidated democracies even in hostile cultural environ-
ments. Democratic parties can create democrats. But just as equally,
weakly institutionalised parties and party systems can allow authori-
tarianism to take root. Hence, before parties can play their vital role in the
process of consolidating democracy, parties themselves must be institu-
tionalised and consolidated.
According to Scott Mainwaring, institutionalisation ‘means the process
by which a practice or organisation becomes well established and widely
known, if not universally accepted’.22 Strongly institutionalised parties
exhibit the following characteristics: ’1) high degrees of stability of inter-
party competition and low electoral volatility; 2) strong roots in society;
3) they possess unassailable support and legitimacy from elites and citi-
zenry; 4) they have strong, disciplined and territorially comprehensive
organisations with well established structures and procedures; 5) signifi-
cant material and human resources; and 6) an independent status not
overshadowed by a personalistic leader or coterie’.23 Mainwaring con-
trasts the highly institutionalised parties largely to be found in western
Europe and North America with the weakly institutionalised ‘inchoate’
parties of the ‘third wave democracies’ in eastern Europe and Russia.
Party representation in regional assemblies
There has already been a significant body of work devoted to the study
of parties in Russia at the national level24 but very little has, as yet, been
published on the development of parties at the regional level.25 Here, we
focus on the participation of ‘national’ parties26 in elections for regional
assemblies and governors. In contrast to previous studies, based on a
small sample of case studies, I provide a macro-level analysis covering all
eighty-nine of Russia’s regions. In addition to the study of national parties
in elections at the regional level we also examine the territorial compre-
hensiveness of national parties as indicated by their participation in the
December 1999 elections to the state Duma.
Whilst there has been some progress in the consolidation and solidifi-
cation of political parties at the national level, the development of parties
and their participation in regional level politics, if anything, has declined
since 1995. All six of Mainwaring’s factors of institutionalisation are still
very weak and undeveloped in Russia.
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There has been a proliferation of parties and political movements in
Russia. Over the period 1991–97 a total of 5,000 parties and 60,000 public
organisations were registered with the Ministry of Justice.27 However, the
vast majority of elections for regional assemblies and executive bodies have
been, and continue to be, largely partyless. And although, some progress
in party activism could be detected over the two election cycles of 1993–94
and 1995–97, it has declined precipitously in the recent round of elections
which were held in 2000–1 (see table 6.1). Thus, for example, of the 3,481
deputies elected to 83 of Russia’s 89 republics and regions, in post as of
January 1998, only 18.4 per cent were members of national political parties,
a slight improvement from 14 per cent elected in the 1993–94 elections
cycle. But this figure fell to 12.7 per cent in 2000 and declined further to just
8.4 per cent in 2001. Furthermore, candidates standing for election on a
party ticket in 2000 comprised 15.7 per cent and this fell dramatically in the
first half of 2001 to just 8.7 per cent, a sharp drop from 24.9 per cent in
1995–97.28
Turning to an examination of the party affiliation of individual legis-
latures the data shows that party saturation of individual assemblies is
very weak. Figures for January 1998 show that in 17 regional assemblies
there was no party representation at all,29 and in only 5 assemblies did
party members comprise a majority of the deputies corps; Krasnoyarsk
Krai (80.4 per cent), Novosibirsk Oblast (55.1 per cent), Kemerovo Oblast
(57.1 per cent), Ryazan Oblast (50.0 per cent), and Sverdlovsk Oblast 
(69.3 per cent)30 (see appendix 6.1). But no single party held a majority 
of the seats in any of Russia’s 89 regional assemblies, and there were only
10 chairs of assemblies with a party affiliation.31
It is only in the regions of the so called ‘red belt’ (e.g., Stavropol¢ Krai,
Belgorod, Vologda, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tambov, Bryansk and Penza
oblasts), where we see higher levels of party saturation of assemblies.
Here, the communists have been able to achieve a plurality, if not a major-
ity of assembly seats, in coalition with other parties and blocks, such as
Table 6.1 Party representation in regional assemblies
Election cycle 1993–94 1995–97 2000 2001
% of candidates who stood – 24.9 15.7 8.7
on a party ticket
Party affiliation of deputies 14.0 18.6 12.7 8.4
Source: Data for 1993–94, and 1995–97, Vybory v Zakonodatel’nye (predstavitel’nye) Organov
Gosudarstvennoi Vlasti Sub’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995–97 (Moscow: Ves¢ Mir, 1998). Data
for 2000 and 2001, A. I. Tur and A. S. Novikov, ‘O soveshchanii predstavitelei izbiratel’nykh
komissii sub’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Vestnik Tsentralnaya Izbiratel’naya Komissiya, 6:120
(2001), 60.
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the Agrarian Party of Russia and the National Patriotic Union of Russia.
I can find no comparable data on party representation for 2001, but the
situation, if anything, must be worse than in 1998. I would expect that
currently there will be an even smaller number of assemblies where party
members make up a plurality or a majority of the legislature.
It is also important to note that these figures for party membership refer
to figures for the umbrella term ‘electoral associations’ which include not
only parties, but a host of other ‘political movements’ and civic organi-
sations, many of which should more precisely be classified as interest, or
occupational groups. Thus, under this rubric we find, for example, such
groups as; the ‘Union of Young Jurists’ (Penza oblast), the ‘Capital
Housing Movement’, and ‘Medics for the Rebirth of Health’ (Moscow
city), the ‘Fund for the Mentally Ill’ (Saratov oblast), and even the foot-
ball club ‘Salyut’ (Saratov oblast), and what appears to be a contradiction
in terms, the ‘Bloc of Non-Party Independents’ (Krasnoyarsk krai). Also
we need to take into account the fact that, in a number of regions, party
representation will most likely be higher than the officially declared
results, as candidates often deliberately fail to declare their party affilia-
tion during the elections, only to emerge as members of party factions in
the first session of the newly elected assemblies. Such concealment of
one’s party affiliation shows that for most candidates party membership
continues to be seen as more of a liability than an asset.
The political orientation of legislative assemblies in 1998
Of the 635 deputies with a party affiliation in January 199832 by far the
largest number belonged to the Communist Party of the Russian Federa-
tion (KPRF) (279 deputies or 44.0 per cent) which won seats in 42 regions.
However, overall the Communist’s 279 seats made up only 8.0 per cent
of the total (see table 6.2).
All of the other political parties had a minimal presence, none com-
prising even as much as 1 per cent of the total number of deputies. Thus,
for example the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR) won a mere 28 seats in 7
assemblies, the National Patriotic Union of Russia (NPSR), 26 seats in
three assemblies, Yabloko, 22 seats in 8 assemblies; Our Home is Russia
(NDR), 18 seats in 12 assemblies, and the Liberal Democratic Party of
Russia (LDPR), 15 seats in just 6 assemblies.
Party affiliation in gubernatorial elections
If, as we have demonstrated above, party affiliation in regional assemblies
was weak, in the governors’ corps it has been even more inchoate and
transient. Thus, for example, of the 4,000 public associations which had
the right to nominate candidates in gubernatorial elections over the
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period 1995–97, only 100 (or 2.5 per cent) actually participated in just 48
regions.33 And these public associations put forward just 18.8 per cent of
the total number of candidates. Finally, of the 70 chief executives who
were finally elected, just 10 (14.3 per cent) had a party affiliation.34
The majority of regional governors and republican presidents have, for
the most part, rejected any party affiliation or allegiance to a particular
ideology, tending to portray themselves as strong pragmatic ‘economic
managers’ whose deep concern for the welfare of their regions transcends
party politics.
As Petrov and Titov note, of the 154 candidates in the 1995–97 guber-
natorial elections, two-thirds lacked any political affiliation. And of the 57
candidates which did declare a political affiliation, 36 were communists,
18 liberal reformers, and there were 3 nationalists. 36 of the 70 incumbent
governors won re-election. As table 6.3 shows, leaders of parties, political
movements and public organisations made up only 5.3 per cent of the can-
didates and they won only 2.9 per cent of the posts. Leaders of economic
Table 6.2 Number of seats won by candidates of national parties and number
of assemblies in which parties have seats, January 1998
Name of party Total number of seats Number of assemblies
KPRF 279 42
APR 28 7
KEDR 1 1
DVR 2 1
CO 11 4
RP 1 1
RKRP 9 5
LDPR 15 6
NPSR 26 3
DNR 18 12
YABLOKO 22 8
PST 1 1
NPR 1 1
KRO 2 1
Others 219 45
Source: ‘Parties in Assemblies’, special report prepared for the author by the Russian Central
Electoral Commission, no author, January 1998.
Notes: KPRF = Communist Party of the Russian Federation; APR = Agrarian Party of Russia;
KEDR = Ecological Party of Russia; DVR = Russia’s Democratic Choice; CO = Honour and
Fatherland; RP = Republican Party; RKRP = Russian Communist Workers’ Party; LDPR =
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia; NPSR = National Patriotic Union of Russia; NDR = Our
Home is Russia; PST = Party of Independent Workers; NPR = People’s Party of Russia; KRO
= Congress of Russian Communities.
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enterprises and commercial organisations fielded a much higher per
centage of candidates, 28.4 per cent, and won 8.7 per cent of the posts. To
a large degree the gubernatorial contests could be seen more as a strug-
gle between representatives of executive and legislative bodies than a
struggle between parties. Of the 154 candidates, 79 came from posts in the
executive, 40 from representative bodies and only 35 candidates were not
related to either of these two branches (for a discussion of executive–
legislative relations, see chapter 7).35
Political affiliation of governors
Box 6.1 shows the political affiliation of governors in October 1999.
However, in the wake of the success of the presidential ‘party of power’,
Yedinstvo (Unity) in the December 1999 elections, many governors have
already shifted their political allegiances and are now jumping on the
political bandwagon of President Putin. The weak political affiliation of
regional governors is graphically illustrated by the colourful career of
Aleksandr Rutskoi, the former Russian Vice President who moved rapidly
from being a staunch ally of Yeltsin in 1991 to his arch enemy by Sep-
tember 1993. After his release from prison for his leading role in the
‘October 1993 events’, Rutskoi was elected to the post of Governor of
Kursk with the support of the KPRF and the National Patriotic Union of
Russia (NPSR). However, it was not long before Rutskoi soon abandoned
any supposed loyalty to these left-wing parties, becoming one of Yeltsin’s
Table 6.3 Comparisons of registered candidates with winners, 1995–97
Candidates % of candidates % of winners
Chief executives of regions 19.2 51.4
Chairs (deputy chairs) of legislative 4.7 13.0
bodies of regions
Deputies of legislative bodies of subjects 6.1 2.9
of RF
Deputies of the state Duma of the 10.0 11.6
Federal Assembly of the RF
Assistants to Deputies of the State Duma 3.6 0.0
Leaders of economic enterprises and 28.4 8.7
commercial structures
Leaders of parties, movements and 5.3 2.9
public organisations
Others 22.6 10.1
Source: Vybory glav Ispolnitel’Noi. Vlasti Sub’Ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995–97 (Moscow: Ves¢
Mir, 1997).
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Box 6.1 Political affiliation of Russian governors
Unity
Adygeya President Aslan Dzharimov Kursk Governor Aleksandr Rutskoi
Arkhangelsk Governor Anatolii Efremov Leningrad Governor Valerii Serdyukov
Buryatiya President Leonid Potapov Magadan Governor Valentin Tsvetkov
Chelyabinsk Governor Petr Sumin Nenets Governor Vladimir Butov
Chukotka Governor Aleksandr Nazarov Omsk Governor Leonid Polezhaev
Dagestan President Magomedali Magomedov Orenburg Governor Vladimir Elagin
Yevenk Governor Aleksandr Bokovikov Primorskii Krai Governor Evgenii Nazdratenko
Kaliningrad Governor Leonid Gorbenko Rostov Governor Vladimir Chub
Kalmykiya President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov Sakha (Yakutiya) President Mikhail Nikolaev
Kamchatka Governor Vladimir Biryukov Sakhalin Governor Igor Farkhutdinov
Koryak Governor Valentin Bronevich Smolensk Governor Aleksandr Prokhanov
Kostroma Governor Viktor Shershunov Tver Governor Vladimir Platov
Fatherland
Kareliya Prime Minister Sergei Katanandov Moscow Oblast Governor Anatolii Tyazhlov
Kirov Governor Vladimir Sergeenkov Murmansk Governor Yurii Evdokimov
Komi President Yurii Spiridonov Nizhnii Novgorod Governor Ivan Sklyarov
Mordoviya President Nikolai Merkushin Novosibirsk Governor Vitalii Mukha
Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov Udmurtiya State Council Chairman Aleksandr Volkov
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All-Russia
Bashkortostan President Murtaza Rakhimov Khanty-Mansi Governor Aleksandr Filipenko
Belgorod Governor Yevgenii Savchenko North Osetiya-Alaniya President Aleksandr Dzasokhov
Chuvashiya President Nikolai Fedorov Penza Governor Vasilii Bochkarev
Ingushetiya President Ruslan Aushev Perm Governor Gennadii Igumnov
Irkutsk Governor Boris Govorin St Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev
Khabarovsk Governor Viktor Ishaev Tatarstan President Minitimer Shaimiev
Our Home is Russia
Astrakhan Governor Anatolii Guzhvin Tomsk Governor Viktor Kress
Jewish Autonomous Oblast Governor Nikolai Volkov Tyumen Governor Leonid Roketskii
Novgorod Governor Mikhail Prusak Tyva President Sherig-Ool Oorzhak
Saratov Governor Dmitrii Ayatskov Ust-Orda Buriatiya Governor Valerii Maleev
Union of Right Forces, Voice of Russia, New Force
Gorno-Altai Republic President Semen Zubakin Samara Governor Konstantin Titov
Marii El President Vyacheslav Kislitsyn Vologda Governor Vyacheslav Pozgalev
Communists
Altai Krai Governor Aleksandr Surikov Stavropol Governor Aleksandr Chernogorov
Amur Governor Anatolii Belonogov Tambov Governor Aleksandr Ryabov
Bryansk Governor Yurii Lodkin Tula Governor Vasilii Starodubtsev
Kemerovo Governor Aman Tuleev Vladimir Governor Nikolai Vinogradov
Krasnodar Governor Nikolai Kondratenko Volgograd Governor Nikolai Maksyuta
Ryazan Governor Vyacheslav Lyubimov Voronezh Governor Ivan Shabanov
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Box 6.1 Continued
Lebed
Krasnoyarsk Governor Aleksandr Lebed Khakasiya Prime Minister Aleksei Lebed
Zhirinovskii
Pskov Governor Yevgenii Mikhailov
Unaffiliated with major blocs
Orel Governor Egor Stroev Ulyanovsk Governor Yurii Goryachev
Sverdlovsk Governor Eduard Rossel Yaroslavl’ Governor Anatolii Lisitsyn
Affilation Unknown
Agin-Buriatiya Governor Bair Zhamsuev Komi-Permyak Governor Nikolai Poluyanov
Chita Governor Ravil Genyatulin Kurgan Governor Oleg Bogomolov
Khabardino-Balkariia President Valerii Kokov Lipetsk Governor Oleg Korolev
Kaluga Governor Valerii Sudarenkov Taimyr Governor Gennadii Nedelin
Karachaevo-Cherkesiya President Vladimir Semenov Yamal-Nenets Governor Yurii Neelov
Source: Robert Orttung and Daniele Lussier, EWI, Russian Regional Report, October, 1999.
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staunchest supporters in the Federation Council. And Rutskoi even
became a member of Yedinstvo. In a similar manner, once in office, even
such hard line Communists, as the President of Mordoviya (Merkushkin),
and the governors of Ul’yanovsk (Gorachev), Smolensk (Glushenkov),
and Lipetsk (Narolin) oblasts, quickly abandoned any pretence of party
loyalty in order to curry favour with the federal government.36
The new governors’ parties
Rather than governors joining parties in order to promote their election
prospects, it is more often the case that parties are forced to turn to gov-
ernors to help them bring home the regional votes. Regional presidents
and governors have considerable control over electoral finances, the local
media, courts and electoral commissions. There are many instances of
governors resorting to outright manipulation of the electoral rules to
ensure their victory in gubernatorial elections or to pack regional as-
semblies with their own appointed officials (we discuss these points in
chapter 9).37
A new and worrying development is the creation of a number of gov-
ernors’ parties which were first created in the run-up to the 1999 Duma
elections. The creation of these artificial top-down ‘parties of government’
have been a major blow to the development of grassroots democracy in
the regions. As Slider notes, these governors’ blocs were in effect, ‘anti-
party parties’ set up specifically to preclude effective national party build-
ing in the regions.38 These ‘parties’ (for example, Fatherland, All-Russia,
Voice of Russia) were set up by regional governors to promote their own
personal interests and the interests of their regions in the Duma. Table 6.4
shows variations in the level of governors’ support for parties in 1999.
However, as noted above, we must be careful to take such declarations of
party allegiance with a strong pinch of salt.
Elections for chief executives, 2000–1
As Corwin notes, the results of the 2000 gubernatorial elections shows
that, ‘incumbency bestows best advantage, while party identification . . .
means little’.39 Thus, for example, in 60 elections which were held over the
period December 1999 to January 2001, incumbents won 68 per cent of
the seats. This was a much better result than in 1995–97 where just over
half of the incumbents (36 of 70) were victorious. And data for the latest
round of gubernatorial elections which took place from January 2000 to
June 2001 show that only 1.4 per cent of electoral associations participated
in 2000, and an even lower figure of just 0.74 per cent in 2001. Moreover,
only 4.7 per cent of registered candidates belonged to electoral asso-
ciations in 2000, and this rose slightly to 6.6 per cent in 2001. Using a 
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different set of figures for 35 gubernatorial elections conducted over the
period October 15, 2000 to January 28, 2001, Oreshkin and Kozlov show
that of 300 candidates, only 9 were officially registered as ‘belonging to a
political party’. The KPRF had just 4 candidates, LDPR (2), Yedinstvo (1),
Yabloko (1), RKRP (1). And of those who won, only 3 were party
members!40
Factors explaining Russia’s weakly institutionalised party system
How can we explain the chronically low levels of party activism and
representation demonstrated in the data above? I would argue that the
following six factors have thwarted the institutionalisation of political
parties in Russia; (1) the legacy of an authoritarian political culture, (2)
the weak development of social and economic cleavages, (3) the negative
impact of Russia’s presidential system, (4) the choice of electoral systems,
(5) Russia’s weak asymmetrical form of federalism, and (6) the power of
regional governors and republican presidents to thwart the development
of parties in their territories and to control the electoral process.
The legacy of an authoritarian political culture
Seventy years of communist rule have left an authoritarian legacy, a very
weak and inchoate civil society and massive citizen distrust in political
institutions.41 As President Putin notes, ‘The roots of many of our failures
Table 6.4 Variations in the level of governors’ support of parties, 1999
No. of No. of electoral No. of voters Share of
Bloc subjects RF districts (millions) electorate (%)
OVR 18 74 34.6 32.0
KPRF 16 40 20.6 19.1
Yedinstvo 23 40 17.7 16.4
NDR 10 20 10.2 9.5
SPS 1 5 2.5 2.3
LDPR 1 1 0.6 0.6
Yabloko 0 0 0 0
Not stated 20 45 21.7 20.1
Total 89 225 108.0 100.0
Source: Vladimir Kozlov, Dmitrii Oreshkin, ‘Bluzhdayushchie zvezdy rossiiskoi politiki 
(o politicheskikh migratsiiakh regional’nykh liderov)’ Golos Rossii, no. 6, November 1, 1999,
pp. 1–6, p. 4.
Notes: OVR = Fatherland–All Russia; KPRF = Communist Party of the Russian Federation;
NDR = Our Home is Russia; SPS = Union of Right Forces; LDPR = Liberal Democratic Party
of Russia.
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lies in the underdevelopment of civil society and the authorities’ inabil-
ity to communicate and work together with it . . . Only the scaffolding 
of a civil society has been built in Russia’.42 A legal framework for 
political parties has only recently been developed and up until 2001 there
was no law on parties, their judicial status, or financing. Laws on elec-
tions, as we have noted, speak of ‘electoral associations’ and ‘blocks’
among which there are ‘parties’, ‘political movements’ and ‘political 
associations’.
Moreover, political parties still command very little trust in Russian
society. In a VTsIOM survey of public opinion, carried out in March 1999,
only 3 per cent of respondents declared full confidence in parties.43
The weak development of social and economic cleavages
As McFaul notes, ‘Whereas most countries in transition seek to change
only their system of governance, Russia had to create a new state, a new
political system, and a new economic system simultaneously’.44 But which
reforms should be implemented first? Linz and Stepan have argued 
that political reform should come first ‘because democracy legitimates 
the market, not the reverse’.45 However, without comparable economic
reforms accompanying political change, transitional states cannot gener-
ate the necessary social cleavages around which parties need to coalesce
and compete for power. As Smolar observes, ‘in state socialist societies,
the typical citizen identified with only two levels of community, one was
family and friends, and the other was the nation. Identification with any
intermediate structures was lacking altogether. In addition, the proletar-
ianisation of these societies made it difficult for individuals to recognize
differences of interests’.46
In the first years of Russia’s transition the implementation of political
reforms far outpaced the development of economic reforms. This has 
led to a situation whereby we have seen the formation of a multitude of
parties with very shallow roots in civil society. Thus, for example we have
witnessed a proliferation of right of centre parties which were founded
long before there was any sizeable property owning bourgeoisie to sup-
port them. Where sharp cleavages did emerge they were much more 
likely to be based on ethnic and regional conflicts rather than economics
and class.
The lack of well developed social cleavages has meant that Russian
parties are more often based around personalities than policies. Many
parties in post-communist states are classic ‘insider parties’ formed from
loose coalitions of deputies in the national parliament or they are top-
down elite organizations with no real grassroots support (for example, the
‘parties of power’). Not surprisingly, party identification is extremely low
in Russia. As Stephen White notes, according to survey evidence, just 22
per cent of Russians identified to some degree with a political party,
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compared with 87 per cent of the electorate of the United States and more
than 92 per cent in the United Kingdom.47 And electoral volatility in
Russia is, according to Matthew Wyman six times higher than in western
Europe and twice as high as in eastern Europe.48 It is estimated that just
0.5 per cent of the population are actually members of political parties
compared to about 4–5 per cent in Europe.
Party cohesion is much more difficult to achieve in presidential systems 
than in parliamentary regimes
For Ryabov, Russia’s ‘super-presidential republic’ with a ‘legislature
highly limited in power and functions’ has been extremely detrimental to
the development of a viable party system in Russia. In such conditions,
parties do not vie for power at either the federal or regional level. With
the exception of the KPRF and Yabloko, parties do not put forth their own
candidates for the presidency of Russia or the governorship of the regions;
in the best case they join various pre-election coalitions and backing
groups, where the decisive role is played not by parties, but by other often
non-institutionalised support groups.49
As Dawisha writes: ‘Presidentialism by focusing on the election of a
single individual to an all powerful post, diminishes the influence of the
party system’. In contrast, ‘parliamentary systems require the formation
of disciplined parties and coalitions in order to keep the executive in
power’ (see chapter 7).50 And as Golosov notes: ‘Presidentialism has an
negative impact on the development of political parties for in order to win
the Presidency parties are forced to abandon any ideological orientations
in order to try and win votes from as wide a constituency as possible’.51
Legislative stalemate and deadlock are also much more common in
presidential systems. In Russia, such stalemate turned to outright hos-
tilities between the parliament and the president, and ultimately to the
forced dissolution of the White House in September 1993. Moreover,
Yeltsin’s claim to ‘stand above party’ hindered the consolidation of parties
at the national level. It has clearly not been in the interest of Yeltsin or
Putin to support the development of strong disciplined parties which
could rise up and challenge their authority – a divided and fragmented
parliament is a weak parliament.
Russia’s choice of electoral system
As Lijphart observes, electoral systems are ‘strong instruments for
shaping party systems and (through those party systems) cabinets,
executive–legislative relations’.52 For Sartori electoral systems have two
goals:
One is representative justice that is, fair and equal representation. The other
is governing capability. There is a trade-off between the advantages of
proportional representation and those of majoritarian electoral laws.
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Proportional-representation systems tend to maximize representation, while
majoritarian ones maximize governability.53
In majoritarian systems we usually find two-party systems whilst in
systems based on proportional representation we see multiparty systems
and multiparty coalitions. Different electoral systems also benefit certain
groups. Thus for example, ‘First past the post systems tend to favour the
incumbent powers whilst proportional representation systems allow for
a more diverse set of representation’.54
In Russia the role of parties at the national level has matured over the
three elections of 1993/95/99 helped undoubtedly by the fact that half the
members of the state Duma are elected according to proportional repre-
sentation using a party list system.55 However, the maturation of parties
at the regional level has been less impressive. Here the first past the post
system in single-member districts is the most common system in opera-
tion.56 However, across the federation there are various types of multi-
mandate constituencies which may be formed according to territorial,
administrative-territorial, national, or national-territorial criteria.57
The effect of the electoral system on party building in Russia’s regions
is borne out by the data on party saturation which is much higher in those
assemblies which are elected according to some form of proportional-
ity (data for 1995–97 election cycle); Krasnoyarsk Krai (80 per cent), 
Kaliningrad Oblast (34 per cent), Koryak AO (44 per cent), Ust¢-Orda
Buryatiya AO (21 per cent). And all of the 28 seats in the lower chamber
of Sverdlovsk Oblast which are elected (half each two years) by party 
list. In Sverdlovsk, in contrast to most other regions the assembly is domi-
nated by regional rather than federal parties but as we discuss below this
will radically change once the new law on parties comes into operation.
The introduction of a party list system throughout the federation
would undoubtedly increase party representation in the assemblies, but
this change is clearly not in the interests of the incumbent governors (and
economic elites) who have benefited from fragmented, weak, and party-
less assemblies and the absence of a parliamentary opposition. None-
theless, the Central Electoral Commission is currently considering new
proposals to introduce party lists in the regions. If these reforms are imple-
mented, half of the seats in regional assemblies will in the future be
reserved for party members.58
Russian federalism has impacted negatively on the development of 
national parties
Russia’s highly asymmetrical federalism has made it very difficult for
parties to create strong unified structures, and party fragmentation has in
turn intensified regional divisions within the state. Only the communist
party can be said to have anything approaching a coherent national party
structure and party discipline is also very low or non-existent. Through-
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out the federation we can also witness a bewildering array of electoral
coalitions with different regional branches of the same federal party strik-
ing up agreements with different parties in different regions and putting
forward a plethora of differing party platforms.
Russia’s adoption of nationally drafted party lists in a single nation-
wide electoral district rather than regionally drafted lists in multi-member
districts (as is the case in Germany), has also worked against the develop-
ment of strong nationally integrated parties. As Remington notes, the
choice of one single nation-wide electoral district rather than a larger
number of multimember districts, was a deliberate one, ‘designed to
reduce the chances that parties with a strong regional or ethnic appeal
might win seats and weaken the state’s unity’.59 However, some element of
federalism has now been built into the electoral system. There are two types
of party list for Duma elections, an all-Union federal list with a maximum
of eighteen candidates, and a second regional list of candidates.60
Some degree of party centralisation is also essential for parties to
operate effectively in a federation. Centralised parties can help bind the
members of a federation together, whilst, on the contrary, weak feder-
alised parties can exacerbate ethnic problems in multinational federations.
Thus, as Burgess argues, where there is symmetry, ‘between the federal
government and the constituent units we can expect the relative partisan
harmony to have a binding impact upon the federation’. However, where
there is asymmetry, ‘the resulting differences of interest may have a cen-
trifugal effect’ which may ultimately ‘lead to pressures for secession from
the union’.61
The importance of national parties which cross ethnic and regional
divisions is also vital in multinational federations. As David Laitin notes:
National parties that seek to build alliances that crosscut cultural groups in
all regions tend to modulate the demands from regionally based autonomy
movements. In Nigeria, the constitutional drafters recognised this issue and
required that to become accredited parties must have significant member-
ship across a variety of regions.62
But, not one single party in Russia has branches in all federal subjects.
And, none of the parties have been able to compete in all electoral dis-
tricts. As table 6.5 shows, in the 1999 elections for the Duma even the
KPRF could only field candidates in 62.2 per cent of the single member
election districts. Yabloko and NDR fielded candidates in 50–60 per 
cent; OVR and SPS in half, and Yedinstvo (‘Unity’) in just 18 per cent.63
Zhirinovsky’s block failed to contest a single seat.64 Turning to the 
party list elections, even here, none of the parties fielded candidates in 
all of the regions; NDR’s candidates competed in 84 of Russia’s 89 
regions; the KPRF (84 regions), OVR (68), SPS (63), Yabloko (57) and
Yedinstvo (53).65
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The weak organisational base of national parties in the regions is also
revealed by the stark fact that a significant number of the candidates regis-
tered for election, even in the party lists (PL), are not actually members
of these parties. LDPR had the highest per centage of its own party mem-
bers on its party list (92.6 per cent), followed by the KPRF (78 per cent),
Yabloko (73.2 per cent), OVR (62.1 per cent), SPS (49.4 per cent). The
former ‘party of power’ NDR, had an incredibly low figure of only 
3.1 per cent66 (see table 6.5 which also shows similar wide variations in
the single member lists (SM)). And, when it comes to choosing candidates
for national elections we find very poor representation of party members
from the regions. Thus, for example, approximately one third of all
candidates nominated by national parties for the 1999 Duma elections
came from elites residing in the cities of Moscow and St Petersburg (see
table 6.5).
The weak political affiliation of regional governors, and chairs of
regional assemblies, is also important for party consolidation in the Fed-
eration Council where these two groups (up until January 2002 were ex
officio members). In a vicious circle, weak levels of party affiliation at the
regional level feed into weak party consolidation at the national level and
vice versa.
The role of governors and presidents in thwarting the development 
of parties in the regions
Finally, it is clearly not in the interests of most regional governors 
and presidents to support the development of parties in their regions. A
partyless assembly is a weak assembly. As we discuss in chapter 9 many
regional executives have been able to hold on to power by manipulating
the electoral process, squeezing out opposition candidates, and blocking
the development of parties.
The June 2001 Law on Political Parties
The new ‘Law on Political Parties’ which was ratified by the Duma in June
2001 does address some of the issues and problems of party building, dis-
cussed above. According to this law, which comes into operation in 2003,
before a party can be registered it must have a minimum 10,000 members
spread across ‘more than half of the subjects of the Russian Federation’
(article 3.2) with a minimum of 100 members in each regional branch. And
when the law comes into force ‘political blocks’ and ‘electoral associa-
tions’ will be prohibited. Those parties which are registered will be funded
by the state. Thus, any party which collects more than 3 per cent of the
total vote in parliamentary elections will receive 0.2 roubles from the
Federal Budget for each vote cast in its favour. The Chair of the Central
Electoral Commission, Aleksandr Veshnyakov, has predicted that the law
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will have the positive effect of reducing the number of parties and move-
ments from the current 200 to 10–30.68 Other politicians are not so opti-
mistic. Vladimir Lysenko (head of the Republic Party) argues that the new
legislation will disproportionately benefit the two largest parties, the
Communist Party, and Yedinstvo, ‘transforming the multi-party system
into a system of only a few parties’.69 According to Lysenko, the new law
will make it impossible for any of the other parties to recruit the neces-
sary number of new members in the time permitted. Furthermore, the law
strikes a blow against local democracy in the regions as it bans regional
parties from forming and competing in elections. As a consequence,
Lysenko argues: ‘The provinces will inevitably be removed from politics
on all levels, and all decisions will be made in and by the centre alone. It
means reverting to a unitary state, a loss of one of the major achievements
of the past decade – the federal structure of the state’.70
Financial and other bureaucratic controls from the centre over the
parties will also prohibit the development of a ‘strong and constructive
opposition’, without which, as Lysenko argues, ‘any state is doomed to
stagnation and authoritarianism’.71 Moreover, the law makes it relatively
easy for the government to suspend the activity of a party or to shut it
down for good. Finally, the ‘law does not allow the party system to evolve
naturally’. Instead, it is the state which is ‘to decide what kinds of parties
Russia requires and which ones it can do without, and what kind of party
system Russia needs’.72
Table 6.5 Regional distribution of parties in the December 1999 
Duma elections
% of party
SMa reside in PLa reside in
PL
members
Moscow/St Moscow/St
SM candidates candidates SM PL Petersburg Petersburg
KPRF 140 62.2% 84 86.4 78.0 27.0 30.3
Yedinstvo 41 18.2% 53 – – 46.3 41.8
OVR 118 52.4% 68 25.3 62.1 34.8 41.4
SPS 108 48.0% 63 51.4 49.4 34.2 27.8
Yabloko 135 60.0% 57 60.8 73.2 28.9 32.2
Zhir – – – 92.6 – –
NDR 118 52.4% 86 7.1 3.1 31.0 16.0
Source: ‘Who is Who on the Parties’ Lists?’, www.panorama.ru:8101. (2000).
Notes: KPRF = Communist Party of the Russian Federation; OVR = Our Fatherland–All
Russia; SPS = Union of Right Forces;67 Zhir = Zhirinovsky Bloc; NDR = Our Home is Russia;
SM = Single Member List; PL = Party List. a Candidates residing in Moscow and St.
Petersburg oblasts and the cities, Moscow and St Petersburg.
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Conclusions
The problem of party building in Russia’s regions comes not so much
from what Sartori calls ‘polarized pluralism’ or the danger of ‘anti-system
parties’ threatening the stability of the party system. Russia’s problem is
that, with the exception of the KPRF, and the transient ‘parties of power’
(Russia’s Choice, Our Home is Russia, Yedinstvo), there are no other
national parties with sufficient organisational capacity and financial
resources to compete effectively in federal wide elections. Thus, one of the
striking features of local politics in Russia is the almost total partyless
nature of regional election campaigns and the dismal representation 
of political parties in regional assemblies. Politics at the regional level 
is highly fragmented. In the majority of cases, competition is not be-
tween disciplined nationwide parties with competing policies but rather
between a host of competing individuals and personalities. If you are a
communist candidate in the ‘red belt’ this may very well be an advantage,
but in most other regions a party label is more liable to scare away poten-
tial voters.
The absence of strong institutionalised parties in the regions has inten-
sified the clientalistic and corporatist nature of politics in Russia. As we
discuss in the next chapter state officials and economic elites have bene-
fited from the partyless nature of regional politics and the fragmented and
divided nature of politics in the assemblies. As Liebert notes: ‘empirical
studies on Third World legislatures . . . have pointed out that legislatures
are far more vulnerable to extra-constitutional attacks against their pre-
rogatives in systems where political parties are weak; stronger parties
help the legislature to generate the support it needs from mass publics to
withstand challenges from bureaucratic elites’.73 Populist regional gover-
nors have tapped into the vacuum of power in Russia’s partyless regions,
creating regional autocracies. As Mainwaring observes: ‘The weakness 
of parties’ social roots means that democratic political competition, 
rather than being channelled through parties and other democratic insti-
tutions, assumes a personalized character . . . populism and “antipolitics”
are more common in countries with weak institutionalised systems’.74
However, fragmented and divided assemblies have also led to legisla-
tive deadlock. Governors often cannot guarantee majority support for
their policies and often they are forced to enter into a ‘war of laws’ with
the regional assemblies. Just as Yeltsin found himself caught in a deadly
stalemate with the Russian parliament in 1993 so republican presidents
and regional governors (mini-presidencies) have found themselves in
similar predicaments (see chapter 7).
In recent years we have also seen the worrying development of
governors’ parties, created from above, thwarting the development of
grassroots parties, from below. As the centrifugal power of the regions
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have expanded, the need for strong unifying parties has become more
pressing. Yet as Alfred Stepan observes, ‘No other federal system has a
party system that to date has contributed so little to producing polity wide
programmatic discipline’.75 It is very difficult to consolidate parties in
weak and fragmented federal systems, but it is even more difficult to build
federal systems in the absence of strong and territorially comprehensive
parties. The new law on political parties has gone some way to try and
reduce the number of parties competing at the national level by demand-
ing that in order to register they must have a minimum number of
members, with representation in at least half of Russia’s federal subjects.
However, as we noted, the law also prohibits the development of regional
parties and it has a number of other negative features. In conclusion, there
can be no consolidation of democracy in Russia without a nationwide con-
solidation of parties and the party system. The future prospects for the
development of a multi-party democracy in Russia, both at the national
and local levels, looks even bleaker under Putin than it did under Yeltsin.
Appendix 6.1 Party membership of regional assemblies, 
January 1998
Total no. No. of party % of party
Federal subject of deputies members members
Krasnoyarsk Krai 41 33 80
Sverdlovsk Oblast 49 34 69
Kemerovo Oblast 21 12 57
Novosibirsk Oblast 49 27 55
Ryazan¢ Oblast 26 13 50
Bryansk Oblast 49 24 49
Republic of Adygeya 45 22 49
Kamchatka Oblast 43 20 47
Kaluga Oblast 40 18 45
Koryakskii Autonomous Okrug 9 4 44
Altai Krai 50 22 44
Belgorod Oblast 35 14 40
Penza Oblast 45 17 38
Udmurtskaya Republic 100 37 37
Stavropol¢ Krai 25 9 36
Khabarovsk Krai 23 8 35
Kaliningrad Oblast 32 11 34
Omsk Oblast 30 10 33
Smolensk Oblast 30 10 33
Kirov Oblast 54 17 31
Pskov Oblast 20 6 30
Orel Oblast 50 14 28
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Total no. No. of party % of party
Federal subject of deputies members members
Tambov Oblast 50 14 28
Astrakhan Oblast 29 8 28
Republic of Kareliya 56 15 27
Yevreiskaya Autonomous Oblast 15 4 27
Voronezh Oblast 45 12 27
Tula Oblast 48 11 23
Moscow City 35 8 23
Rostov Oblast 45 10 22
Volgograd Oblast 47 10 21
Ust¢-Ordynskii Buryatskii Autonomous 19 4 21
Okrug
Karachaevo-Cherkesskaya Republic 73 15 21
Ivanovo Oblast 35 7 20
Ul’yanovsk Oblast 25 5 20
Orenburg Oblast 47 9 19
Lipetsk Oblast 38 7 18
Murmansk Oblast 24 4 17
Irkutsk Oblast 44 7 16
Chuvashskaya Republic 63 9 14
Kabardino-Balkarskaya Republic 36 5 14
Kursk Oblast 44 6 14
Vladimir Oblast 37 5 14
Aginskii-Buryatskii Autonomous 15 2 13
Okrug
Moscow Oblast 50 6 12
Sakhalin Oblast 27 3 11
Republic of Marii-El 66 7 11
Republic of Tatarstan 130 13 10
Yaroslavl¢ Oblast 50 5 10
Republic of North Osetiya-Alaniya 73 7 10
Republic of Tyva 21 2 10
Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) 66 6 9
Saratov Oblast 35 3 9
Republic of Komi 50 4 8
Samara Oblast 25 2 8
Tomsk Oblast 42 3 7
Vologda Oblast 30 2 7
Republic of Khakasiya 75 4 5
Republic of Altai 41 2 5
Yamalo-Nenetskii Autonomous Okrug 21 1 5
Tyumen¢ Oblast 25 1 4
Kurgan Oblast 33 1 3
Tver¢ Oblast 33 1 3
Arkhangel’sk Oblast 36 1 3
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Total no. No. of party % of party
Federal subject of deputies members members
Nizhegorod Oblast 45 1 2
Leningrad Oblast 50 1 2
Amur Oblast 30 0 0
Republic of Bashkortostan 185 0 0
Republic of Buryatiya 64 0 0
Chelyabinsk Oblast 41 0 0
Chita Oblast 39 0 0
Chukotkskii Autonomous Okrug 13 0 0
Republic of Dagestan 121 0 0
Khanty-Mansiiskii Autonomous Okrug 23 0 0
Komi-Permyatskii Autonomous Okrug 15 0 0
Kostroma Oblast 19 0 0
Magadan Oblast 17 0 0
Nenetskii Autonomous Okrug 15 0 0
Novgorod Oblast 26 0 0
Perm¢ Oblast 40 0 0
Primorskii Krai 39 0 0
Taimyrskii Autonomous Okrug 11 0 0
Yevenkiiskii Autonomous Okrug 23 0 0
Source: ‘Parties in Assemblies’, special report prepared for the author by the Russian Central
Electoral Commission, no author, January 1998.
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7Federalism and political 
asymmetry: executive versus
legislative power
As we have noted, political institutions are of crucial importance during
transitions to democracy, and for Mainwaring, among all the choices of
institutions ‘none is more important than the system of government:
presidential, semipresidential, parliamentary or some hybrid’.1 There is
now a general consensus in the literature that parliamentary systems are
more stable than presidential ones and that it is much easier to con-
solidate democracy in parliamentary regimes.2 As Zvi Gitelman notes:
‘Parliamentarism is generally more favourable to democratic consolida-
tion than presidentialism because it gives the political system greater
efficacy, the capacity to construct majorities and the ability to terminate a
crisis of government without it becoming a crisis of the regime’.3
One of the major problems with presidential systems is that they are,
‘prone to creating two opposing centres of power’, and often ‘legislative
paralysis can set in when neither parliament nor president are strong
enough to break the deadlocks which ensue’.4 Politics quickly becomes a
zero-sum game where the winner takes all. As we noted in chapter 6,
presidential systems are thus often prone to chronic conflict, legislative
stalemate and even complete paralysis. This is particularly the case,
where, ‘the executive does not have sufficient support in the congress to
pass legislation but does have sufficient strength to have his or her vetoes
sustained’.5 And furthermore, as Mainwaring has shown, the deadly
combination of a presidential system with a fragmented multi-party
system, as in Russia, ‘can have pernicious results’.6
In Russia, deadlock at the national level lead to outright physical
violence and the dissolution of the Russian Parliament in October 1993.
And this struggle between parliament and president also gravitated
downwards to the local level with similar battles occurring between
regional soviets (assemblies) and executive bodies of power. What fol-
lowed were presidential decrees fundamentally seeking to increase the
powers of the executive at the national and local levels and parliamen-
tary (Supreme Soviet) laws which sought to enhance the powers of the
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national legislature and local assemblies. Soon Russia was faced with the
horrifying possibility of eighty-nine battles between regional executives
and assemblies.
Striking the first blow in his ‘war of laws’ with the Russian Parliament,
Yeltsin adopted a decree on August 22, 19917 which granted him powers
of appointment over all the chief executives (governors) in the regions.8
Although the local assemblies were in theory supposed to approve the
appointment of these executives, in many cases chief administrators were
simply imposed upon them without any prior consultation. However, in
March 1992 the Russian Supreme Soviet struck back adopting its own law
on regional assemblies which significantly increased the powers of the
soviets (regional assemblies) vis-à-vis the governors.9 As Gel¢man notes,
this law instituted the dual subordination of the chief executive of a region
before the regional assembly and the President, and the dual subordina-
tion of the regional administration before the assembly and the governor.
The regional assemblies were also given the right to name four key
members of the regional cabinets (the first deputy chief of the adminis-
tration, and heads of the departments of finance, property, and social
affairs).10 Moreover, they could also declare a vote of no confidence in the
governors, and appeal for the removal of governors to the President or
the Constitutional Court.11 The chief executives in their turn were given
the right to veto the decisions of the assembly but their vetoes could be
overturned by a simple majority of the assembly.
In December 1992 as the battle between Parliament and President
intensified, the Russian Parliament adopted a further resolution which
stripped Yeltsin of his ‘authority to appoint regional heads of adminis-
tration, and called for the abolition within one month of the presidential
representatives in Russia’.12 Yeltsin responded to this attack from the Par-
liament with a presidential decree which he promulgated on February 5,
1993. This decree13 made the presidential representatives a permanent
body under the direct supervision of the head of the presidential ad-
ministration, and he simply ignored the parliament’s moves to rescind his
powers of appointment of regional governors.14 During this period,
1991–93, Gel¢man argues there was a presidential–parliamentary type
system in operation in the regions.15
The assault on local assemblies 1993–96
Yeltsin’s victory over the parliamentarians in October 1993 signalled a
victory of executive power over legislative power. As Gel¢man notes, from
1993 we see the development of a hierarchical chain of executive author-
ity. Presidential decrees adopted over the period 1993–94 brought an end
to the assemblies’ rights of confirmation of the appointment of chief
executives and members of regional administrations, and of their right to
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bring sanctions against the executive, or to express a vote of no confidence
in the governors.16 The right of a legislative veto over decrees of the chief
executive now required the vote of two-thirds of the deputies and not as
previously a simple majority. Indeed, Gel¢man notes, that if you compared
the competence of the regional assemblies in 1994 with the powers of the
two chambers of the federal assembly, then the President had significantly
less rights than the regional governors. Thus, for example, the Duma may
express a vote of no confidence in the government and also may express
its disagreement with this or that law. No such rights were given to
regional soviets. The regional soviets were also to be part time bodies with
only a small percentage of the deputies engaged in full time parliamen-
tary work. Once again it is important to note that this legislation was
aimed only at the regions, and the republics were given the go ahead to
forge their own political institutions.
However, it was not long before regional assemblies fought back
against executive dominance. Russia’s weak and inchoate form of
federalism played into the hands of the regions. Yeltsin (as we showed in
chapter 3) in a search to maintain stability and to win the support of
regional voters, went out of his way to grant recalcitrant regions 
and republics special deals and favours. Many of the bilateral treaties
allowed the republics and regions to develop their own political systems.17
Articles 72 and 77 of the Russian Constitution also grant republics and
regions the right to independently structure their political institutions as
long as they do not contradict the Constitution and federal laws. No such
law delineating the powers of regional soviets was forthcoming until
1999.
Taking advantage of this lack of clarity in federal directives, and
bolstered by new electoral mandates, a number of regional assemblies
began the process of drawing up charters which, if adopted, would radi-
cally increase their powers and status, reinstating many of the rights taken
away from them by presidential edicts in 1993. In some cases the assem-
blies drew up charters which called for the abolition of the ‘presidential’
systems in their regions to be substituted by fully-fledged ‘parliamentary’
regimes (e.g. Altai Krai, Chita, Tambov, Saratov and Kemerovo oblasts).18
Thus, for example, in Altai Krai and Chita Oblast regional elites were able
to create strong ‘parliamentary charters’19 which, ‘sought to make their
regional executives accountable to the regional assemblies, establish
legislative control over cabinet appointments and structure, and allow for
votes of no confidence in the head of the region’.20 In many other regions
there were wide variations in the specific powers which assemblies 
were granted vis-à-vis the executive.21 Constitutional asymmetry soon led
to political asymmetry. By 1995 there was a highly varied system of 
executive–legislative relations in operation in the regions (see box 7.1). In
particular, the right of assemblies to ratify nominations for executive posts
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varied substantially across the federation. The most traditional variant was
where the chief executive appointed and dismissed cabinet members and
other officials of executive power. However, in other cases legislative
organs of power were required to give their approval for: chairs of the gov-
ernment (Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Ingushetiya, Karachaevo-
Cherkesiya, Tatarstan, Mordoviya, Sakha, North Osetiya-Alaniya), first
deputy and/or deputy chiefs of executive power (Irkutsk, Saratov,
Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Kareliya, Sakha, Tyva, Tambov oblast), all mem-
bers of the government, ministers, and leaders of state committees 
(Altai, Buryatiya, Tatarstan, Marii El, Mordoviya, Sakha (Yakutiya), 
Tyva), individual ministers (Adygeya, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Kareliya,
Khakassiya, Saratov, Tambov, Perm). In some regions (e.g., Tver and
Khakasiya) assemblies had the exclusive right to sign and promulgate
laws (see box 7.1).
However, regional assemblies suffered yet another blow when in
January 1996, the Constitutional Court declared that the ‘parliamentary
charters’ of Altai Krai and Chita Oblast violated the constitutional prin-
ciple of the ‘separation of powers’.22 In March 1996 the legislature of Altai
Krai reluctantly agreed to withdraw from its charter those articles which
had granted it the right to directly elect the governor and members of the
regional administration. And legislators in Chita oblast were soon forced
to follow suit. Armed by this constitutional precedent, governors in many
other regions across the federation were able to strengthen their powers
of control over the assemblies. Thus, as Gel¢man notes, federal legislation
over the period 1993–96 transformed politics in most regions from a
‘parliamentary-presidential’ system to a fully fledged ‘presidential’ one.23
Nonetheless, it was still far from the case that there were uniform laws in
practice throughout the federation. In some regions it was regional elites
and not presidential decrees or parliamentary laws which determined the
specific institutional structures that were put in place.
Elites and regional politics
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union regional elites largely
determined their own institutional structures. This was a time when
institutions were in flux, and there was a power vacuum at the centre.
Thus, those elites (parliamentary or presidential) which commanded the
most political and economic resources and support during the period
1991–93 were largely able to impose their institutional designs on the
regions. In those regions where there was a strong political affinity
between the governor and the deputies compromises over the provisions
of the charters were soon achieved. In others where there was no such
affinity there was often a fierce and prolonged conflict. As Vladimir
Lysenko observed:
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If relations are calm and business like, the charter will be calm and relatively
terse . . . But if relations have not been going well, the draft charter will
resemble a blanket that each side is trying to put to its side of the bed. A
great many alternative drafts will appear, and there will be struggle for
every word, every letter and every comma.24
In some regions executive bodies dominated the process of constitution
building and subsequently were able to implement strong presidential
systems much as Yeltsin did at the national level. In other regions
126 Federalism and democratisation in Russia
Box 7.1 Variations in the powers of legislative and executive bodies of power
as stipulated in regional and republican charters and constitutions
1 Exclusive right to sign and promulgate laws:
• Assemblies in Tver Oblast and Republic of Khakasiya.
2 Right to call referendums:
• Executive has right: Buryatiya, Ingushetiya, Marii El, Leningrad Oblast.
• Assembly has right: Bashkortostan, Mordovya, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya,
Kareliya, Khakassiya, Komi, Kostroma, Primorski Krai, Sakha, Vologda and
Voronezh.
• Both executive and legislative bodies have such a right: Kalmykiya, North
Osetiya, Tatarstan and Irkutsk.
3 Legislative agreement/consent required for appointment of key members of the executive:
• Chairs of government: Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Ingushetiya,
Karachaevo-Cherkesiya, Tatarstan, Mordovya, Sakha and North Osetiya.
• First deputy and/or deputy chiefs of executive power: Irkutsk, Tambov and
Saratov oblasts; Republics of Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Kareliya, Sakha and
Tyva.
• All members of the government/administration, ministers, and leaders 
of state committees: Republics of Altai, Buryatiya, Tatarstan, Marii El, 
Mordoviya, Sakha and Tyva.
• Heads of specific ministries, administrations: Republics of Adygeya,
Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Kareliya, Khakassiya; Saratov, Tambov and Perm
oblasts.
4 Right to dissolve the assembly:
Executive has right:
• If assembly refuses three times to ratify the governors appointment of chief
of government (e.g., Irkutsk, Yaroslavl¢ and Sverdlovsk).
• If there is an absence of a quorum in the assembly. Assembly: requires two-
thirds of the votes of assembly members.
Source: I. Umnova, Razdelenie zakonodatel¢noi i ispolnitel¢noi vlasti v sub¢ektov Rossiiskoi
Federatsii: pravovye aspekty’, in V. Gel¢man, A. Kuz¢min, G. Lyukhterkhandt and S.
Ryzhenkov (eds), Organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub¢ektov Rosiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow: IGPI,
1998), pp. 121–2.
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legislative bodies were able to take the upper hand and to push for strong
parliamentary charters and the installation of parliamentary regimes. 
As Vladimir Nechaev shows in his careful study of institution building 
in four regions, elites in the Republic of Kareliya and Pskov Oblast were
able to carve out strong and independent assemblies whilst Kursk and
Astrakhan both created weak regional assemblies under the control of
powerful executives. The most important determining factors in these
four regions were the specific powers of the legislative and executive
bodies at the time of drawing up the charters/constitutions; and the date
when the charters were ratified. As Nechaev notes, in Kursk the admin-
istration controlled the process whilst in Pskov and Kareliya it was rep-
resentatives of the legislative assemblies. In Astrakhan both participated.
Here it was the respective powers of these bodies at the time of the for-
mation of the charter that was crucial.25 In Pskov work on the charter
began in the first half of 1993, that is, before the dissolution of the parlia-
ment and the adoption of the 1993 federal Constitution. Those charters
drawn up before the dissolution of the soviets in 1993 were more likely
to see a victory of the assemblies over the executives.
In some regions there was elite stalemate and a settled political
structure failed to materialise. This was most graphically seen in the
conflict between executive and legislative bodies of power in Tver Oblast
where conflict between the legislature and executive held up the adoption
of its regional charter for a number of years. In the republic of Udmurtiya,
stalemate between elites, and the realisation that in a presidential system
the ‘winner takes all’, led elites to originally opt for a parliamentary
regime.26
Another common source of conflict is the rivalry between the heads of
regional executive bodies of power and mayors of capital cities. In Pri-
morskii Krai the struggle between the regional governor and the mayor
of Vladivostok took on epic proportions. Such tensions and conflicts were
complicated and exacerbated by the dominance of independents in the
majority of assemblies and an absence in all but a few of strong disci-
plined parties.27
However, the specific nature of executive–legislative relations in a
region depend on a number of other factors other than the powers of the
respective elites at the time the charters/constitutions were laid down.
Other important factors determining this relationship are the electoral
support of the chief executive, the social composition of the assembly 
(see section on corporatism and clientelism below) and the relation-
ship between the governor and the federal government. In a study of 
executive–legislative relations in twenty-seven regions Turovskii classifies
regional assemblies according to: (a) the degree of governor’s control over
the legislature (strong, partial, or weak), and (b) the balance of political
forces in the legislature. A combination of these two criteria allows
Turovskii to posit five possible ‘ideal types’ of legislature:28
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1 Nomenklatura dominated legislatures under strong governor’s control: Such
legislatures (Kabardino-Balkariya, Novgorod, Samara, Saratov, Tomsk
and Komi-Perm AO) are dominated by economic and administrative
elites, as well as representatives of organisations funded by the regional
budget. Party representation is negligent or non-existent. Here we see
a fusion of executive and legislative power with the vast majority of
the deputies supported by the governor in the elections, and the chair
of the assembly fully in the pocket of the governor.
2 Legislatures with sizeable party representation under strong governor’s
control: (Sakha, Astrakhan, Tambov, Moscow and Yevreiskaya AOB.)
For example, in Moscow city Duma a majority of party and inde-
pendent deputies support the mayor.
3 Nomenklatura under partial governor’s control: In several regions the gov-
ernor’s control over a nomenklatura-dominated Duma was far from
complete (Leningrad, Murmansk and Perm).
4 Party/nomenklatura legislature under partial governor’s control: This type
is the most common. Several groupings compete for power but none
is predominant. The governor’s ‘party of power’ normally manages to
ensure a majority, but to build it the governor has to strike alliances
with various influential elite groups (Krasnoyarsk, Primorskii Krai,
Stavropol’, Khabarovsk, Belgorod, Kamchatka, Moscow Oblast,
Novosibirsk, Penza, Smolensk and Tver’).
5 Nomenklatura legislature under weak governor’s control: In some of the
legislatures the majority belongs to elite groups which do not support
the governor (Altai Republic and Tyumen Oblast) (see table 7.1).
As noted above, one of the reasons why regional bodies have been able
to create such varied political structures is the fact that it took until
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Table 7.1 Turovskii’s classification of regional legislatures, 1997
Degree of
governor’s
control Nomenklatura domination Parties + nomenklatura
Strong Kabardino-Balkariya, Sakha (Yakutiya), Astrakhan,
Novgorod, Samara, Saratov, Tambov, Moscow, Jewish AO
Tomsk, Komi-Perm AO
Partial Leningrad, Murmansk, Perm Krasnoyarsk, Primorskii Krai,
Stavropol¢, Khabarovsk, Belgorod,
Kamchatka, Moscow Oblast,
Novosibirsk, Penza, Smolensk, Tver¢
Weak Altai Republic, Tyumen
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October 1999 before the Duma adopted the long awaited federal law, ‘On
the general principles of organising the legislative (representative) organs
of state power in the subjects of the Russian Federation’.29 But, as Mendras
notes, by the time the law was promulgated: ‘all the territories had already
adopted their own constitution or statute (Ustav) and had shaped their
relations with federal authorities through years of daily bargaining and
compromise’.30 Moreover, as Gel¢man observes, the new law was adopted
just before the 1999 Duma elections at a time when the Yeltsin regime did
not want to alienate the regions. Thus, Gel¢man concludes, the ‘law does
not provide any political or legal innovations and merely served to codify
the existing regional state of affairs’.31
Elites, clientelism and corporatism
As O’Donnell observes, when democratic institutions are weak and
inchoate their place is soon taken over by informal practices, such as clien-
telism, patrimonialism, and corruption.32 The chronic weakness of parties
has left open the door for other groups to enter politics. Two of the most
powerful are industrial executives and state bureaucrats. In a new post-
communist corporatist alliance, regional economic and political elites
(many of whom were formerly members of the Soviet nomenklatura)
have joined forces to plunder the wealth of their regions. Politics in Russia
is built upon a myriad of patron–client networks which cut across the
formal administrative, rational–legal and constitutional boundaries of the
state. Behind the formal façade of federalism lies a network of informal
vertical and horizontal ties which have created a kind of ‘pluralism of
elites’ which prevent any one individual, group or clan from controlling
all the levers of power either at the national or regional levels.
Representation of economic elites
As Fillipov notes, ‘compared to the first round of legislative elections in
the regions which took place over the period 1993–94, we have witnessed
a meteoric rise in the importance of financial resources’.33 Key members
of the Soviet economic and administrative elites now dominate and
control the work of Russia’s local assemblies.34 Thus, for example, in the
1995–97 elections for regional assemblies there were 4,120 candidates from
industry, and many of these were high ranking executives or directors of
enterprises and collective farms. Of these 23.0 per cent were successful in
winning seats.35 And members of the economic elite have been able to turn
their economic power into political power and victory at the ballot box.
Thus for example, enterprise directors have been able to ‘persuade’ their
employees (whom they provide with not only wages, but other vital ser-
vices and goods, such as healthcare and housing) to bring home the votes.
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As Lallemand notes, ‘In times of uncertainty employees find they have an
interest in maintaining the factory’s paternalism, and they willingly vote
for a member of their management’.36
In his 1998 study of 27 regional assemblies Turovskii concluded that by
far the largest groupings in the assemblies were directors of industrial
enterprises and chairs of collective farms. In ten of the assemblies entre-
preneurs made up a majority or near majority of the deputies corps.
Indeed, so great was the representation of business interests that the list
of deputies in some assemblies read like a ‘Who’s Who?’ of local business.37
For example, 80 per cent of the members of the legislature of Kabardino-
Balkariya represented the economic elite of factory directors and busi-
nessmen.38 In Sakha’s regional assembly, the firm Russian Diamonds was
represented not only by its president but also by two vice presidents, and
there were also two managers of the Sakha Gold Company. In Tyumen
oblast at least five deputies, including the speaker of the assembly,
belonged to the top leadership of the gas giant Gazprom.39 Of the 130
members of the Tatarstan parliament elected in 1999, 48 were directors of
enterprises and banks.40 In 1998 representatives of large business concerns
won twenty of thirty seats in the Ishevsk city Duma:
The new members of the legislature control two of the largest banks in the
city, all the private television stations, 90 per cent of private newspapers,
two-thirds of the market for oil products, all three large construction com-
panies, and the two trading companies that control produce sales in the city.
Among the winners was the Chairman of ‘Udmurtneft’, which extracts 80
percent of the oil in the region. No political party member was elected.41
Members of the economic elite have also sought to win elections for
governor. Thus, for example, in the elections for 70 governors conducted
over the period 1995–97 there were 102 candidates from industry and
commerce, of which, 6 were finally victorious. And in a recent round of
gubernatorial elections conducted in 1999–2001 there was a gradual
increase in the number of top businessmen among the governor’s ranks.
Thus, for example, the new governor of Chukotka, Roman Abramovich,
is one of the heads of Russian Aluminium, a giant conglomerate which
controls 70 per cent of Russia’s aluminium production. Aleksandr 
Khloponin the new governor of Taimyr AO is the head of Norilsk Nickel.
Others with backgrounds in business are Vladimir Loginov of the Koryak
AO, Aleksandr Tkachev of Krasnodar, and Yurii Trutnev of Perm.42 The
former first vice president of the YUKOS oil company Viktor Kazakov was
appointed first deputy governor of Samara in July 2000.43
Representation of members of the state
A number of republican presidents and regional governors have also been
successful in creating weak ceremonial parliaments. In a flagrant viola-
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tion of the democratic principle of the separation of powers they have
packed legislative bodies with their subordinates from the state adminis-
tration. Thus, for example, in elections conducted over the period 1995–97,
332 heads of city and district administrations won seats in 45 regional
assemblies. Although federal laws prohibit deputies from combining state
and municipal service there has been some confusion over the interpre-
tation of what constitutes ‘municipal service’. In most regions, heads of
district administrations have not been considered by the courts to be
‘municipal servants’. Thus, for example, in Samara oblast the regional
court declared that one could combine legislative duties with a post as
chief of a local administration, but in Tver this was declared illegal. In
1998 the state Duma passed a law prohibiting heads of local adminis-
trations from being elected deputies but this law was vetoed by the
Federation Council.44
Part of the explanation for allowing full time administrators to be
elected deputies is explained by the fact that, as we noted in chapter 6,
most deputies do not work on a full time professional basis and the major-
ity combine their deputies’ duties with some other kind of occupation.45
Representatives of executive bodies of power in regional assemblies
made up 18.6 per cent of all deputies in 1997. However, in some regions
this figure was much higher. The highest representation of state officials
in regional parliaments were to be found in Bashkortostan (50.0 per cent),
Novgorod (46.2 per cent), Sverdlovsk Oblast (35 per cent), Kabardino-
Balkariya, and Komi (30 per cent, respectively).46
Indeed, in some cases where there are bicameral assemblies, the upper
chamber was specially created to include heads of local administrations.
In Bashkortostan, 73 of 74 heads of district administrations were elected
members of the upper house of the parliament.47 As Farukshin observes,
in Tatarstan we find what would appear to be a contradiction in terms, a
‘bureaucratic parliament’ where 60 of the 130 members elected to the leg-
islature (the State Council) in 1999 held full time posts in the state appa-
ratus. These included, the Prime Minister, the head of the Presidential
Administration, a deputy head of a branch of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, and 57 heads or deputy heads of district administrations. More-
over, the majority of these state officials were directly appointed to their
posts by the President.48 And if we also consider the fact that the heads
of the district administrations also hold the post of chair of district
legislatures, then the idea that there is any real separation of powers 
in Tatarstan is patently absurd.49
A similar situation exists in the Komi Republic, where the 1997 law on
local government contains numerous contradictions with federal law.
Thus, for example according to this law President Spiridonov is granted
the powers to appoint local government heads, and local legislatures are
given the task of selecting the mayors on the recommendation of the pres-
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ident.50 In Bashkortostan the Republic Constitution also gives President
Rakhimov the power to directly appoint mayors. In Marii-El administra-
tive territorial districts were created to allow the heads of seventeen dis-
tricts to enter the Republic’s Legislative Assembly. In Kursk’s charter 
the governor has the right to name the heads of 28 district adminis-
trations, and the communist party governor Aleksandr Mikhailov has
packed the administration with appointees from the communist party.51
In Kalmykiya there is no conflict between executive and legislative bodies
for the simple reason that the republic’s legislative assembly (the Khural),
is made up of just thirty or so unelected deputies, personally selected by
the President.52
Elites, institutions and democracy
Whilst a great deal of the conflict between regional parliaments and ex-
ecutives can be explained by the political orientation of their members, as
for instance, when we have a communist governor and a reformist assem-
bly or vice versa, often there are also deeper institutional factors at work.53
Theorists of the ‘new institutionalism school’ argue that democracy
depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on the
design of political institutions.54 According to this school, ‘Political actors
are driven by institutional duties and roles as well as, or instead of, by
calculated self-interest’.55 Fundamentally, ‘institutions shape politics’, and
they ‘influence outcomes because they shape actors’ identities, power and
strategies’.56
Furthermore, institutions are not neutral, as they both incorporate and
exclude certain actors, and ultimately, ‘determine which agents, on the
basis of which resources, claims, and procedures, are accepted as valid
participants’ in the decision making process. Thus, institutions matter,
and they matter more the longer they are in existence. As O’Neil notes,
over time institutions as ‘self-replicating structures’, develop their own
particular characteristics – resources, values, norms, routines, and pat-
terns – which are passed on to individuals both inside and outside the
structure’.57
Elites and institutions
The above authors stress the primacy of institutions over individual
actors. However, for other scholars who take an ‘elite centred’ approach,
it is elites that are responsible for the creation of institutions in the first
place. Institutions are created out of elite conflict and bargaining. Elites
are the primary actors in crafting democracy or bolstering authoritarian
regimes. Here democratic elites are necessary for democracy.
In Russia the founding charters and constitutions (‘rules of the game’)
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emerged out of elite conflict in the regions. Political elites struggled to
create the rules (e.g., a presidential or parliamentary system, a unitary or
federal system, a majoritarian, proportional, or mixed type of electoral
system) so that they could win the game. Moreover, elites are liable to be
more powerful in transitional societies such as Russia, where institutions
tend to be weak and in flux. However, we should not dismiss the impor-
tance of regional institutions in Russia and their development over the
last ten years. Elections, parties, constitutions and charters, assemblies,
presidencies and courts, are now a normal part of the political landscape
even if not all the major political actors have accepted the democratic
process as the ‘only game in town’. But Russia’s fledgeling democracy is
still far from consolidated, especially in the ethnic republics where, as we
discuss in chapter 9, ‘elective dictatorships’ and ‘delegative democracies’
are the norm rather than the exception.
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8Federalism under Putin
In August 1991 Yeltsin created two new administrative bodies to keep the
regions in check: presidential representatives and regional governors.
Between 1991 and 1996 Yeltsin was able to maintain control over the gov-
ernors through his powers of appointment. However, once Yeltsin relin-
quished these powers and governors were able to come to power via the
ballot box (see chapter 6), he was forced to turn to his presidential repre-
sentatives to win back control of the regions.
As we noted in chapter 3 one of the major powers of the governors was
their control over the appointment of the heads of federal bodies situated
in their territories. By controlling the appointment of such powerful offi-
cials (e.g., heads of the tax inspectorate, financial oversight bodies, and
customs officers, the judiciary, procuracy, central electoral commissions
and others), regional executives were able to undermine the authority of
the federal government and to thwart the implementation of federal 
policies. In some regions (for example Stavropol¢) governors were even
able to appoint their own regional security councils thus giving them a
significant degree of leverage over the ‘power ministries’ (security,
internal affairs) in their territories.
According to Yeltsin’s Presidential Decree of August 24, 1991, ‘On
Representatives of the President of the RSFSR in Krais and Oblasts of the
RSFSR’, the presidential representatives were charged with overseeing the
work of the governors and federal agencies. However, three further 
presidential decrees followed in a largely unsuccessful attempt to raise
the profile of the representatives.1 In the last of these decrees promulgated
in July 1997 the presidential representatives were given increased powers
to monitor the implementation of federal programmes and to coordinate
the activities of the myriad of federal bureaucracies situated in the regions.
However, these decrees failed to give the representatives sufficient
powers and resources to challenge the authority of the popularly elected
governors. Many of the envoys appointed by Yeltsin had strong ties with
their regions, and they soon turned ‘native’ taking on the interests of those
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whom they were supposed to be controlling. Moreover, governors in
many regions captured control over the appointment of the representa-
tives. In some cases bilateral treaties actually gave the governors the right
to appoint their own presidential representatives or to approve presiden-
tial nominees. Indeed, in some cases presidential representatives were
actually high ranking members of regional elites. Thus, for example, in
Stavropol¢ Krai we had the absurd sitation whereby the presidential
representative simultaneously held the post of deputy governor of the
region. In 1994 Yeltsin bowed to the will of the Primorskii krai regional
administration and sacked his presidential representative.2
Other more loyal lieutenants of the President simply did not have
sufficient authority, or the resources, to stand up to the governors. The
representatives relied on the regional administrations to supply them with
housing, office space, transportation and other administrative supports.
The governors also controlled access to the best schools and hospitals, 
and other local services for the families of the envoys. As Hyde notes, by
the mid-1990s, ‘Some representatives came to fulfill a function better
described as representative of the regions to the centre’.3 Indeed, in 1997
the situation was so bad that the Kremlin was forced to replace 60 per
cent of its representatives because of fears that ‘their loyalty had been 
co-opted by the regional power elites’.4 We should also note that the
legislation setting up the presidential representatives was aimed at the
regions and not the ethnic republics, many of which were able to escape
the imposition of Yeltsin’s envoys.
Putin’s radical assault on federalism
It was Putin’s election victories in 1999 and 2000 which paved the way
for his audacious assault on the powers of the regional governors and his
radical reform of the federal system. Armed with a democratic mandate
from his impressive victory in the 2000 presidential elections, coupled
with the surprise success of his presidential party Yedinstvo (Unity) in the
December 1999 Duma elections, Putin was able to persuade a now ‘tame
parliament’ that a radical overhaul of the federal system was essential if
Russia was not to collapse into anarchy and ethnic turmoil. Moreover,
Putin was able to win over key oligarchs to his view that the only way to
bolster Russia’s flagging economy was to reduce the anarchic powers of
the governors, and to strengthen, ‘the power-vertical’. As Putin stated in
his message to the Federal Assembly: ‘It’s a scandalous thing when a fifth
of the legal acts adopted in the regions contradict the country’s Basic Law,
when republic constitutions and province charters are at odds with the
Russian Constitution, and when trade barriers, or even worse, border
demarcation posts are set up between Russia’s territories and provinces’.5
In order, to ‘restore an effective vertical chain of authority’ and to imple-
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ment a uniform policy, Putin called for a ‘dictatorship of law’, in order 
to ensure that every citizen whether in Moscow or ‘the most remote 
backwoods of Russia’, would be guaranteed the same rights, and federal
legislation would be ‘understood and enforced’ in a uniform manner
throughout the federation.6
Putin’s primary objectives are to create a unified economic, legal and
security space in the federation and to tighten the federal government’s
controls over the regions. There are six major strands to Putin’s federal
reforms: (1) The creation of seven new federal super-districts, (2) a reform
of the Federation Council, (3) the creation of a new State Council, (4) the
granting of new powers to the President to dismiss regional governors
and dissolve regional assemblies, (5) new rights for regional governors to
dismiss municipal officials, and (6) a major campaign to bring regional
charters and republican constitutions into line with the Russian Consti-
tution. Below we examine each one of these reforms in turn.
By stressing the need to strengthen what he called the ‘power vertical’,
Putin’s reform agenda was very much in tune with many of the ideas
which had recently been put forward by political parties in the run up to
the 1999 Duma elections. Indeed, many of the same issues had already
been raised by former Prime Minister Yevegenii Primakov. On coming to
power in the autumn of 1998 Primakov had warned the country that the
federation was in danger of splitting up into separate parts. And in
January 1999 he called for a ‘restoration of the vertical state power struc-
ture’, demanding that separatist trends ‘must be quelled, liquidated, and
uprooted’.7 Primakov also sought to bring the governors under federal
control by coopting them into the cabinet and government presidium.8
Thus for example, eight of the most powerful governors, each heading a
regional economic association, were made members of the Presidium.9
After the anarchy of the Yeltsin years when the regions had almost turned
into the ‘personal fiefdoms’ of the governors there was a general consen-
sus that something had to be done to reinstate a single legal space in
Russia.
The creation of federal districts
If Putin’s major aim was to reassert federal authority over the regions then
something had to be done to improve the work of the presidential repre-
sentatives and to remove them from the clutches of the regional gover-
nors. And, even more importantly Putin had to recapture control over the
work of the myriad of federal agencies which were situated in the regions
and which had also fallen under the sway of the regional executives. Thus,
on the May 13, 2000 Putin adopted what was to be the first of a package
of decrees whose key aim was to rein in the power of the governors and
to ‘strengthen the unity of the state’.10
Federalism under Putin 139
FAD8  10/17/2002  6:02 PM  Page 139
In this first major reform of the federal system, Putin divided the country
into seven super-districts, each of which contained a dozen or more federal
subjects, and he appointed a plenipotentiary representative (Polpredy –
‘Polnomochnyi Predstavitel’ Prezidenta’) to each district (see box 8.1).
Putin deftly sidestepped calls to format the new districts to conform to 
the contours of Russia’s eight inter-regional associations or eleven socio-
economic regions. Instead, the new federal districts were drawn up to
closely match Russia’s military districts, thus giving the envoys (most of
whom had a background in the military or security organs, direct access to
the command and control networks of the military garrisons in their dis-
tricts. And in a blow against the sovereignty claims of the ethnic republics,
Putin drew up the boundaries of the new federal districts in such a way
that each district would include a mixture of ethnic republics and territo-
rially defined regions. None of the capital cities of the federal districts are
situated in an ethnic republic. This has led some commentators to specu-
late that the creation of the federal districs is but the first step in Putin’s
programme of levelling down the status of the republics to that of the
regions. For a list of the districts and ‘polpredy’ see box 8.1.
However, many of the regions are not too happy with their new federal
districts. Thus, for example, Astrakhan and Volgograd currently part of
the Southern district would rather be in the Volga federal district. Perm,
which is placed in the Volga district would rather be in the Urals, while
Tyumen which is in the Urals wants to be part of the Siberian district, 
and Bashkortostan would like to be moved from the Volga District to the
Urals.11
Putin’s creation of the seven federal districts and the instigation of the
‘polpredy’ fully comply with article 83 of the Russian Constitution which
simply states that the President, ‘appoints and removes plenipotentiary
representatives of the President of the Russian Federation’. As Oracheva
notes, ‘the Constitution does not specify in what particular form this insti-
tution exists, what functions presidential representatives perform, how
many representatives may be appointed’.12 Thus, Putin can argue that the
changes brought about by the May 13 decree were simply changes to his
presidential administration, and not constitutional changes to the federa-
tion itself which would have been required to go through (and certainly
failed to pass) complex and protracted amendement procedures provided
for by the Constitution. However, as discussed below, Putin’s federal
reforms taken together undoubtedly are an assault on the federal idea 
and they certainly violate the spirit of the Constitution if not the actual
Constitution itself.
The administrations of the federal districts
Five of the seven polpredy have a background in the army or security ser-
vices. Of the two civilians, only one (Kirienko the former Prime Minister)
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Box 8.1 The seven federal districts
Central District
Presidential Representative: Lieutenant-General Georgii Poltavchenko.
District capital: Moscow. Belgorod, Bryansk, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kostroma, Kursk,
Lipetsk, Moscow, Orel, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tambov, Tver, Tula, Vladimir, Voronezh
and Yaroslavl oblasts; and the city of Moscow.
Far Eastern District
Presidential Representative: Lieutenant General Konstantin Pulikovskii (retired).
District capital: Khabarovsk. Republic of Sakha; Khabarovsk and Primorsky Krais;
Amur, Kamchatka, Magadan and Sakhalin oblasts; the Jewish autonomous oblast;
and the Koryak and Chukchi autonomous okrugs. 
North-western District
Presidential Representative: Goneral Viktor Cherkesov.
District capital: St Petersburg.
Republics of Karelia and Komi; Arkhangelsk, Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Murmansk,
Novgorod, Pskov and Vologda oblasts; the Nenets autonomous okrug; and the
city of St Petersburg.
Siberian District
Presidential Representative: Leonid Drachevskii (April 5, 1942). 
District capital: Novosibirsk.
Republics of Altai, Buryatia, Khakassia and Tyva; Altai and Krasnoyarsk Krais;
Chita, Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Omsk and Tomsk oblasts; and the Evenk,
Taimyr and Ust-Orda Buryat autonomous okrugs.
Southern District
Presidential Representative: Army General Viktor Kazantsev.
District capital: Rostov-on-Don.
Republics of Adygeya, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria,
Kalmykia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and North Ossetia; Krasnodar and Stavropol
Krais; and Astrakhan, Rostov and Volgograd oblasts.
Urals District
Presidential Representative: Colonel-General (Police) Peter Latyshev.
District capital: Yekaterinburg.
Chelyabinsk, Kurgan, Sverdlovsk and Tyumen oblasts; and the Khanty-Mansii
and Yamal-Nenets autonomous okrugs.
Volga District
Presidential Representative: Sergei Kirienko.
District capital: Nizhnii Novgorod.
Republics of Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, Marii El, Mordovia, Tatarstan and
Udmurtiya; Kirov, Nizhnii Novgorod, Orenburg, Penza, Perm, Samara, Saratov
and Ulyanovsk oblasts; and the Komi-Permyak autonomous okrug.
Source: RFE/RL Russian Federation Report, nos 18 and 19, 2000, compiled by Julie Corwin.
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has experience of working in politics at the national level, and the other
is a former diplomat. In terms of responsibilities, their rank is somewhere
between deputy chief of staff of the presidential administration and
Deputy Prime Minister.13 The high status of the polpredy is also reflected
in their membership of the Russian Security Council, and their right to
attend cabinet meetings of the federal government. In fact, the decree
setting up the federal districts was drafted by the Security Council. The
status of the polpredy is also reflected in their regular meetings with the
President. To prevent the polpredy going native the presidential adminis-
tration will fund them directly.
The polpredy also have a not inconsiderable backup bureaucracy to
assist them in their duties. In each of the seven federal districts there 
are approximately 100 members of staff. In addition, in each district there
are also five ‘deputy polpredy’, a chief federal inspector, and a federal
inspector appointed to each region within the federal districts.
Many of the major ministries have begun to restructure their adminis-
trations bringing them into line with the new federal districts. Thus, each
of the federal districts now has a deputy prosecutor general and each dis-
trict has a department for combating organised crime under the dual sub-
ordination of the polpredy and the Russian Minister of Internal Affairs.
In addition, the Ministry of Justice also recently created branches in each
of the seven districts and the Ministry of Finance, and the Tax Inspectorate
have likewise begun to restructure their administrations in line with the
reforms. Other federal bodies such as the Ministry of Health are in the
process of following suit.
Power and responsibilities of the polpredy
The powers and responsibilities of the polpredy, at least on paper, are very
impressive. Their key tasks are: (1) to monitor the regions’ compliance
with the Russian Constitution, federal laws and presidential decrees, (2)
to oversee the selection and placement of personnel in the regional
branches of the federal bureaucracy, (3) to protect the national security
interests of the regions, and (4) to set up and coordinate within their dis-
tricts inter-regional economic programmes.14 They also have the power to
recommend to the President that he suspend specific local laws or decrees
when they contradict federal laws and to call for the dismissal of gover-
nors and the dissolution of regional assemblies if they adopt decrees or
laws which violate federal laws (see below).
Putin has been at pains to stress that the primary role of the polpredy
are not to supplant the role of the elected governors but rather to co-
ordinate the work of the federal agencies in the their districts. Putin 
noted: ‘The authorised representatives, needless to say, will help in 
effectively solving the problems in their regions. But they do not have the
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right to interfere in areas under the jurisdiction of the electoral heads 
of the regions’.15 This statement reminds one of pronouncements made
during the Soviet era about the proper role of the party and state bodies.
The party was charged with ‘leading and guiding’ the work of state
bodies, but not ‘supplanting’ them. Of course, what happened in practice
was quite the opposite, party bodies did meddle in the affairs of state
bodies, often hindering, rather than helping them to carry out their
administrative functions. It would appear that the polpredy may face 
a similar dilemma in their relations with the governors and federal
bureaucracies.
One of the most important and controversial powers of the polpredy
is that of the selection and placement of personnel. As presidential repre-
sentative to the Volga district, Kirienko notes: ‘In essence, the presiden-
tial representatives will oversee personnel policy for the president and
will approve all appointments and promotions. The representatives will
also maintain a reserve of personnel for all federal agencies’.16 These
powers will bring the polpredy into direct conflict with the governors who
can cite article 72 of the Russian constitution to defend their right to be
consulted over such appointments especially with regard to the judiciary
and law enforcement bodies.
There is also some confusion over what controls the polpredy will be
given in the economic sphere. Whilst they will not have direct control over
the purse strings they are nonetheless charged with monitoring all the
federal funds which come into their districts and overseeing the collec-
tion and transfer of taxes to the federal budget. Kirienko has stated that
the districts will not have their own budgets. However, he did confirm
that they will have their own socio-economic development plans, and
thus, the ability to exercise some influence over economic policy making
in the regions.
Thus, Putin’s unelected polpredy have ostensibly been granted con-
siderable powers over the internal politics of federal subjects and their
democratically elected representatives. And it is difficult to imagine how
these new federal representatives will be able to carry out their functions
without infringing the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the federal
subjects.
The creation of seven quasi-states
Whilst the powers of the polpredy seem impressive, it remains to be seen
how effective they will be in practice. Given the fact that each presiden-
tial envoy will have to take charge of a dozen or so regions (whose admin-
istrative centres may be hundreds of miles apart), and the fact that every
region has between forty and fifty federal agencies operating on its terri-
tory, this means that each presidential envoy will have to coordinate and
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control the work of approximately 400–600 agencies. In some of the very
large districts it is difficult to see how the envoys will be able to exercise
control over such vast territories and/or populations. Moreover, as we
noted in chapter 5 the formation of the new federal districts has made the
Federation even more asymmetrical. Thus, for example, almost half of 
the Russian population is situated in just two of the federal districts: the
Central district and the Volga district.
Putin’s reforms may simply have created seven powerful quasi-
regional states. Already the polpredy have begun to create the institutions
necessary to turn their districts into mini-regional states. Thus, for
example, we are beginning to see the development in the federal districts
of councils of the heads of regional legislative and executive bodies (mini-
federal councils), councils of regional governors (mini-state councils).
Councils for local self-government, and expert consultative and scientific
research councils.17 Thus, for example Poltavchenko has created a council
in his federal district which includes all the chief executives of the eight-
een regions under his jurisdiction.18 The council will deal with all aspects
of economic development. The new council would also appear to usurp
the role of the Black Earth and Central Russian inter-regional economic
associations.
In the Volga district, Kirienko has created a coordinating council for
regional legislative chairmen. The aim of the council is to develop a united
approach for drafting regional legislation and bringing regional laws into
line with federal norms. These new mini-councils will soon co-exist next
to a series of new district-level banks and financial bodies.19
Emboldened by their new powers to appoint leaders of the regional
branches of the All Union Television and Radio Company the polpredy
have also been actively promoting the development of a ‘single informa-
tion space’ in each of their federal districts. To this end they have also set
up district-wide mass media councils. Now the press will not only come
under the control of the governors but the polpredy, hardly a recipe for
the creation of a vibrant and open ‘civil society’ in Russia.
The capital cities of the seven federal districts are also rapidly becom-
ing the home to new branches of the federal bureaucracy. Thus, for
example, in addition to the district offices of the law-enforcement and
justice departments, the following agencies have been established in
Rostov region: the inter-regional Tax Inspectorate, the Federal Tax Police
Service’s Chief Administration for the Southern Federal District, the
Southern Customs Administration, the Southern District Inspectorate of
the President’s Oversight Administration; the Russian Finance Ministry’s
Oversight and Auditing Administration for the Southern Federal District,
the District Administration of the Federal Service for Financial and 
Bankruptcy, and others. There are twenty-eight district government 
agencies in all.20 These developments have further undermined the 
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constitutional equality of the federal subjects and intensified the levels of
asymmetry between members of the federation.
Also regional clientelism is already working against the creation of a
new intermediate level of bureaucracy beholden to Putin. Each of the
seven polpredy have begun to build up their staffs based on patron–client
relations, much as the President himself has appointed to his administra-
tion many of his former associates from St Petersburg and the security
services. As Badovskii notes in some regions the polpredy have acted as
a powerful force limiting the powers of the regional governors. But, in
many regions, the apparatus of the polpredy is created from the gover-
nor’s people, is quickly integrated and absorbed by the local elites, and
we see the merging or joining of federal and regional bureaucracies –
eventually creating a highly effective system of regional lobbying.21 The
relations between governors, presidential representatives, and federal
bureaucrats is still unclear and will undoubtedly vary from district to
district. As Orttung and Reddaway note: ‘Rather then creating a stronger
vertical hierarchy of authority leading from the central government to the
regions, Putin has created a triangle, with the ministries, the presidential
representatives, and the regions making up the triangle’s three points’.22
It is also becoming apparent that such power relations will be worked out
on the ground and cannot be planned and mapped out by Putin at the
centre.
Reform of the Federation Council
In a second major initiative Putin stripped the governors and chairs of
regional assemblies of their ex officio right to sit in the upper chamber 
of the parliament.23 These were to be replaced (from January 2002), with
‘delegates’ chosen by the regional assemblies and chief executives. More
specifically, the governors have the right to appoint and dismiss their
delegates as long as their choice of candidate is not vetoed by a vote of
two-thirds of the members of their regional parliaments. And the regional
assemblies appoint and dismiss their representatives according to their
own voting procedures.
For a number of commentators, such changes will inevitably lead to a
decline in the powers of the upper chamber and perhaps even in the long
run to a situation whereby the upper house may be dispensed with
altogether. As Kostyukov argues, the Federation Council will soon be
filled with nonentities, ‘bureaucrats beholden to their regions and without
any political clout in Moscow’s corridors of power’.24
On the other hand, as Putin himself has stressed, the new body will
now meet full time, and not as in the past just for a few days a month.
This will give the new members, who are totally reliant on their masters
in the regions, far greater opportunities to scrutinise legislation coming
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from the Duma and presidency. And we will no longer have the spec-
tacle of members of the executive sitting in a legislative chamber thus
making a mockery of the principle of the separation of executive and
legislative powers.
And, it is by no means the case, that the representatives of the gover-
nors and assemblies are as Kostyukov argues, ‘non-entities’. Indeed, an
examination of those selected shows this to be far from true. Indeed in a
surely unforeseen scenario we have witnessed the selection of outgoing
governors to represent incoming governors,25 or the choice of deputy
governors as representatives. Legislative chairs have also selected high
ranking members of their assemblies as their representatives.26 And in
other cases, regions have chosen Moscow insiders or high ranking entre-
preneurs.27 However, it must also be noted that these changes undermine
King’s stress on the ‘legislative entrenchment’ of the regions in central
decision making (see chapter 1) as many of the new appointees to the
upper chamber have only very tenuous links with their regions, or in
some cases, none at all.
More worrying for the governors is the fact that when they are denied
membership of the upper chamber they will automatically lose their right
to immunity from criminal prosecution. And they will no longer have a
direct say in the ratification of top posts to the judiciary and procuracy
(although this will fall to their delegates). Putin will now be able to use
the threat of prosecution to keep the chief executives in line.
The State Council
To sweeten the pill and to partially compensate the regional elite for their
loss of membership in the upper chamber, Putin on September 1, 2000
created a new presidential advisory body – the State Council.28 The new
body which is made up of all of the chief executives from the regions
meets once every three months and is chaired by the President. There is
also an inner presidium made up of seven governors (one from each of
the federal districts), whose membership rotates each six months. The
members of the presidium meet with the President once every month.
However, neither the State Council nor its presidium is likely to have
real powers. The new body is purely consultative and has no law making
functions. Moreover, as it was drawn up by presidential decree, it may
similarly be dissolved by the President if it is not to his liking. The maga-
zine Itogy has called the new council ‘the factory of governor’s dreams’.29
Its main aim at present is to give the regional leaders a direct channel to
the President and some limited input into policy making. However, as
Teague notes, there may be a more sinister motive behind the creation of
the new Council. Putin may be planning in the future to replace the
Federation Council with this much weaker rubber stamping body.30
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Dismissal of governors and dissolution of regional legislatures
The third major reform strikes at the very heart of the regions’ power
structures – a new law giving Putin powers to dismiss popularly elected
governors and to dissolve regional assemblies.31 As Putin explains such
legislation now makes it possible for federal intervention ‘in situations in
which government bodies at the local level [have flouted] the Russian
Constitution and federal laws, violating the uniform rights and freedoms
of Russian citizens’.32 The new law gives both chambers of the legislature,
the general procurator and the regional legislatures the right to recom-
mend that a governor be removed. However, as Corwin notes, the process
is so long and involved that regional leaders would have to demonstrate
‘unprecedented obstinacy, audacity, and even stupidity’ before they could
be fired. For a regional head to be dismissed: ‘One, he must on two dif-
ferent occasions ignore presidential decrees, two, allow the passage of two
bills with provisions that violate federal laws, or three, make use on two
different occasions of regional acts previously denounced by the president
or the courts. And, in each of these cases, a court verdict is required ruling
that these actions constitute violations of federal law’.33
The president can also temporarily remove a governor while criminal
charges that have been filed against him are being studied. If the presi-
dent removes a governor from office he appoints a temporary governor
to replace him. However, it is interesting to note that Putin did not 
use his new powers against the Governor of Primorskii krai, Yevgenii
Nazdratenko. Instead Putin simply dismissed Nazdratenko and to keep
him quiet, rewarded him with a ministerial post in Moscow. Moreover, as
Orttung and Reddaway note: ‘even if the president does force a governor
out of office, the region will hold new elections within six months, and
there is no guarantee that the new governor will be any more pleasing to
the federal government than the old one’.34
The law also calls for the dissolution of regional assemblies if they
violate federal legislation. According to this legislation regional assem-
blies have three months to amend any legislation that violates federal laws
or legal proceedings may be enacted against them. However, the presi-
dent must gain the approval of the State Duma before an assembly can
be dissolved. Whilst it is certainly the case that regional assemblies do
pass legislation that infringes the constitution, it is highly questionable
that Putin’s right to dissolve democratically elected assemblies is itself
constitutional.
The governors’ rights to dismiss lower level officials
Putin also steered passage of a law through the Duma which gives the
governors the right to dismiss lower level administrative heads (with the
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exception of the mayors of capital cities) within their regions. As Putin
explained: ‘if under certain conditions, the head of a region can be
removed from office by the country’s president, then the regional leader
should have a similar right with respect to lower-ranking authorities’.35
Also to win over the governors’ support Putin promoted the so-called
third-term law in the Duma. Under this law, the leaders of 69 Federation
members will now be able to run for a third term and some even for a
fourth even although such extensions to their tenure violate regional 
charters and republican constitutions (see chapter 9).36
Bringing regional legislation into line with federal laws
One of the main aims of the Putin’s reforms is to create a unified legal
space in the Russian Federation. To this end therefore, the polpredy have
been charged with overseeing the complex process of bringing republic
constitutions and regional charters (and other local laws and decrees) into
line with the federal constitution and federal laws. By 2001 the number
of normative legal acts adopted by the regions and republics exceeded
300,000, and of these, just under a quarter (70,000) contradicted the federal
constitution and federal laws.37
Within a matter of just a few months after his election to the Russian
Presidency in March 2000, Putin issued decrees demanding that the
republics of Adygeya, Altai, Bashkortostan and Ingushetiya; and Amur,
Smolensk and Tver oblasts, bring their regional laws into accordance with
the Russian Constitution and federal legislation. Putin’s decrees were
backed up by two landmark decisions of the Constitutional Court
(adopted on June 7 and June 27, 2000) which ruled that the republics’
declarations of sovereignty were incompatible with the sovereignty of 
the Russian Federation.38
In its ruling of June 7 the court declared that several clauses in the Altai
Constitution were illegal. In particular the court ruled against Altai’s dec-
larations of sovereignty, stating that ‘the subjects of the Russian Federa-
tion do not possess any state sovereignty, which belongs to the Russian
Federation alone’. And on June 27 the court declared that similar clauses
in the constitutions of Adygeya, Ingushetiya, Bashkortostan, Komi, North
Osetiya, and Tatarstan were also illegal.39
In August 2000 the Chief Procurator of the Russian Federation called
for all regional laws to be brought into line with federal laws by January
1, 2001. And reporting back, in January 2001, the deputy head of the Presi-
dential Administration, Dmitrii Kozak, boasted that about 80 per cent of
the regional laws checked by the administration had either already been
brought into compliance with federal law, or were being considered in 
the courts.40 In the same month Putin declared that sixty constitutions and
regional charters, as well as over 2,000 regional laws had been brought
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into compliance with the constitution.41 However, there would appear to
be as many different figures about the number of laws which have been
brought into line as there are members of the presidential administration,
and as Orttung notes there are good reasons to believe, ‘that the numbers
they cite are probably about as meaningful as Soviet era crop statistics’.
In April 2001 the Justice Ministry reported that 23 regions continued to
adopt laws which contradicted federal legislation. According to Interfax
these regions included the republics of Adygeya, Altai, Ingushetiya,
Bashkortostan, Komi, Tatarstan, Sakha and Tyva in addition to
Arkhangelsk, Voronezh, Novgorod, Pskov, Ryazan, Moscow, Kamchatka,
Irkutsk, Novosibirsk, Chita, Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk regions;
Krasnoyarsk Krai, and the cities of Moscow and St Petersburg.42 And in
his April 2001 address to the Russian Parliament, Putin declared that over
3,500 normative acts adopted in the regions contradicted the Russian
Constitution and federal laws.43
Indeed, it is possible that the number of laws violating federal norms
may actually have grown in number! As I demonstrate below we are still
very far away from the creation of a ‘unified legal space’ in the Russian
Federation.
Putin’s efforts efforts to rein in the regions has elicited a range of
reactions from reluctant acquiescence to outright defiance. Many re-
publics and regions have dragged their feet in implementing the reforms
and/or they have steadfastly refused to renounce their sovereignty and
their control over natural resources. And just as quickly as old legislation
is being revised to conform to federal norms, regional and republican
parliaments have been able to adopt new laws with new infringements.
For example, more than two dozen amendments made to the constitution
of Khakasiya (in its revised edition of November 21, 2000) are in violation
of federal laws.44 And only under considerable pressure from the presi-
dential representative in the Siberian district and threats that federal 
subsidies would be cut off, did Tyva finally adopt a new version of its
constitution on May 6, 2001. The previous version of the constitution gave
the republic the right to secede from Russia and declared that only repub-
lican laws would be in effect during crises (see chapter 3). However, there
have been so many legal violations in the process of writing the new
constitution that its legitimacy is now being challenged in the courts.45
In Bashkortostan the new Constitution which was adopted in Novem-
ber 2000 is reported to contain almost as many violations as the old one!
And whilst the new version, places limits on the republic’s sovereignty,
no longer declares its laws above Russian laws, removes claims that 
the republic is a subject of international law, and introduces procedures
for appointing judges and procurators in line with federal norms, it still
includes the full text of the Republic’s power-sharing treaty.46 The 
Bashkortostan authorities have refused to recognise the rulings of the
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Russian Constitutional Court and continue to adopt legislation that
violates federal laws.47 In December 2001, 72 per cent of Bashkortostan’s
laws still violated federal norms, a figure which was actually higher than
it was in May 2000 at the beginning of Putin’s reforms.48
The Tatarstan leadership has also steadfastly refused to renounce the
Republic’s sovereignty, and a Bilateral Commission set up to examine the
Republic’s Constitution also agreed to uphold the 1994 bilateral treaty,
‘even though it contradicts both the federal and republican constitutions
in several places’. Moreover, President Shaimiev has repeatedly called for
the Russian Constitution to be brought into line with republican con-
stitutions rather than vice versa. As Graney observes, Tatarstan’s strategy
of defiance includes, ‘a legal defense of the republic’s sovereignty . . .
appeals to international bodies for help in protecting Tatarstan’s sover-
eignty, political maneuvering aimed at forcing the centre to take a more
moderate position on re-centralisation, attempts to co-opt various agents
of federal re-centralisation’,49 or simply ignoring federal laws and decrees.
It is also informative to note that the presidential representative in
Tatatarstan, General Marsel Galimardanov, is not only an ethnic Tatar, but
he is from the same rural district as President Shaimiev, which surely must
lead us to question where his real loyalties lie – to his master in the Volga
Federal District (Kirienko) or Tatarstan?50
Likewise in Sakha there has been strong opposition to Putin’s reforms.
Thus, for example, on January 16, 2001 the Sakha Republican Legislature
rejected a law proposed by the Republican Procurator that would have
renounced the Republic’s sovereignty. Nineteen of the legislature’s thirty-
two members voted against it. And in March 2001, the legislators (in the
lower house of the republican parliament) refused to make amendments
to article 5 of the Republic’s Constitution which gives it ownership over
its land and natural resources. The Sakha government had signed a 25-
year agreement with the Alrosa diamond company on January 11, 2001,
and it was in no mood to give up its control over such a lucrative source
of income. Diamond production in the republic makes up 77 per cent of
the government’s revenue.51 However, the legislators did agree to remove
from the Republic’s constitution ten of the most egregious violations of
federal law, including a provision which allowed the republic to have its
own army.52 However, little progress had been made in amending Sakha’s
constitution by the summer of 2001. Thus, for example, on May 3, 2001,
the Sakha (Yakutiya) Supreme Court declared that about half of the 144
articles in the republican constitution were unconstitutional.53
And it is not only in the republics that such infringments of federal
legislation have taken place. Thus, Latyshev, the presidential representa-
tive to the Urals Federal District, in an examination of 1,544 regional laws
found that 306 violated the Russian constitution and federal legislation.
The study also revealed that 92 per cent of municipal charters and 48 of
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the 67 agreements signed between federal agencies and regional execu-
tive branch agencies in the federal district also violated federal laws.54
Within the Urals Federal District, the governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast,
Rossel, has been particularly defiant. An analysis of 157 regional laws in
his region uncovered federal violations in eighty one. And by January
2001 the regional Duma had only amended 22 of these.55. The head of the
Constitutional Court, Marat Baglai, who visited Sverdlovsk in January
2001, called for the region to speed up its programme for bringing its 
legislation into line. Baglai justified his demands by declaring that it 
‘was impermissible for citizens of Russia to have different rights in dif-
ferent regions’.
In the summer of 2001 Putin, realising that his reforms were being
bogged down, announced a new initiative – the setting up of a commis-
sion to examine Russia’s bilateral treaties. Addressing the first session of
the commission, which took place on July 17, 2001, Putin admitted that
adding yet another layer of bureaucracy to deal with the governors had
been a failure. Regional leaders, he noted, had responded by building 
‘a Great Wall of China’ between themselves and the centre.56 The com-
mission called for regions to unilaterally rescind their bilateral treaties.
However, to date only six regions have withdrawn from the power-
sharing agreements (Marii El Republic, and Perm, Nizhnii Novgorod,
Ulyanovsk, Omsk and Novosibirsk oblasts).57 It remains to be seen how
many others will follow.
Putin’s federal reforms and democracy
There is a paradox at the heart of Putin’s reforms – that is, they can be
read as both promoting and restricting democracy. Bringing regional
legislation into line with the Russian Constitution is absolutely essential
for the consolidation of democracy, particularly in those ethnic republics
which have deprived their citizens of universal democratic norms and
human rights (see chapter 9). Thus for example recent moves to bring
Bashkortostan’s law enforcement bodies into line has undoubtedly im-
proved the human rights of citizens in the Republic. In May 2001 under
pressure from federal authorities Bashkortostan Prosecutor Yavdat
Turumtaev admitted that republican law enforcement agencies ‘grossly
violated criminal procedure law’ and that 50 per cent of all arrests and
detentions in the republic were illegal. A total of 2,545 individuals have
recently filed suits claiming that they were arrested and detained illegally.
By reasserting the rule of law and due process, Putin’s reforms in 
Bashkortostan and many other republics are positive steps in creating
equal rights for all citizens across the federation. However, Putin’s new
powers to sack democratically elected governors and to dissolve regional
legislatures is a setback for the consolidation of democracy.
Whilst most students of Russian federalism support Putin in his quest
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to discipline unruly regional bosses, many have argued that the President’s
radical reform of the federal system may have ended up, throwing the baby
out with the bath water. Putin, it is argued, could have simply called for a
more vigorous enforcement of existing executive powers.
There are real worries that Putin’s quest for law and order will be
bought at the expense of civil liberties and the consolidation of democ-
racy. For Boris Berezovskii, Putin’s reforms, ‘will destroy the system of
the balance of power, which is necessary for the normal functioning of
any democratic government and market economy, significantly increase
the authority of the executive branch of power at the expense of the 
legislative and limit citizens’ participation in the representative manage-
ment of government’.58
Moreover, Putin’s reforms also put into doubt his adherence to the
principles of federalism as enshrined in the Russian Constitution. In his
book, First Person, Putin states that, ‘from the very beginning, Russia was
created as a super centralised state. That’s practically laid down in its
genetic code, its traditions, and the mentality of its people’.59 Putin’s re-
organisation of the Federation Council, his usurpation of unilateral
powers to dismiss regional assemblies and chief executives, combined
with his creation of the seven federal districts, make a mockery of feder-
alism and democracy. ‘What kind of federation is it’, asked President
Ruslan Aushev of Ingushetiya, ‘if the president can remove the popularly
elected head of a region or disband the regional legislature’?60 Moreover,
as Chuvash President, Nikolai Fedorov, has pointed out, the people have
no way to democratically check the activities of the seven unelected
presidential representatives.61
As we noted in chapter 1, in federations, regional autonomy is consti-
tutionally guaranteed. The ‘noncentralisation’ of federations must be dis-
tinguished from the ‘decentralisation’ of unitary states. In other words, in
federations there is a vertical separation of powers among federal and
regional bodies of power, each of which have constitutionally guaranteed
rights and powers. As Smirnyagin notes, in a federation, each tier of gov-
ernment is ‘chosen at separate elections by the state’s citizens, who give
each its own legitimacy and make it independent of the others’.62 Putin
cannot legally centralise policy areas which have been constitutionally
assigned to the regions or which come under the joint authority of the
regions and the federal government. The federal government cannot
simply ignore the rights of the federal subjects without itself violating the
Constitution and undermining both federalism and democracy. Moreover,
Putin’s claim that his reforms are wholly within the ambit of the Consti-
tution is patently absurd. His attempts to justify his reforms by stating
that they are reforms of his presidential administration and not of the
country, remind us of Yeltsin’s cynical manipulation of the Constitution
and his penchant for ignoring federal laws whenever it suited him (see
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chapter 9). Putin would appear to be following in the footsteps of a long
line of previous Soviet leaders, who seek to justify the ‘means’ by refer-
ence to the ‘ends’.
Finally, Putin faces the same dilemma as that of Gorbachev and Yeltsin
before him, how to maintain the unity of the state without abandoning a
commitment to democratisation. At present it would appear that Putin is
willing to sacrifice democracy in order to win unity. However, his attacks
on the sovereignty claims of the republics are surely just as likely to stir-
up nationalist sentiments as to quell them. Putin will have to tread care-
fully if he does not want to lead Russia back to the chaotic days of the
‘parade of sovereignties’.
Notes
1 See, Presidential Decree no. 765, July 23, 1992, ‘Ob utverzhdenii polozheniya
o predstavitele Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii v krae, oblasti, avtonomnoi
oblasti, avtomnon okruge, goradakh Moskve i Sankt-Peterburge’, Vedemostii
S¢ezda Deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Verkhovnovo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 29
(July 23, 1992), 2163; Presidential Decree no. 186, February 5, 1993, ‘O pred-
stavitele Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii v krae, oblasti, avtonomnoi oblasti,
avtomnon okruge, goradakh Moskve i Sankt-Peterburge’; Presidential Decree
of January 17, 1995, ‘O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Ukaz Prezidenta
Rossiiskoi Federtatsii ot 5 Febralya 1993 no. 186, ‘O predstavitele Prezidenta
Rossiiskoi Federatsii v krae, oblasti, avtonomnoi oblasti, avtomnon okruge,
goradakh Moskve i Sankt-Peterburge’; Presidential Decree no. 696, July 9, 1997,
‘O polnomochnom predstavitele Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federtatsii v regione
Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 28 (1997),
3421. See also the accompanying statute to the 1992 Decree, ‘O predstavitele
Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii v krae, oblasti, avtonomnoi oblasti, avtomnon
okruge, goradakh Moskve i Sankt-Peterburge’, Rossiiskaya gazeta (July 24,
1992).
2 P. Kirkow, Russia’s Provinces: Authoritarian Transformation versus Local
Autonomy? (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 123.
3 M. Hyde, ‘Putin’s federal reforms and their implications for presidential 
power in Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 53:5 (2001), 722. See also, W. A. Clark,
‘Presidential prefects in the Russian provinces: Yeltsin’s regional cadres policy’,
in Graeme Gill (ed.), Elites and Leadership in Russian Politics (New York: St
Martin’s Press, 1998), and I. Busygina, ‘The President’s representatives: prob-
lems of establishing and developing an institution’, Russian Politics and Law,
35:1 (1997).
4 J. Helmer, ‘Russia: regions pressure Kremlin into policy shift – an analysis’,
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Daily Report (November 4, 1997), 2.
5 V. V. Putin, ‘Television address by the Russian President to the Country’s
citizens’, Rossiiskaya gazeta (May 19, 2000), p. 3. Translated in CDPSP, 52:20
(2000), 5.
6 Ibid.
Federalism under Putin 153
FAD8  10/17/2002  6:02 PM  Page 153
7 M. Evangelista, ‘Russia’s path to a new regional policy’, Davis Centre for
Russian Studies, Harvard University, PONARS Policy Paper, 157 (2000), p. 3.
8 Thus for example, Vladimir Gustov was appointed First Deputy Prime
Minister in charge of regional issues. Primakov also established a new Ministry
of Regional Policy headed by Viktor Kirpichnikov, the leader of the Union of
Russian Cities.
9 N. Petrov, ‘Russia’s regions or regions’ Russia?’, Carnegie Briefing Papers, 3
(March 1999), 4.
10 See, Presidential Decree, no. 849, May 13, 2000, ‘O Polnomochnom Predstavitele
Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Federal’nom Okruge’, and the accom-
panying Resolution, ‘O Polnomochnom Prestavitele Prezidenta Rossiiskoi
Federatsii v Federal’nom Okruge’. Published in Rossiskaya gazeta (13 May, 2001).
11 J. A. Corwin, RFE/RL Russian Federation Report, 2:9 (March 7, 2001), 5.
12 O. Oracheva, ‘Democracy and federalism in post-communist Russia (relations
between Moscow and the regions in the Russian Federation)’, paper presented
at the conference, ‘The Fall of Communism in Europe: Ten Years On’, May
14–17, 2001, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, p. 11.
13 ‘Presidential administration’s Samoilov on seven representatives’, EWI Russian
Regional Report, 5:30 (August 2, 2000), 4–6.
14 See, E. Teague, ‘Putin reforms the federal system’, and R. Sakwa, ‘Federalism,
sovereignty and democracy’, in C. Ross (ed.), Regional Politics in Russia
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), M. Hyde, ‘Putin’s federal re-
forms and their implications for presidential power in Russia’, Europe–Asia
Studies, 53:5 (2001), 719–43. The duties of the ‘polpredy’ were further outlined
in Putin’s Presidential Decree of January 30, 2001, no. 97, ‘O Vnesenii dopol-
neniya I izmeneniya v polozhenie o polnomochnom predstavitele Prezidenta
Rossiiskoi Federatsii v federal’nom okruge, utverzhdennoe ukazom Prezi-
denta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 13 Maya 2000 No 849’. Published in Rossiskaya
gazeta (30 January 2001). According to this decree the presidential envoys were
directly subordinate to the head of the Presidential Administration.
15 Speech by V.V. Putin at the Presentation of the Annual Message from the
President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly of the Russian
Federation, Rossiiskaya gazeta (July 11, 2000), pp. 1, 3. Translated in CDPSP,
52(28) (2000), p. 7.
16 Interview with S. Kirienko, Nezavisimaya gazeta (October 25, 2000), p. 3.
17 D. V. Badovskii – ‘Systema federal¢nykh okrygov i institut polnomochnykh
predstavitelei prezidenta RF: sovremennoe sostoyanie i problemy razvitiya’,
in Polpredy Prezidenta: Problemy Stanovleniya Novovo Instituta (MGU, Nauchnye
Doklady, no. 3, January 2001), p. 5.
18 A. Slabov, ‘Georgy Poltavchenko raises his voice’, Kommersant (February 10,
2001), 2. CDPSP, 53:6 (March 7, 2001).
19 It is also interesting to note that the political movement ‘Otechestvo’ has begun
to restructure its party-territorial structures in conformity with the new federal
districts.
20 I. Gordeyev, Vremya Novostei (January 12, 2001), 1.
21 Badovskii, ‘Sistema federali¢nykh okrugov’, p. 6.
22 R. Orttung and P. Reddaway, ‘Russian state-building: the regional dimension’,
in The Russia Initiative: Reports of the Four Task Forces (New York: Carnegie
Corporation, 2001), p. 100.
154 Federalism and democratisation in Russia
FAD8  10/17/2002  6:02 PM  Page 154
23 See, the Federal Law, no. 113–F3, August 5, 2000, ‘O Poryadke Formorovaniya
Soveta Federatsiya Federal’novo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii’. Adopted by
the state Duma July 19, 2000 and ratified by the Federation Council July 26,
2000, Rossiskaya gazeta (August 5, 2000).
24 A. Kostyukov, Obshchaya gazeta, 30 (July 27–August 2, 2000), pp. 1–7. Trans-
lated in the CDPSP, 52:30 (2000), 5.
25 The Governor of Kaluga, Vyacheslav Parinov appointed his predecessor Valerii
Sudarenko; Chukotka Governor Roman Abramovich appointed his predeces-
sor Aleksandr Nazarov. In Altai krai, Governor Aleksandr Surikov named
Vladimir Germanenko, a deputy governor in the krai; Andrei Chirkin, the First
Deputy Governor of Khabarovsk Krai, will represent the krai administration.
And Viktor Stepanov, former head of Kareliya was selected to represent that
Republic’s presidential administration. J. A. Corwin, RFE/RL Federation Report
(December 16, 2001) as cited in Kommersant-Daily (December 15, 2001).
26 The legislature in Buryatia selected Vladimir Bavlov, Deputy Chair of 
Buryatia’s Committee on Natural Resources; legislators in Amur Oblast
selected Galina Buslova, General Director of the Aviation Agency ‘Aviatrast’;
Deputies in Khabarovsk Krai’s Legislature confirmed the selection of the
former chair of the krai legislature, Viktor Ozerov as their representative. J. A.
Corwin, RFE/RL Russian Federation Report (December 16, 2001), 2.
27 The head of ‘Transaero’, Aleksandr Pleshakov was nominated by the 
Governor of Penza oblast; Sergei Bekov, Vice President of the Russian Union
of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Ingushetiya); Leonid Binder, a Norislk
Nickel Executive (Taimyr AO); Ilya Lomakin-Rumyantsev, a former Federal
Finance Ministry official (Marii-El). Oleg Deripasta, the Head of ‘Siberian 
Aluminium’ (Nizhnii Novgorod). J. A. Corwin, RFE/RL Russian Federation
Report, 3:12 (April 4, 2001), 2.
28 ‘Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, no. 602, September 1, 2000, published
in Rossiiskaya Gazeta (September 1, 2000).
29 I. Busygina ‘Federalism and the administrative reforms of President Putin in
the context of the democratic transition in Russia’, unpublished have presented
at the winter 2000 SRC symposium, p. 8.
30 Putin here would appear to be borrowing ideas from Russia’s past. The State
Council was the supreme consultative body in the Russian Empire from 1810
to 1917. And a State Council also functioned in the Soviet Union for just a few
months after the failed August 1991 Coup.
31 The law on the removal of the governors and disbanding of legislatures 
takes the form of amendments to the Federal Law ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh
Organizatsii Zakonodatel’nykh (Predstavitel’nykh) i Ispolnitel’nykh Organov
Gosudarstvennoi Vlasti Sub’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatstii’, which was ratified
by the President on October 6, 1999. Published in Rossiskaya gazeta (October 19,
1999).
32 ‘Annual message of the President to the Russian Federal Assembly’, Rossiiskaya
gazeta (July 11, 2000), 3. Translated in CDPSP 52:28 (2000), 7.
33 J. A. Corwin, ‘Vulnerability of governors to dismissal questioned’, RFE/RL
Russian Federation Report, 2:21 (June 7, 2000).
34 Orttung and Reddaway, ‘Russian state building’, p. 98.
35 Putin, ‘Television address’, 5.
36 A. Kostyukov, Obshchaya gazeta, 5 (February 1–7, 2001), p. 1. This amends a
Federalism under Putin 155
FAD8  10/17/2002  6:02 PM  Page 155
previous law adopted in October 1999 which limited governors to two terms.
The amendment counts the first term for a governor as the one starting after
October 16, 1999.
37 M. I. Vil’chek, ‘O klyuchevikh problemakh stanovleniya instituta pol-
nomochnykh predstavitelei Prezidenta RF’, in Polpredy Prezidenta, p. 20.
38 Resolutions of the Constitutional Court of June 7, and June 27, 2000 repudi-
ated the sovereignty of the republics as not in line with the Federal Constitu-
tion. See, M. V. Baglai, Konstitutsionnoe Pravo Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow:
Norma, 2001), pp. 305, 338–9. This same resolution also noted that it was
against the Constitution for regional organs of power to appoint officials of
federal bureaucracies in the regions.
39 K. E. Graney, ‘Ten years of sovereignty in Tatarstan: end of the beginning or
beginning of the end?’, Problems of Post-communism (September/October 2001),
37.
40 J. A. Corwin, RFE/RL Russian Federation Report, 3:2 ( January 10, 2001) as cited
in Obshchaya gazeta, 52 (January 10, 2001).
41 Interfax (January 11, 2001).
42 J. Corwin, RFE/RL Russian Federation Report, 3:13 (April 11, 2001), 1.
43 R. Orttung, EWI Russian Regional Report, 6:18 (May 16, 2001), 2.
44 M. Shandarov, EWI Russian Regional Report, 6:5 (February 7, 2001), 5.
45 Kommersant Daily (May 8, 2001).
46 I. Rabinovich, ‘Bashkortostani legal situation is worse than before campaign to
bring laws into line’, EWI, Russian Regional Report, 6:44 (December 12, 2001), 10.
47 Ibid., 11.
48 Ibid., 10.
49 Graney, ‘Ten years of sovereignty’, 37–8.
50 Ibid., 38.
51 O. Yemelyanov, EWI Russian Regional Report 6:3 (January 24, 2001), 3.
52 EWI Russian Regional Report, 6:10 (March 14, 2001), 6.
53 R. Orttung, EWI Russian Reional Report, 6:18 (May 16, 2001), 4.
54 S. Pushkarev, EWI Russian Regional Report, 6:9 (March, 7, 2001), 4–5.
55 EWI Russian Regional Report, 5:47 (December 20, 2000), 5.
56 J. A. Corwin, RFE/RL Russian Federation Report, 3:21 (July 18, 2001), 2.
57 Ibid., 3.
58 B. Berezovskii, ‘Open letter to President Putin’, Transitions (June 5, 2000), p. 1.
59 V. Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President
Vladimir Putin, with N. Gevorkyan, N. Timakova and A. Kolesnikov; translated
by C. A. Fitzpatrick (London: Hutchinson, 2000), pp. 182–3. Cited in R. Sakwa,
‘federalism, sovereignty and democracy’, in C. Ross (ed.), Regional Politics in
Russia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 18.
60 Graney, ‘Ten years of sovereignty’, 37.
61 N. Fedorov, Nezavisimaya gazeta (October 25, 2000), 2.
62 L. V. Smirnyagin, ‘Federalizm po Putiny ili Putin po federalizmu (zheleznoi
pyatoi)’, Carnegie Briefing Papers, 3:3 (March 2001), 3.
156 Federalism and democratisation in Russia
FAD8  10/17/2002  6:02 PM  Page 156
9From constitutional to 
political asymmetry: crafting
authoritarian regimes in Russia’s
regions and republics
Russia’s constitutional asymmetry has prevented the development of uni-
versal norms of citizenship and human rights in the federation. As long
as republic and regional leaders pledged support for Yeltsin and ‘brought
home the bacon’, in the way of ethnic stability, tax revenues and electoral
support, federal authorities have been quite happy to turn a blind eye to
the flagrant violations of the Russian Constitution by regional elites.
Russia’s ‘federation’ without ‘federalism’ has simply allowed the authori-
tarianism of the centre to be replaced by local level authoritarianism.
As we discussed in chapter 3 regional and republican elites have been
able to adopt constitutions/charters and other laws which violate the
federal constitution. And a number of the bilateral treaties signed between
Moscow and the regions have sanctioned the transfer of unconstitutional
rights and powers to the republics.1 Thus, authoritarian leaders have been
able to use the federal system as a protective shield in their quest to con-
solidate their various brands of authoritarianism. Moreover, the greater
the degree of autonomy given to a federal subject in Russia the greater
the degree of authoritarianism we find.
Below we discuss the various ways in which presidents and governors
have been able to gain a dominant control over their political systems. In
particular, we examine the way in which leaders of the ethnic republics
have been able to maintain power by manipulating the electoral system.
Sartori has described the electoral system as the most specific manipu-
lative instrument of politics.2 As we discussed in chapter 1, free and fair
elections are a major prerequisite for democracy. Moreover, Huntington’s
‘two-turnover test’ for a consolidated democracy is centred on elections.3
Certainly, democracy ‘may entail more than a fair election’ but as Blais
and Dion note, ‘without an election no democracy’.4 And as Pammett
stresses, only after elections ‘allow power to be peacefully handed over
to the opposition’ can it be argued that, ‘the initial phase of democratic
construction is in some sense completed’.5 According to Blais and Dion in
a democracy:
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1) All citizens must have the right to vote, with no exclusion based on sex,
race, opinion or religion, 2) voting must be secret so as to minimize poten-
tial intimidation, 3) the election must be regular: it must be held at steady
intervals, as prescribed by law, 4) the whole process must be fair, devoid of
violence or fraud and, 5) finally, the election must be competitive, that is to
say, all positions can be contested, all groups or parties may run candidates
and are free to express their points of view.6
For O’Donnell elections can be considered institutionalised only when
1) Leaders and voters take for granted that in the future inclusive, fair, and
competitive elections will take place as legally scheduled, 2) voters will be
properly registered and free from physical coercion, 3) their votes will be
counted fairly, 4) winners will take office, and will not have their terms arbi-
trarily terminated.
And he notes that countries ‘where elections do not have these charac-
teristics do not qualify as polyarchies’.7
As we shall document below, many of Russia’s republics and regions
patently fail to even meet Dahl’s minimum conditions for polyarchy never
mind the more stringent prerequisites for consolidated democracy as dis-
cussed in chapter 1. The fact that most deputies work part-time, that many
work for the executive branch of government, and that parties are non-
existent or very weak have all conspired to give regional executives a free
reign to govern their regions as they see fit. In most regions there is no
effective democratic opposition to challenge the authority of the execu-
tive branch.
In Russia, presidents and governors, as we discussed in chapter 8, have
captured control over the nomination and appointment of heads of federal
bureaucracies situated in their territories (including members of regional
courts, law enforcement and security bodies etc.). And they have also been
able to draw on the considerable financial resources of their administra-
tions (local government printing presses, administrative staff, transport
and hotels) to support their electoral campaigns. In addition, the press in
most regions is firmly under the control of the executive.8
One of the most important powers of regional executives has been their
control over the appointment of the chairs of local electoral commissions.
Thus, for example, in Sverdlovsk, the governor (Rossel) was able to
remove the chair of the regional electoral commission from power in 1995,
and the President of Buryatiya (Potapov) saw to the removal of the chair
of the republic’s electoral commission in 1998. In Krasnodar the governor
solved the problem by simply appointing himself chair of the krai elec-
toral commission. And according to the central electoral commmission
there were serious infringements of federal legislation with regard to the
appointment of members of electoral commissions in eleven regions in
the most recent assembly and gubernatorial elections which were con-
ducted over the period 1998–2000.9
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According to article 111 of Tatarstan’s Constitution, the President has
the right to nominate candidates for half the members of the republic
central electoral commission and half the members of the Constitutional
Court. The other half of both bodies are chosen by members of the 
Parliament. Thus, by packing the Parliament with his administrative sub-
ordinates (see chapter 8) the Tatarstan President can maintain control over
the courts and the electoral process in the republic, which in turn guar-
antees the president’s complete domination of the legislature. For 
Farukshin, ‘therein, lies the roots of servile obedience, hypocrisy and flat-
tery that the appointed officials abundantly exhibit for the person of 
President Shaimiev and for the Kazan Kremlin’s policies’.10
Language, residency and age
Although federal legislation states that citizens of the Russian Federation
may be elected regardless of their ‘sex, race, nationality, language, origin,
property and official status, place of residence, religion, beliefs, affiliation
of public associations, and other factors’,11 as we discussed in chapter 4,
ten republics require that presidential candidates posses knowledge of
both Russian and the titular language.
Thus, for example, Valentin Lednev was prevented from standing in
the 1997 Adygeyan Presidential election because he did not speak the
Adegeyan language, even although Adygeyans make up only 20 per cent
of the republic’s population. Other republics have placed unconstitutional
residency and age requirements on candidates.12 Thus, for example,
according to local electoral legislation, candidates standing for presiden-
tial elections in Sakha must have resided in the republic for fifteen years.
In Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Buryatiya, Kabardino-Balkariya and Komi
ten years; Kareliya and Khakasiya seven years. And in more than fifty
regions of the Russian Federation local electoral laws place similar resi-
dency restrictions on candidates for regional assemblies. These laws have
been used by incumbent presidents and governors to prevent opposition
candidates from participating in elections. Local electoral laws also
stipulate minimum and maximum age requirements for electoral candi-
dates which infringe federal legislation.13
Nomination signatures
Chief executives have also manipulated the rules for collecting nomina-
tion signatures to squeeze out opposition candidates from the elections.
According to the 1997 Federal Law on elections, ‘The maximum number
of signatures required for a candidate to be registered must not exceed
two percent of the total number of voters’ in the electoral district where
the candidate is standing’ (article 31.1).14 However, in the republics of
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Buryatiya, Sakha, Tyva; Stavropol¢ Krai, Orenburg and Tomsk Oblasts,
electoral rules call for nomination signatures from 3 per cent; in Kurgan,
Saratov, Chelyabinsk, 5 per cent, and in Dagestan and Kalmykiya, 10 per
cent. The system of collecting signatures is often corrupt, with candidates
paying for signatures with money, vodka or even other household goods
such as sugar. As Fillipov notes, in rural districts it would quite 
literally be impossible to gather such a large number of signatures without
the active support of the regional authorities.15 In the 1997 law on elec-
tions a much stricter regime for regulating the collection of signatures and
for checking their accuracy was introduced. Nonetheless, in elections
under the new rules in Rostov oblast which took place in 1998, 38 of the
238 candidates (19 per cent) were still refused nomination, and in
Kalmykiya 11 of 13 opposition candidates were refused registration for
elections in that Republic.16 In regional elections (for governors and
assemblies) conducted in 2000, 22 regions violated federal legislation with
regard to the collection of signatures.17
In Bashkortostan and Mordoviya the incumbent presidents (Rakhimov
and Merkushkin, respectively) used identical ploys to stop popular oppo-
nents from standing against them in presidential elections. Special clauses
were added to the local election rules which declared that candidates
would be barred from the elections if more than 3 per cent of their nomi-
nation signatures were invalid. By this method, all but one ‘bogus oppo-
sition candidate’, was expelled from the presidential elections in both
republics. In Bashkortostan the bogus candidate was a minor member of
President Rakhimov’s own cabinet, and in Mordoviya, the director of a
factory. In Bashkortostan, a Russian Supreme Court order demanded that
two of the expelled candidates be reinstated, but this decree was simply
ignored by the Bashkortostan Republican Court which is under the
control of the President. As Lussier notes: ‘the electorate had little knowl-
edge of these events since the local media offered a one sided support for
Rakhimov, the independent newspaper and radio stations had been shut
down, and the station director arrested’.18
Both Presidents easily won re-election, Rakhimov gaining 70 per cent
and Merkushkin 96.6 per cent of the votes cast.19 In Bashkortostan the
protest vote against all candidates was 17 per cent, the highest ever in an
election at this level.20 In Ufa, the capital and a region of high sympathy
for one of the expelled candidates, only 53.4 per cent of the voters partici-
pated in the election, and over one-third (34.6 per cent) voted against both
the candidates.21 The former Governor of Primorskii Krai, Nazdratenko,
has also engaged in similar actions in elections which Yeltsin finally can-
celled in October 1994. Nazdratenko also engaged in outright intimida-
tion of rival candidates in the gubernatorial election of December 1999.
The former mayor of Vladivostok, Cherepkov, withdrew from the race in
November. His bank accounts had been seized by the krai administration.
160 Federalism and democratisation in Russia
FAD9  10/17/2002  6:03 PM  Page 160
Another rival for the governorship, Svetlana Orlova, was ‘removed forty-
eight hours before the election by the Krai Duma’ leaving only one serious
candidate. Nazdratenko, not surprisingly won the election, picking up 65
per cent of the vote.22
Single candidate uncontested elections
It is against federal laws to hold uncontested elections for the post of chief
executive, but even so the republics of Tatarstan, Kalmykiya and
Kabardino-Balkariya continue to flout this law. In Tatarstan where the
republican constitution (article 77) states that ‘any number of candidates
can be listed on the electoral ballot’, President Shaimiev simply inter-
preted this to mean that only one candidate may be nominated. Shamiev
was subsequently elected President in uncontested elections in 1991 and
1996. Similarly, in the 1995 campaign for the Tatarstan legislature, twenty-
one heads of local governments, who were the direct appointees of
Shaimiev, were allowed to run unopposed.23 In Tatarstan’s presidential
elections voters who supported Shaimiev simply had to place their ballots
in the ballot box; however, if they wanted to vote against him they had
to take the ballot paper, in the full view of members of the electoral com-
mission, to a cabinet where they crossed out his name and then return 
to place this in the ballot box. This is exactly the way elections were
conducted during the Soviet period.
Kalmykiya’s law on elections permits presidential candidates to 
stand in single candidate races and to gain office with as little as 15 per
cent of the vote, from a turnout of just 25 per cent of registered voters.
Kalmykiya President Ilyumzhimov reportedly rejected suggestions from
members of the parliament (Khural) that he should be elected for life,
saying that ‘for the time being, we must outwardly observe democratic
procedures’.24
Manipulation of the date of elections
Presidents and governors have also not been averse to changing the 
date of elections to their own advantage. Thus, for example elections 
were called before their due date in Ingushetiya in 1994, Kalmykiya in
1995, Tatarstan in 1996, Orel in 1997, and Bashkortostan in 1998.25 In a
rather extreme case, in 1995 the President of Kalmykiya, Ilyumzhinov,
called for new presidential elections to be held three years ahead of
schedule where he stood as the only candidate, winning 85.1 per cent of
the vote.26
In February 1999, Belgorod Govenor Yevgenii Savchenko managed to
persuade the regional legislature to change the timing of the election from
December 1999 to May 1999. And as Danielle Lussier notes, Savchenko’s
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success in both moving up the date and winning his election inspired
other regional leaders to follow suit. Soon after, Omsk Governor, Leonid
Polezhaev, Novgorod Governor Mikhail Prusak, and Tomsk Governor
Viktor Kress all managed to move their elections to September and secure
landslide victories. Moscow Mayor Luzhkov opted to have the election
for his post changed from June 2000 to December 1999 to coincide with
the State Duma elections. As expected Luzhkov easily won another term,
earning 71.5 per cent of the vote.27 We should not forget, of course, that
Yeltsin cynically brought forward the Russian presidential elections from
July to March 2000 in order to ensure Putin’s victory.28
Manipulating rules on election turnout
There are also wide variations in regional electoral laws over the mini-
mum turnout required for elections to regional assemblies and execu-
tives to be valid. According to federal legislation a 25 per cent minimum
turnout is the norm for legislative assemblies, but in some regions it is as
high as 50 per cent (for example, republics of Altai, Kabardino-Balkariya,
North Osetiya-Alaniya and Khakasiya) and in others as low as 15 per cent
(Kalmykiya). In total contravention of federal law, no minimum turnout
is stipulated for elections to regional assemblies in Stavropol¢ and
Khabarovsk Krais; Belgorod, Volgograd, Kirov, Leningrad, Novgorod and
Chita Oblasts.29 In a similar manner minimum turnout requirements also
vary considerably for gubernatorial elections. Thus, in fifty-six regions it
was stipulated as 25 per cent; in two regions 33 per cent; four regions 35
per cent; and nineteen regions 50 per cent. In five regions no norm was
noted.
Turnout for the 2000–1 round of gubernatorial elections averaged 51.8
per cent with the lowest registered in Vladimir oblast (34 per cent) and
the highest in Nenetsk AO (73.8 per cent). However, unusually high
turnouts may not represent a high level of democracy but quite the oppo-
site. High turnounts may indicate that political pressure was put on
citizens to participate in the elections much as happened during the Soviet
period (see discussion on ‘guided elections’ below).
Turnout is generally lower for elections to regional assemblies than for
gubernatorial elections. In some cases where turnout has been very low
the legitimacy of the assemby has been weakened and in extreme cases it
has made it impossible for the legislature to gain the necessary quorum
to function. Thus for example, In Kaluga in the election of August 25, 1996
turnout was less than the minimum requirement in nineteen electoral dis-
tricts out of forty. In Ryazan oblast in the election of March 30, 1997 in ten
of thirty-six electoral districts turnout was also below the 25 per cent
minimum. This was a marked improvement over 1994 when because of
political apathy at the elections the assembly did not have the necessary
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two-thirds complement of deputies for a quorum, and it required a special
edict from the President to function. The Chuvash elections which first
took place in March 1994 were followed by seven further rounds of elec-
tions over the course of the following two years, as the regional assembly
desperately sought to raise its electoral turnout.30 In Khakasiya in the elec-
tion of December 1, 1996, twenty electoral districts out of seventy-five had
turnouts of less than the required 50 per cent and a hurried executive
order to lower the minimum turnout requirement to 25 per cent was
quickly adopted in the midst of the electoral campaign! In July 2001
legislators in Primorskii Krai made an even more drastic amendement to
their law on elections by abolishing the requirement for a minimum
turnout altogether. In perhaps the most infamous case of all, it took until
May 2001 before the citizens of Vladivostok were finally able to elect a
city Duma. There had been no representative body in the city since Yeltsin
disbanded the soviets in 1993. The previous twenty attempts had all failed
due to low turnout.31
Gerrymandering
A number of regional executives have also sought to redraw the bound-
aries of their electoral districts to favour their candidacies. Federal law
states that variations in the size of electoral districts must not vary by
more than 10 per cent. But a number of regions have simply ignored this
law when drawing up their electoral registers. In the regional elections of
1995–97, of the 3,154 electoral districts, 350 had variations in size of more
than 10 per cent and 124 more than 15 per cent. In Novgorod oblast the
difference between the largest and the smallest electoral district varied by
a magnitude of 5.6 times, in Tula a magnitude of 6.8. In the 1999 elections
for the State Council in Tatarstan some districts were 100 times larger than
others. The Russian Supreme Court declared these district boundaries
illegal, and opposition groups called for the legislature to be disbanded.32
In Rostov oblast almost one-quarter of the rural districts are flat plains
which many railways and roads traverse, and the population in these
rural districts are predominantly communist in political orientation. In
drawing up the boundaries of the electoral districts the anti-communist
governor was able to dilute the communist vote by artificially joining
some of the rural districts with the more ‘reformist oriented’ urban dis-
tricts. The new electoral districts now include combined rural and urban
districts which do not even have borders with one another.
Changing the rules on tenure of office
Once in office, regional leaders have also used their considerable
autonomy to manipulate local election rules in order to hold on to power.
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Thus, for example, on November 27, 1996 the Tatarstan parliament 
made changes to article 108 of the Republic’s Constitution, which stipu-
lated that a person may be elected Republic President for only two five-
year terms in a row. The parliament also removed the age limit for
presidents which had been set at 65 years. This allowed President
Shaimiev to run for a third term in March 2001 which he won easily with
80 per cent of the vote (this time the election was competitive, with four
other contenders).
More recently new legislation promoted by President Putin has sanc-
tioned the further infringements of such tenure rules. Thus, on January
25, 2001 the State Duma (with Putin’s express wish) approved a law that
allowed sixty-nine regional leaders to stand for a third term and a further
seventeen to seek a fourth term in office. According to this new legisla-
tion a governor’s term is now considered to start after October 1999. The
new rules will permit President Shaimiev of Tatarstan to run for a fourth
term. Also eligible for a fourth term will be the leaders of the republics of
Kalmykiya, Ingushetiya, Adygeya, Tyva, Kabardino-Balkariya, Buryatiya,
Bashkortostan, Sakha, Komi and Chuvashiya, as well as the governors of
Tomsk, Omsk, Novgorod, Sverdlovsk, Belgorod and Orel oblasts.33 The
law was a concession to regional leaders for their loss of membership in
the Federation Council (see chapter 8).
Electoral fraud
If all else fails, republican elites have not been loath to resort to outright
fraud and the falsification of election returns. As Lowenhardt notes,
during the 1996 presidential elections in Tatarstan the republican leader-
ship illegally transferred somewhere between 35–45,000 votes from
Zyuganov, Lebed, Yavlinskii and Zhirinovsky to Yeltsin.34 According to
Lowenhardt the following foolproof methods of falsifying election results
were common practice in the Republic:
1) Widespread tampering with voters’ registers: voters’ registers contain
considerable numbers of ‘dead souls’ (deceased or non-existent people);
others vote in their name;
2) Pressure of local officials on voters to vote for the establishment
candidate;
3) Fictive voting (particularly in the countryside);
4) ‘mistakes’ made by polling station members during counting, in favour
of one particular candidate;
5) Intimidation of local election observers;
6) Replacement of ballots during or after counting in favour of a particular
candidate;
7) Outright falsification of counting protocols in cases where all other
methods have failed.35
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Guided elections
Governing elites are also not averse to using coercion and/or persuasion
to mobilise their citizens to come out and vote for their choice of leaders.
The votes of the electorate in these ‘guided’ elections always coincide with
the interests of the local elites.36 A first clue to the phenomenon of guided
elections is where the electorate always cast their votes for the domi-
nant political force in Moscow, the ‘party of power’. Thus, for example 
in the 1991 Russian presidential elections the majority of citizens in 
Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaraya, Karachaevo-Cherekessiya, Tatarstan,
North Osetiya, Ingushetiya, Bashkortostan, Kalmykiya, Sakha, and Tyva,
rejected Yeltsin who, at that time, was the representative of the democra-
tic opposition, and they cast their votes in favour of Nikolai Ryzhkov, a
leading member of the CPSU. But in 1996 citizens in these republics were
called upon by the governing elites to support Yeltsin as he now repre-
sented the ‘party of power’ and they duly voted according to the wishes
of the regional elites.
Another indication that we might be witnessing a guided election is
the presence of a high election turnout figures, far above the national
average. Thus, for example, in the 1996 Russian presidential elections
turnout was over 90 per cent in 60 electoral districts: 25 of these districts
were in Bashkortostan and 24 in Tatarstan. Such figures smack of a throw-
back to the Soviet period where mobilization of the electorate was com-
mon practice.
A major study of voting patterns in the lowest level of electoral com-
missions, the Territorial Election Commission (TIK) in the 2000 presiden-
tial elections showed that there were just 121 out of 2,748 commissions
where turnout was above 90 per cent. And once again the majority of these
were in the republics of Bashkortostan (31 out of 70 ) and Tatarstan (35
out of 62). In Ingushetiya all 6 of its TIKs had high turnouts; Kabardino-
Balkariya (8 of 11) and Mordoviya (7 of 27).37
According to official election figures, in the Kaibitsk district of
Tatarstan, of the 11,676 voters on the electoral register only 20 did not par-
ticipate in the elections! In Dzheirakhskoi electoral district there was sup-
posedly a 100 per cent turnout!, which was higher than that reported for
election turnout in Soviet times.38 According to Mikhailov such high
turnouts are the result of mobilisation campaigns directed from above,
and in some instances the outright falsification of data by electoral com-
missions under the guidance of regional elites.
According to Kozlov and Oreshkin further evidence for the existence 
of such ‘guided’ elections can be seen in election data for those regions
which radically changed their political orientation between rounds of
presidential elections or across time between different elections. Thus, for
example, major changes took place in voting patters in Bashkortostan,
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Tatarstan and Dagestan between the two rounds of the 1996 Russian 
Presidential elections.39 In forty-one rural electoral districts in Tatarstan
(all but two) the share of the vote for Zyuganov dropped sharply. In 
thirty-four districts by more than 15 per cent, and in several others 
30–50 per cent. Thus, for example in Zaynisk district in the first round
Zyuganov polled 68 per cent of the votes and in the second round only
18 per cent (Yeltsin polled 76 per cent).40 Such variations in voting can
only be explained with reference to the work of the local elites and their
ability to mobilise the population behind their choice of candidates.
A third source of evidence for guided elections is related to the level of
support given by citizens to candidates in republican presidential elec-
tions. Where a candidate receives a very high percentage of the vote, much
higher than the average, this is likely to suggest that the electorate has
been subjected to some form of extra-legal coercion or ‘persuasion’. This
applies even to uncontested elections (e.g., in Tatarstan, Kalmykiya and
Bashkortostan). Thus for example (in elections conducted over the period
1995–98), the President of Kabardino-Balkariya Republic, Valerii Kokov
received 99.35 per cent. In Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev received 97.14 of
the vote. Over 80 per cent was received by Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov
(88.49 per cent), the President of the Republic of Kalmykiya, Kirsan
Ilyumzhinov (85.09 per cent), head of the administration of Krasnodar
Krai, Nikolai Kondarenko (82 per cent), the governor of Vologda Oblast,
Pozgalev (80.69 per cent), and the governor of Saratov Oblast, Ayatskov
(80.19 per cent).
Finally, we can learn a great deal by studying the number of wasted
ballot papers. Thus, Mikhailov in his study of the March 2000 presi-
dential elections found unusually high percentages of wasted ballots in 
a number of TIKs. Thus, for instance, in Mamadyshskii TIK (Tatarstan)
11.19 per cent of all ballots were deemed wasted; in Chernozemel’skii TIK
(Kalmykiya), 8.26 per cent, Shemyrshinskii TIK (Chuvashiya), 6.87 per
cent, El’nikovskii TIK (Mordoviya), 5.01 per cent, Relyubskii TIK
(Saratov), 4.05 per cent, Bokovskii TIK (Rostov), 3.98 per cent, Maiskii TIK
(Kabardino-Balkariya), 3.35 per cent, Chaa-Khol’skii TIK (Tyva), 3.27 
per cent.41 Moreover, further study of these TIKs showed that turnout was
not particularly high. So another explanation is needed to explain why
there were so many wasted ballots in these particular districts. As
Mikhailov notes, the most likely explanation is that there was a deliber-
ate process of falsification in favour of the candidates supported by the
regional elites.
Taking into consideration factors such as extraordinary high turnout
levels, higher than average numbers of wasted ballots and extraordinary
levels of support for one candidate, Mikhailov argues that the most
serious infringement of electoral laws and the highest levels of falsifica-
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tion took place in the following regions: Bashkortostan, Dagestan,
Tatarstan, Saratov Oblast, Mordoviya, and Kabardino-Balkariya.42 And
the overall picture confirms that it is in the ethnic republics where such
infringements are most common. Thus, in a study of elections for regional
heads of administration (1995–97) the following twelve federal subjects
(all ethnic republics) were found to be the least democratic: Dagestan,
Kabardino-Balkariya, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan,
North Osetiya-Alaniya, Ingushetiya, Kalmykiya, Sakha, Mordoviya,
Adygeya and Altai.43
Furthermore, Stepan’s study of over a hundred gubernatorial and 
presidential elections conducted over the period June 1991–99, shows the
dominant power of incumbents, and particularly incumbent presidents.
As can be seen from table 9.1, the higher the status of the federal subject
the less competitive the elections. Thus, for example, ‘in 7 of the 34 repub-
lican elections (20.5 per cent) only one name appeared on the ballot’
whereas ‘in none of the 72 elections in the other two hierarchical cate-
gories did this occur’. Moreover, ‘the highest percentage of victories, by
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Table 9.1 Comparative prima facie evidence of electoral competitiveness and
non-competitiveness in elections for the chief executive in the eighty-nine
subjects of the Russian Federation, all elections held between June 1991 and
May 1999 (%)
Elections in
Elections non-titular
Elections in titular oblasts,
in titular autonomous krais and All
republics units federal cities elections
(N = 34) (N = 11) (N = 68) (N = 106)
Prima facie evidence 23.7 40 50.8 2.5
of competitiveness:
incumbents contested
and were defeated
Prima facie evidence of 20.5 0 0 6.2
non-competitiveness:
only one candidate
on the ballot
Victory by incumbent by 20.5 0 4.1 8.5
more than 85% of valid
vote
Source: A. Stepan, ‘Federalism and democracy: beyond the U.S. model’, Journal of Democ-
racy, 10:4 (October 4, 1999), 153.
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more than 85 per cent, [were] also found overwhelmingly in the
republics’.44
The development of authoritarianism in the regions
As O’Donnell notes, in democracies accountability runs not only 
vertically, making elected officials answerable to the ballot box, but also
horizontally, across a network of relatively autonomous powers that can
call into question, and eventually punish, improper ways of discharging
the responsibilities of a given official.45
The inability or the unwillingness of the Russian Constitutional Court,
the central electoral commission and other federal law enforcement agen-
cies, to step in and declare such elections null and void, has fundamen-
tally undermined the Constitution and set back the development of a legal
culture in Russia. The politicisation of the judiciary, electoral commissions
and the courts, is a particularly worrying development. The law of 30 
September 1997, ‘On the Basic Gurantees of Electors to Participate in 
Elections and Referendums’ which reiterated the dominance of federal
electoral laws over regional ones, has so far failed to bring uniformity to
electoral rules and practices. As Dmitri Oreshkin noted with regard to the
latest round of gubernatorial elections conducted over the period 2000–01,
‘elections in Russia have not become an institution for the electors to
control the governors, [rather] it is the governors who control the elec-
tors’.46 The unwritten message from the Yeltsin and Putin administrations
to the Russian Central Electoral Commission, has been, to turn a blind eye
if those infringing electoral laws are their supporters.
Politics in Russia’s regions is epitomised by the domination of infor-
mal over formal rules. The ‘politics of uncertainty’47 still dominates the
political landscape of most regions. Regional elites are not fully com-
mitted to the democratic ‘rules of the game’, and in many of the ethnic
republics, in particular, they have ‘crafted’ authoritarian regimes rather
than consolidated democracies.
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Conclusions
Article 1 of the Russian Constitution states that the Russian Federation ‘is
a democratic federative rule of law state with a republican form of gov-
ernment’. However, as this study has shown, whilst many of the struc-
tural prerequisites of a federal state have undoubtedly been formed, a
federal and democratic culture has still to emerge. Thus, as Kempton
notes, ‘although Russia inherited a federal structure, it did not inherit a
federal tradition’.1 Centre–periphery relations in Russia have been deter-
mined principally by political and economic factors rather than constitu-
tional norms.
The difficulties of creating a democratic federation in Russia have
undoubtedly been made much more problematic by the nature of its
origins as a quasi-federation within the USSR. One of the most destruc-
tive legacies which Russia inherited from the Soviet Union was its ethno-
territorial form of federalism. The ‘dual nature’ of Russian federalism,
which grants different constitutional rights and powers to different sub-
jects of the federation, has from the outset created major tensions and divi-
sions between federal subjects. Indeed, the demands for legal separatism
and the development of bilateralism can be seen as logical responses to
the constitutional inequalities inherent in the system.
The foundations of Russia’s constitutional order
The manner by which Russia’s constitutional foundations were laid down
have also had a major impact on its transition. As we have seen the foun-
dations of Russia’s constitutional order were born out of conflict and coer-
cion rather than dialogue and consensus. And the Constitution was
largely imposed from above on a weak society, which was still suffering
from the after-shocks of Yeltsin’s violent assault and dissolution of the
Russian parliament.
Moreover, Yeltsin’s victory over the parliament was a pyrrhic victory.
For although a ‘presidential Constitution’ was officially ratified in 
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December 1993, the Constitution was fundamentally weakened by ques-
tions over its legitimacy. As we discussed in chapter 1, one of the central
preconditions for a democratic federation is the voluntary membership of
its subjects. But in December 1993, forty-two subjects out of eighty-nine
failed to ratify the Constitution. And many of those ethnic republics which
had rejected the Constitution soon went a step further, and declared that
their own constitutions were to take precedence over the Russian one.
Chechnya demanded outright secession and Tatarstan declared that it was
only an ‘associate member’ of the federation. Others republics, such as
Bashkortostan, Kalmykiya, Sakha and Tyva were able to forge confederal
relations with the centre.
Since December 1993, federal relations in Russia have largely been
determined by a ‘war of laws’. There was no ‘elite pact’ or ‘elite settle-
ment’ in Russia. Nor was there a post-revolutionary ‘circulation of elites’
as happened in many of the states of Eastern Europe in 1989. Russia’s 
‘revolution’ was both a ‘revolution from within’ and ‘from above’,
whereby members of the Russian ‘nomenklatura’ largely took over the
reigns of power from members of the Soviet nomenklatura. And elite con-
tinuity rather than elite circulation was even more the norm in Russia’s
twenty-one ethnic republics. Former Communist leaders here were able
to swap their ‘Communist spots’ for nationalist ones.
Over the period 1991–93 there was a fierce struggle for power between
the Russian parliament and President, which soon gravitated, downwards
to the republics and regions. And in 1992 Yeltsin was forced to concede
major powers to the federal subjects in the Federal Treaty. Yeltsin needed
the support of the regions in his struggle with the Russian parliament. 
In the period between the signing of the Federal Treaty in March 1992 and
the adoption of the Russian Constitution in December 1993 the republics
were able to make the most of the political impasse in Moscow. Thus, the
constitutional foundations, that were to determine the future direction of
these republics for many years to come, were laid down during a time of
great turmoil and uncertainty, and before the Russian Constitution was
formally adopted. During this period of weak and divided central
powers, the republics were able to carve out for themselves ever-greater
amounts of national autonomy.
Problems over the legitimacy of the federal Constitution weakened the
authority of the federal government and the status of federal laws in the
federal subjects. And, as we discussed in chapter 3, Yeltsin further under-
mined the authority of the Constitution by signing forty-six bilateral
treaties with the regions. Before long there was a ‘war of laws’ between
federal and republican constitutions. Indeed, federal relations have been
regulated by five competing and contradictory sources of law: (1) the
federal Constitution, (2) the Federal Treaty, (3) federal laws, (4) bilateral
treaties, and, (5) the constitutions and charters of the republics and
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regions.2 Thus, unity and diversity both exist in Russia but in contradic-
tion rather than harmony. Indeed, there would appear to be as many kinds
of federal relations as there are subjects of the federation.
From ethnic to legal and economic secessionism
Fearing that demands for secession would spread from Chechnya to other
parts of the federation, Yeltsin tolerated a high degree of regional 
autonomy in the ethnic republics. By backing moderate nationalist leaders
and promoting bilateral treaties with the most troublesome regions,
Yeltsin was able to marginalise the more radical nationalists and bring the
‘parade of sovereignties’ to an end.
However, as we discussed in chapter 4, the dangers of ethnic sepa-
ratism spreading across the federation were never, in fact, very high. In
only 7 of Russia’s 21 republics does the indigenous population make up
a majority. And of the 11 autonomous there are only 2 where the indige-
nous population predominates. Furthermore, in those 7 subjects where
the indigenous population comprises a majority, 1 is landlocked and the
remaining 6 are dependent on the centre for their economic survival.
It is the development of legal separatism, not ethnic secession, which
has proved to be the greater threat. Over the period 1996–97 Yeltsin lost
his control over the appointment of regional governors and his ability to
control the federation Council was therefore also substantially weakened.
And by 1997–98 many of Russia’s governors and presidents had success-
fully carved out personal fiefdoms. Legal separatism was soon a de facto
reality for many regions. Thus, as we noted in chapter 8, by 2001 just
under a quarter of all legal acts adopted by the regions and republics con-
tradicted the federal Constitution and federal laws. Regional governors
and republican presidents were also able to capture control over the
appointment of the heads of federal bureaucracies situated in their 
territories.
President Putin came to power with a mandate to win back power from
the governors and to create a unified legal space across the federation.
However, Putin’s success has been only partial. In many regions and
republics the number of laws which violate the Constitution have actu-
ally risen. As we noted in chapter 8, in December 2001, 72 per cent of
Bashkortostan’s laws still violated federal norms, a figure which was actu-
ally higher than it was in May 2000 at the beginning of Putin’s reforms.
Moreover, new constitutions adopted in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan still
include the full texts of their bilateral treaties, many of whose provisions
violate the Russian Constitution. And in defiance of a Constitutional court
ruling, Bashkortostan, Sakha, Tatarstan and Tyva have all steadfastly
refused to renounce their sovereignty claims.
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Federalism and democratisation in Russia
As we discussed in chapter 1, scholars of federalism have stressed the 
positive relationship between federalism and democratisation. Thus, for
example, Daniels argues that, ‘by distributing power, federalism curbs
arbitrary rule, both at the centre and locally. It decentralizes responsibil-
ity while providing a mechanism to restrain potential local conflicts and
abuses. It provides a school of democracy, and it quite literally brings
government closer to the people’.3 Similarly, for Elazar, ‘Federalism by its
very nature must be republican in the original sense of res publica – a
public thing; a federal polity must belong to its public and not be the
private possession of any person or segment of that public, and its 
governance therefore requires public participation’.4
And for Elazar, public participation is the key factor which distin-
guishes federalism from feudalism. Feudalism entails, ‘a series of con-
tracts among fiefdoms, in which authority is arranged hierarchically and
power is usually organised oligarchically’. On the other hand, ‘true
federal arrangements must rest upon a popular base’.5 For King, as we
have seen, federation and democracy are synonymous, and for true 
federalism to function relations between the centre and regions must be
grounded in constitutional law and democratic representation. For, King,
only liberal democracies can be truly federal.6
Such theories are fine for liberal democracies, but what of transitional
regimes such as Russia where federalism and democracy need to be con-
structed and consolidated simultaneously, and where constitutionalism
and the rule of law are, as yet, only weakly developed in Russian society.
The Russian federation’s unique blend of constitutional, socio-economic,
and political asymmetry, far from promoting democracy, has bolstered
authoritarian regimes in the regions. High levels of regional autonomy
have led the regions more often in the direction of dictatorship than
democracy. The constitutions of the republics and the charters of the
regions have been forged out of fire and the struggle for power between
regional executive and legislative bodies of power. Whoever wins the
struggle imposes their form of political system. Thus, we would appear
to be in a conundrum, for federalism, it is argued, is impossible without
democracy, but in Russia’s multi-national state, democracy is impossible
without federalism.
As the Russian proverb states ‘the fish rots from the head down’. In a
bid to bring in regional votes and to ensure tax returns and ethnic
quiescence, Yeltsin often turned a blind eye to the development of authori-
tarian regimes in the regions. Likewise, Putin’s reforms of the federal
system have made a mockery of both federalism and democracy. The
constitutional powers of the regions have been usurped by seven
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unelected presidential representatives. And Putin’s powers to dismiss
popularly elected governors and assemblies is a highly retrograde step.
Moreover, Putin’s attack on the sovereignty claims of the ethnic republics
may weaken the powers of moderate leaders in the republics and give
greater degrees of popular support to more radical nationalists and
separatist movements.
The development of such high levels of constitutional and political
asymmetry in Russia has weakened the federal government’s ability to
protect and promote democracy across the federation. Paradoxically, it is
in those subjects of the federation which have been granted the most
autonomy, the ethnic republics, where we find the highest levels of
authoritarianism. Presidential leaders in the ethnic republics have been
able to use their considerable levels of political autonomy to carve out
authoritarian regime. Thus, as Whitmore notes: ‘Many of Russia’s 89
regional executives have indeed become brazenly authoritarian, flaunting
the law, ignoring the country’s constitution, and routinely violating
human rights and democratic norms. Regional leaders have fixed elec-
tions, emasculated parliaments, bribed the courts, strong-armed the
media, and bullied opposition figures’.7
Such practices have enabled regional leaders to pack regional assem-
blies with their loyal supporters. And in many of the ethnic republics,
assemblies are nothing more than an appendage of executive power. And
by controlling the parliaments regional leaders have been able to control
other key bodies such as the police, courts and electoral commission all
of which are highly politicised.
There can be no consolidation of democracy in Russia without a nation-
wide consolidation of parties and the party system. The chronic weakness
of political parties in regional assemblies has intensified the clientalistic
and corporatist nature of politics in Russia and it has allowed regional
governors to virtually rule alone without any effective opposition. And in
the absence of parties and party competition regional assemblies have
been swamped by economic and administrative elites.
Moreover, Putin’s reform of the party system is yet a further blow to
the development of local-level democracy. Regional parties will no longer
be able to operate from 2003. The President’s ‘party of power’ (Unity) will
undoubtedly be one of the few beneficiaries of the new law on parties.
And the centralisation of the party system will undoubtedly bolster
Putin’s quest to centralise power in the state and restore the ‘power ver-
tical’. Finally, as we have stressed in chapter 6, it is very difficult to con-
solidate parties in weak and fragmented federal systems, but it is doubly
difficult to build federal systems in the absence of strong and territorially
comprehensive parties.
Local democracy is also surely a necessary prerequisite for democrati-
sation at the national level. And the provision of certain basic democratic
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procedures should, in a democracy, be universally available to all citizens
across the federation regardless of their place of residence. But, in Russia
this has been far from the case, and there are wide regional variations in
the development of civil society, electoral practices and adherence to con-
stitutional norms and the exercise of human rights. Regional and repub-
lican parliaments have blatantly adopted legislation violating human
rights and they have openly carried out policies which discriminate
against the rights of ethnic minorities.
Whilst we have not conducted a systematic study of politics in all
eighty-nine subjects of the federation it is clear from this study that,
according to the definitions given by Dahl, O’Donnell and Beetham, (see
chapter 1), very few, if any, of Russia’s regions, and none of its ethnic
republics qualify as democracies. Authoritarian regimes dominate
Russia’s regional landscape.
For Montesquieu, large states must choose between tyranny and 
federalism. But as Petrov stresses, ‘True to its habit of choosing both evils,
Russia has taken the path of building a “federation of tyrannies” ’.8 In a
vicious circle, authoritarianism at the centre has been nourished by
authoritarianism in the regions and vice versa. To conclude, Yeltsin and
Putin, unlike Gorbachev, may have succeeded in maintaining the unity of
the state, but only by sacrificing Russia’s democratic transition.
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